From: Yonghong Song <yhs@meta.com>
To: Yi He <clangllvm@126.com>
Cc: andrii@kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
daniel@iogearbox.net, haoluo@google.com,
john.fastabend@gmail.com, jolsa@kernel.org, kpsingh@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
martin.lau@linux.dev, mhiramat@kernel.org, rostedt@goodmis.org,
sdf@google.com, song@kernel.org, yhs@fb.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2] bpf: security enhancement by limiting the offensive eBPF helpers
Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2023 21:25:21 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <fff62f98-dd2b-21d1-2a3f-f63122b2c2cf@meta.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230118005432.634229-1-clangllvm@126.com>
On 1/17/23 4:54 PM, Yi He wrote:
> The bpf_send_singal, bpf_send_singal_thread and bpf_override_return
> is similar to bpf_write_user and can affect userspace processes.
> Thus, these three helpers should also be restricted by security lockdown.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yi He <clangllvm@126.com>
> ---
> V1 -> V2: add security lockdown to bpf_send_singal_thread and remove
> the unused LOCKDOWN_OFFENSIVE_BPF_MAX.
>
> include/linux/security.h | 2 ++
> kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 9 ++++++---
> 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 5b67f208f..42420e620 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
> LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS,
> LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR,
> LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER,
> + LOCKDOWN_BPF_SEND_SIGNAL,
> + LOCKDOWN_BPF_OVERRIDE_RETURN,
> LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL,
> LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION,
> LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
Also, do you need to add an entry in lockdown_reasons in
security/security.c?
Also add linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org so security experts can
chime in as well.
> diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
> index 3bbd3f0c8..fdb94868d 100644
> --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
> +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
> @@ -1463,9 +1463,11 @@ bpf_tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog)
> return &bpf_cgrp_storage_delete_proto;
> #endif
> case BPF_FUNC_send_signal:
> - return &bpf_send_signal_proto;
> + return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_SEND_SIGNAL) < 0 ?
> + NULL : &bpf_send_signal_proto;
> case BPF_FUNC_send_signal_thread:
> - return &bpf_send_signal_thread_proto;
> + return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_SEND_SIGNAL) < 0 ?
> + NULL : &bpf_send_signal_thread_proto;
> case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value:
> return &bpf_perf_event_read_value_proto;
> case BPF_FUNC_get_ns_current_pid_tgid:
> @@ -1531,7 +1533,8 @@ kprobe_prog_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog)
> return &bpf_get_stack_proto;
> #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_KPROBE_OVERRIDE
> case BPF_FUNC_override_return:
> - return &bpf_override_return_proto;
> + return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_OVERRIDE_RETURN) < 0 ?
> + NULL : &bpf_override_return_proto;
> #endif
> case BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip:
> return prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_KPROBE_MULTI ?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-18 5:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-17 15:12 [PATCH] bpf: security enhancement by limiting the offensive eBPF helpers WritePaper
2023-01-17 16:16 ` Greg KH
2023-01-17 17:24 ` Yonghong Song
2023-01-18 0:54 ` [PATCH V2] " Yi He
2023-01-18 5:25 ` Yonghong Song [this message]
2023-01-18 9:49 ` Daniel Borkmann
2023-01-18 11:18 ` Yi He
2023-01-18 15:36 ` Djalal Harouni
2023-01-19 4:22 ` Yi He
2023-01-20 0:26 ` KP Singh
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