From: daw@cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner)
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch 1/2] [RFC] Simple tamper-proof device filesystem.
Date: Mon, 17 Dec 2007 01:19:30 +0000 (UTC) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <fk4ir2$g11$1@taverner.cs.berkeley.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 200712162103.IEC69233.FFOFOOtJMQHSLV@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Tetsuo Handa writes:
>When I attended at Security Stadium 2003 as a defense side,
>I was using devfs for /dev directory. The files in /dev directory
>were deleted by attckers and the administrator was unable to login.
If the attacker gets full administrator-level access on your machine,
there are a gazillion ways the attacker can prevent other admins from
logging on. This patch can't prevent that. It sounds like this patch
is trying to solve a fundamentally unsolveable problem.
A useful slogan: "Don't forbid what you cannot prevent."
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2007-12-17 2:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20071216080441.435456586@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
[not found] ` <20071216080628.061470932@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
2007-12-16 10:44 ` [patch 0/2] [RFC] Simple tamper-proof device filesystem Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-16 10:56 ` [patch 1/2] " Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-06 15:29 ` Pavel Machek
2007-12-18 15:55 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2007-12-18 16:43 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-12-16 11:21 ` David Newall
2007-12-16 11:26 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-16 11:31 ` David Newall
2007-12-16 11:36 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-16 11:58 ` David Newall
2007-12-16 12:03 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-16 12:14 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-17 6:00 ` David Newall
2007-12-18 15:33 ` Radoslaw Szkodzinski
2007-12-16 16:52 ` Indan Zupancic
2007-12-16 19:48 ` Al Viro
2007-12-17 0:40 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-17 11:44 ` Indan Zupancic
2007-12-17 12:59 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-17 13:05 ` Al Boldi
2007-12-17 13:16 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-18 15:22 ` Radoslaw Szkodzinski
2007-12-19 12:11 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-19 19:14 ` Radoslaw Szkodzinski
2007-12-17 13:32 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-17 6:42 ` penguin-kernel
2007-12-17 8:38 ` David Wagner
2007-12-17 1:19 ` David Wagner [this message]
2007-12-17 19:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-12-18 0:03 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-18 0:39 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-12-18 1:39 ` Oren Laadan
2007-12-18 2:09 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-12-18 3:04 ` Oren Laadan
2007-12-19 9:43 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2007-12-19 14:10 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-12-20 0:07 ` Oren Laadan
2007-12-20 7:42 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2007-12-20 14:09 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-12-21 1:47 ` Oren Laadan
2007-12-19 14:13 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-12-18 1:55 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-12-18 2:26 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-18 2:53 ` serge
2007-12-18 3:40 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-19 23:43 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-12-24 13:09 ` Tetsuo Handa
2007-12-16 11:03 ` [patch 2/2] " Tetsuo Handa
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