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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>,
	Yian Chen <yian.chen@intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>, Paul Lai <paul.c.lai@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/7] x86/cpu: Enumerate LASS CPUID and CR4 bits
Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 16:13:18 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <feab0dd1-2030-e31c-cbbf-9857c46d0c1c@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <9d935618-8f84-2d6e-4f4c-9d38eec2ba67@intel.com>

On 1/10/23 12:14, Sohil Mehta wrote:
> On 1/9/2023 9:51 PM, Yian Chen wrote:
>> LASS (Linear Address Space Separation) is a CPU feature to
>> prevent speculative address access in user/kernel mode.
> 
> Would it be better to say?
> 
> LASS (Linear Address Space Separation) is a security feature that
> intends to prevent unintentional speculative address access across
> user/kernel mode.

It's more than that, though.  The spec actually says this pretty nicely:

> Linear-address space separation (LASS) is an independent mechanism
> that enforces the same mode-based protections as paging but without
> traversing the paging structures. Because the protections enforced by
> LASS are applied before paging, “probes” by malicious software will
> provide no paging-based timing information

So, it's not _just_ that it can prevent some speculative accesses.  It
completely short-circuits paging itself and *ALL* of the baggage that
goes along with paging.

The TLB, mid-level caches, the page walker itself, the data cache
impact...  all of it.  Gone.

*THAT* is the important part here, IMNHO.

  reply	other threads:[~2023-01-11  0:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-01-10  5:51 [PATCH 0/7] Enable LASS (Linear Address space Separation) Yian Chen
2023-01-10  5:51 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86/cpu: Enumerate LASS CPUID and CR4 bits Yian Chen
2023-01-10 20:14   ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-11  0:13     ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2023-01-11 23:23       ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-12  0:06         ` Luck, Tony
2023-01-12  0:15           ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-11 19:21     ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-10  5:51 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86: Add CONFIG option X86_LASS Yian Chen
2023-01-10 21:05   ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-12  0:13     ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-10  5:52 ` [PATCH 3/7] x86/cpu: Disable kernel LASS when patching kernel alternatives Yian Chen
2023-01-10 21:04   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-01-11  1:01     ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-11  9:10       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-01-10 22:41   ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-12  0:27     ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-12  0:37       ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-12 18:36         ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-12 18:48           ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-01  2:25             ` Sohil Mehta
2023-02-01 18:20               ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-01  2:10         ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-10  5:52 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86/vsyscall: Setup vsyscall to compromise LASS protection Yian Chen
2023-01-11  0:34   ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-12  1:43     ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-12  2:49       ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-21  4:09   ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-01-10  5:52 ` [PATCH 5/7] x86/cpu: Enable LASS (Linear Address Space Separation) Yian Chen
2023-01-11 22:22   ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-12 17:56     ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-12 18:17   ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-13  1:17     ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-13 19:39       ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-10  5:52 ` [PATCH 6/7] x86/cpu: Set LASS as pinning sensitive CR4 bit Yian Chen
2023-01-10  5:52 ` [PATCH 7/7] x86/kvm: Expose LASS feature to VM guest Yian Chen
2023-02-07  3:21   ` Wang, Lei
2023-02-09 17:18     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-10 19:48 ` [PATCH 0/7] Enable LASS (Linear Address space Separation) Sohil Mehta
2023-01-10 22:57 ` Dave Hansen

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