From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: pavel@ucw.cz, alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk,
dhowells@redhat.com, hch@infradead.org, adilger@sun.com,
mtk.manpages@gmail.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
drepper@gmail.com, jamie@shareable.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 resend] vfs: new O_NODE open flag
Date: Sat, 07 Nov 2009 03:48:43 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <m1y6mipnc4.fsf@fess.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <E1N6jWB-0006gu-2u@pomaz-ex.szeredi.hu> (Miklos Szeredi's message of "Sat\, 07 Nov 2009 12\:31\:43 +0100")
Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> writes:
> On Sat, 07 Nov 2009, ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> writes:
>>
>> > On Fri, 06 Nov 2009, ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> >> So far no one who believes this to be a security hole has found it
>> >> worth their while to look at nd->intent.open in proc_pid_follow_link
>> >> and write a patch.
>> >
>> > A rather disgusting patch that would be. The fact is, checking
>> > permissions on follow_link makes little to no sense. Consider
>> > truncate(2), for example. Will we add another intent for that? I
>> > really hope not
>>
>> No. I was just thinking we have the open intent that is there for
>> combining lookup and open. We can look test for LOOKUP_OPEN and do
>> exactly what we need.
>
> No, because you just covered half the cases. truncate(2) will still
> work fine on the /proc/PID/fd/FD belonging to a O_RDONLY file
> descriptor.
Good point as truncate is as bad as opening read-write. Shrug.
>> > I'm more and more convinced, that the current behavior is the right
>> > one.
>>
>> I think the 15 or so years we have had the current behavior without
>> problems is persuasive.
>>
>> I think it is an interesting puzzle on how to get dup instead of
>> reopen as there are cases where that could be useful behavior as well.
>
> Probably doable with ptrace().
>
>> The usefulness of an O_NONE flag increases significantly if you can
>> open the reference file later with more permissions. Essentially
>> making a hardlink into a running program. Hmm. Weird cases do seem
>> to show up when the last dir entry is removed.
>
> Why are they more weird than files opened without O_NODE?
Because as I recall O_NODE skips all permission checks. Which would
mean you can limit who holds a reference to your inode without O_NODE.
> The only really weird case Alan spotted is device nodes, where the
> actual device registered to a major/minor pair changes over time,
> possibly allowing a re-open to access a device it otherwise was not
> meant to. BTW if the device number reuse happens really quickly, this
> could even be a race for a plain open. Real solution might actually
> be in udev: when deregistering a device, change mode bits to all-zero
> before removing the device node.
Devices nodes specifically were the case I was thinking of.
Changing the mode bits to all-zero at the final unlink would be a lot
more reliable and certain in the kernel.
>> I wonder if we want a rule that you can't open a file with link count
>> of 0. Reasoning may get truly strange otherwise.
>
> Again, don't see why this would be different for O_NODE as for
> non-O_NODE files descriptors.
Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-11-07 11:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-11-05 11:23 [PATCH v2 resend] vfs: new O_NODE open flag Miklos Szeredi
2009-11-05 13:15 ` Alan Cox
2009-11-05 14:27 ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-11-05 14:50 ` Alan Cox
2009-11-05 15:24 ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-11-05 15:56 ` Alan Cox
2009-11-05 16:52 ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-11-05 18:25 ` Alan Cox
2009-11-06 11:10 ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-11-06 1:40 ` Jamie Lokier
2009-11-06 11:31 ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-11-06 14:17 ` Pavel Machek
2009-11-06 20:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-11-07 7:49 ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-11-07 11:09 ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-11-07 11:31 ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-11-07 11:48 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2009-11-08 17:01 ` Pavel Machek
2009-11-16 11:50 ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-11-07 17:58 ` Pavel Machek
2009-11-09 8:58 ` Pavel Machek
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