[PATCH 3.16 051/254] netfilter: xt_bpf: add overflow checks

Ben Hutchings
2018-02-28T16:14:14Z

From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

commit 6ab405114b0b229151ef06f4e31c7834dd09d0c0 upstream.

Check whether inputs from userspace are too long (explicit length field too
big or string not null-terminated) to avoid out-of-bounds reads.

As far as I can tell, this can at worst lead to very limited kernel heap
memory disclosure or oopses.

This bug can be triggered by an unprivileged user even if the xt_bpf module
is not loaded: iptables is available in network namespaces, and the xt_bpf
module can be autoloaded.

Triggering the bug with a classic BPF filter with fake length 0x1000 causes
the following KASAN report:

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_create+0x84/0xf0
Read of size 32768 at addr ffff8801eff2c494 by task test/4627

CPU: 0 PID: 4627 Comm: test Not tainted 4.15.0-rc1+ #1
[...]
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x5c/0x85
print_address_description+0x6a/0x260
kasan_report+0x254/0x370
? bpf_prog_create+0x84/0xf0
memcpy+0x1f/0x50
bpf_prog_create+0x84/0xf0
bpf_mt_check+0x90/0xd6 [xt_bpf]
[...]
Allocated by task 4627:
kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
__kmalloc_node+0x47/0x60
xt_alloc_table_info+0x41/0x70 [x_tables]
[...]
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801eff2c3c0
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2048 of size 2048
The buggy address is located 212 bytes inside of
2048-byte region [ffff8801eff2c3c0, ffff8801eff2cbc0)
[...]
==================================================================

Fixes: e6f30c731718 ("netfilter: x_tables: add xt_bpf match")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Add len variable in bpf_mt_check()
- Drop change in __bpf_mt_check_path()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_bpf.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_bpf.c
@@ -24,8 +24,12 @@ static int bpf_mt_check(const struct xt_
{
struct xt_bpf_info *info = par->matchinfo;
struct sock_fprog_kern program;
+ u16 len = info->bpf_program_num_elem;

- program.len = info->bpf_program_num_elem;
+ if (len > XT_BPF_MAX_NUM_INSTR)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ program.len = len;
program.filter = info->bpf_program;

if (sk_unattached_filter_create(&info->filter, &program)) {