public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	john.johansen@canonical.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/23] Removal of binary sysctl support
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2009 09:49:28 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <m1ocmy4d7b.fsf@fess.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <200911192333.EHB57391.FSQOHOJtMFFLVO@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> (Tetsuo Handa's message of "Thu\, 19 Nov 2009 23\:33\:59 +0900")

Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> writes:

> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
>
> But please wait a bit. We need to solve the twist below.

Agreed.

> Indeed. TOMOYO and AppArmor need a hint for prepending "/proc" prefix.
> A simple implementation which adds one bit to task_struct is shown below.
> In this way, not only the file permission checks inside dentry_open()
> but also the directory permission checks inside vfs_path_lookup() can be
> prepended "/proc" prefix. AppArmor might want to prepend "/proc" inside
> vfs_path_lookup().

There don't appear to be any security hooks in vfs_path_lookup().
>
> Regards.
> ----------------------------------------
> [PATCH 1/2] sysctl: Add in_sysctl flag to task_struct.
>
> Pathname based access control prepends "/proc" prefix to the pathname obtained
> by traversing ctl_table tree when binary sysctl is requested.
>
> Now, binary sysctl code was rewritten to use internal vfs mount of /proc but
> currently there is no hint which can give pathname based access control a
> chance to prepend "/proc" prefix.

Actually there is.

> [PATCH 1/2] TOMOYO: prepend /proc prefix for binary sysctl.
>
> The pathname obtained by binary_sysctl() starts with "/sys".
> This patch prepends "/proc" prefix if the pathname was obtained inside
> binary_sysctl() so that TOMOYO checks a pathname which starts with "/proc/sys".
>
> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
> ---
>  security/tomoyo/realpath.c |    8 ++++++++
>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
>
> --- sysctl-2.6.orig/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
> +++ sysctl-2.6/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
> @@ -108,6 +108,14 @@ int tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(struct pa
>  		spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
>  		path_put(&root);
>  		path_put(&ns_root);
> +		/* Prepend "/proc" prefix if binary_sysctl(). */
> +		if (!IS_ERR(sp) && current->in_sysctl) {
> +			sp -= 5;
> +			if (sp >= newname)
> +				memcpy(sp, "/proc", 5);
> +			else
> +				sp = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> +		}
>  	}
>  	if (IS_ERR(sp))
>  		error = PTR_ERR(sp);

Instead of current->in_sysctl we can just look at the path and see if
it is the root of the mount chain and if the fs is proc.

Something like:

diff --git a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
index 5f2e332..0b55faa 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
@@ -108,6 +108,15 @@ int tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(struct path *path, char *newname,
 		spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
 		path_put(&root);
 		path_put(&ns_root);
+		/* Prepend "/proc" prefix if using internal proc vfs mount. */
+		if (!IS_ERR(sp) && (path->mnt->mnt_parent == path->mnt) &&
+		    (strcmp(path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)) {
+			sp -= 5;
+			if (sp >= newname)
+				memcpy(sp, "/proc", 5);
+			else
+				sp = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+		}
 	}
 	if (IS_ERR(sp))
 		error = PTR_ERR(sp);

Eric

  reply	other threads:[~2009-11-19 17:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-11-08 12:20 [PATCH 00/23] Removal of binary sysctl support Eric W. Biederman
2009-11-08 13:15 ` Tetsuo Handa
2009-11-08 23:39   ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-11-09  0:12     ` Tetsuo Handa
2009-11-09  0:35       ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-11-18 18:44       ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-11-18 22:04         ` Tetsuo Handa
2009-11-18 22:45           ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-11-19 14:33             ` Tetsuo Handa
2009-11-19 17:49               ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2009-11-19 22:17                 ` Tetsuo Handa
2009-11-19 22:22                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-11-19 22:35                     ` John Johansen
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2009-11-08 12:16 Eric W. Biederman
2009-11-08 13:06 ` Arnd Bergmann
2009-11-09  3:44   ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-11-08 12:15 Eric W. Biederman

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=m1ocmy4d7b.fsf@fess.ebiederm.org \
    --to=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=john.johansen@canonical.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox