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From: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
To: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org, chao.gao@intel.com,
	rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, john.allen@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 17/26] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved
Date: Thu, 30 Nov 2023 19:40:09 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <fe7d8df5b6774a83c38b8a6dc244782c943c84b7.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231124055330.138870-18-weijiang.yang@intel.com>

On Fri, 2023-11-24 at 00:53 -0500, Yang Weijiang wrote:
> Add CET MSRs to the list of MSRs reported to userspace if the feature,
> i.e. IBT or SHSTK, associated with the MSRs is supported by KVM.
> 
> SSP can only be read via RDSSP. Writing even requires destructive and
> potentially faulting operations such as SAVEPREVSSP/RSTORSSP or
> SETSSBSY/CLRSSBSY. Let the host use a pseudo-MSR that is just a wrapper
> for the GUEST_SSP field of the VMCS.
> 
> Suggested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h |  1 +
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c               |  2 ++
>  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                   | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h
> index 6e64b27b2c1e..9864bbcf2470 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h
> @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
>  #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT	0x4b564d06
>  #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK	0x4b564d07
>  #define MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL	0x4b564d08
> +#define MSR_KVM_SSP	0x4b564d09
>  
>  struct kvm_steal_time {
>  	__u64 steal;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index be20a60047b1..d3d0d74fef70 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -7009,6 +7009,8 @@ static bool vmx_has_emulated_msr(struct kvm *kvm, u32 index)
>  	case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
>  		/* This is AMD only.  */
>  		return false;
> +	case MSR_KVM_SSP:
> +		return kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
>  	default:
>  		return true;
>  	}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 44b8cf459dfc..74d2d00a1681 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -1476,6 +1476,9 @@ static const u32 msrs_to_save_base[] = {
>  
>  	MSR_IA32_XFD, MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR,
>  	MSR_IA32_XSS,
> +	MSR_IA32_U_CET, MSR_IA32_S_CET,
> +	MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP,
> +	MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB,
>  };
>  
>  static const u32 msrs_to_save_pmu[] = {
> @@ -1576,6 +1579,7 @@ static const u32 emulated_msrs_all[] = {
>  
>  	MSR_K7_HWCR,
>  	MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL,
> +	MSR_KVM_SSP,
>  };
>  
>  static u32 emulated_msrs[ARRAY_SIZE(emulated_msrs_all)];
> @@ -7371,6 +7375,20 @@ static void kvm_probe_msr_to_save(u32 msr_index)
>  		if (!kvm_caps.supported_xss)
>  			return;
>  		break;
> +	case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
> +	case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
> +		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
> +		    !kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
> +			return;
> +		break;
> +	case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
> +		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_LM))
> +			return;
> +		fallthrough;
> +	case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
> +		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> +			return;
> +		break;
>  	default:
>  		break;
>  	}

I still think that pseudo MSR is a hack that might backfire,
but I am not going to argue much about this.

Best regards,
	Maxim Levitsky



  reply	other threads:[~2023-11-30 18:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 104+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-24  5:53 [PATCH v7 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 01/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Always preserve non-user xfeatures/flags in __state_perm Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:24   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 02/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Refine CET user xstate bit enabling Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24  9:40   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-27  2:55     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-28  1:31     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-28  8:50       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-28  1:31   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-28  7:52     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:26   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01  6:51     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05  9:53       ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-06  1:03         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-06 15:57           ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-08 14:57             ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-08 15:15               ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-13  9:30                 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-13 13:31                   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-13 17:01                   ` Chang S. Bae
2023-12-14  3:12                     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Add CET supervisor mode state support Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24  9:45   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-27  4:06     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-28  1:34   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-30 17:27   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01  7:01     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05  9:53       ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 04/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XFEATURE_MASK_KERNEL_DYNAMIC xfeature set Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28  1:46   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-28  8:00     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:33   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01  7:49     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05  9:55       ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-06  3:00         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-06 16:11           ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-08 15:57             ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce fpu_guest_cfg for guest FPU configuration Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 14:58   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-29 14:12     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-29 17:08       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-30 13:28         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:29     ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-30 18:02       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-30 17:29   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 06/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Create guest fpstate with guest specific config Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 15:19   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-29 14:16     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:36   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01  8:36     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05  9:57       ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 07/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Warn if kernel dynamic xfeatures detected in normal fpstate Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 15:25   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-29 14:18     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 08/26] KVM: x86: Rework cpuid_get_supported_xcr0() to operate on vCPU data Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 09/26] KVM: x86: Rename kvm_{g,s}et_msr() to menifest emulation operations Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:36   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 10/26] KVM: x86: Refine xsave-managed guest register/MSR reset handling Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:36   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 11/26] KVM: x86: Add kvm_msr_{read,write}() helpers Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:37   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 12/26] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 13/26] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:37   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 14/26] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 15/26] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:38   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 16/26] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 17/26] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:40   ` Maxim Levitsky [this message]
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 18/26] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 19/26] KVM: x86: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "SHSTK/IBT enabled" Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:40   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 20/26] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:41   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 21/26] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:42   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01  2:23     ` Chao Gao
2023-12-04  0:45       ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:02         ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01  8:55     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 22/26] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:44   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01  6:33     ` Chao Gao
2023-12-05 10:04       ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01  9:45     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:07       ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 23/26] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 24/26] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:46   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 16:15     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:07       ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 25/26] KVM: nVMX: Introduce new VMX_BASIC bit for event error_code delivery to L1 Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24  5:53 ` [PATCH v7 26/26] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested guest Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:53   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-04  8:50     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:12       ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-06  9:22         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-06 17:24           ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-08 15:15             ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-08 15:22               ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-12  8:56                 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-12 11:09                   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-15  2:29 ` [PATCH v7 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Yang, Weijiang

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