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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>,
	containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 4/5] user namespaces: allow killing tasks in your own or child userns
Date: Sat, 01 Jan 2011 15:10:19 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <m1zkrkuso4.fsf@fess.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110101044522.GA26476@mail.hallyn.com> (Serge E. Hallyn's message of "Sat, 1 Jan 2011 04:45:22 +0000")

"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> writes:

> Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com):
>> "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> writes:
>> 
>> > Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com):
>> >> > --- a/kernel/signal.c
>> >> > +++ b/kernel/signal.c
>> >> > @@ -659,11 +686,7 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info,
>> >> >  	cred = current_cred();
>> >> >  	tcred = __task_cred(t);
>> >> Nit pick  you don't need to compute cred and tcred here now.
>> >
>> > Just to make sure I understand right: you mean wait until after the
>> > same_thread_group() check to save calculation in that case, right?
>> 
>> I mean cred and tcred are only use in kill_ok_by_cred.
>> So we can eliminate those two variables from check_kill_permission.
>
> Thanks for the review.  Here is an updated version.

This one looks good.

Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

>
> Subject: [PATCH 4/5] allow killing tasks in your own or child userns
>
> Changelog:
> 	Dec 8: Fixed bug in my check_kill_permission pointed out by
> 	       Eric Biederman.
> 	Dec 13: Apply Eric's suggestion to pass target task into kill_ok_by_cred()
> 	        for clarity
> 	Dec 31: address comment by Eric Biederman:
> 		don't need cred/tcred in check_kill_permission.
>
> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
> ---
>  kernel/signal.c |   36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>  1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
> index 4e3cff1..d890c99 100644
> --- a/kernel/signal.c
> +++ b/kernel/signal.c
> @@ -636,13 +636,39 @@ static inline bool si_fromuser(const struct siginfo *info)
>  }
>  
>  /*
> + * called with RCU read lock from check_kill_permission()
> + */
> +static inline int kill_ok_by_cred(struct task_struct *t)
> +{
> +	struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> +	struct cred *tcred = __task_cred(t);
> +
> +	if (cred->user->user_ns != tcred->user->user_ns) {
> +		/* userids are not equivalent - either you have the
> +		   capability to the target user ns or you don't */
> +		if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
> +			return 1;
> +		return 0;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* same user namespace - usual credentials checks apply */
> +	if ((cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) &&
> +	    (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) &&
> +	    (cred->uid  ^ tcred->suid) &&
> +	    (cred->uid  ^ tcred->uid) &&
> +	    !ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	return 1;
> +}
> +
> +/*
>   * Bad permissions for sending the signal
>   * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock
>   */
>  static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info,
>  				 struct task_struct *t)
>  {
> -	const struct cred *cred, *tcred;
>  	struct pid *sid;
>  	int error;
>  
> @@ -656,14 +682,8 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info,
>  	if (error)
>  		return error;
>  
> -	cred = current_cred();
> -	tcred = __task_cred(t);
>  	if (!same_thread_group(current, t) &&
> -	    (cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) &&
> -	    (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) &&
> -	    (cred->uid  ^ tcred->suid) &&
> -	    (cred->uid  ^ tcred->uid) &&
> -	    !capable(CAP_KILL)) {
> +	    !kill_ok_by_cred(t)) {
>  		switch (sig) {
>  		case SIGCONT:
>  			sid = task_session(t);

  reply	other threads:[~2011-01-01 23:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2010-12-17 15:22 [RFC 0/5] user namespaces: start clamping down Serge E. Hallyn
2010-12-17 15:24 ` [RFC 1/5] user namespaces: Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2010-12-17 15:25   ` [RFC 2/5] user namespaces: make capabilities relative to the user namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2010-12-17 15:26     ` [RFC 3/5] user namespaces: allow sethostname in a container Serge E. Hallyn
2010-12-17 15:26       ` [RFC 4/5] user namespaces: allow killing tasks in your own or child userns Serge E. Hallyn
2010-12-17 15:27         ` [RFC 5/5] user namespaces: Allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces Serge E. Hallyn
2010-12-17 19:45           ` Eric W. Biederman
2010-12-17 20:04             ` Serge Hallyn
2011-01-01  4:47             ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-12-17 19:31         ` [RFC 4/5] user namespaces: allow killing tasks in your own or child userns Eric W. Biederman
2010-12-17 20:09           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-12-17 20:17             ` Eric W. Biederman
2010-12-17 20:22               ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-01-01  4:45               ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-01-01 23:10                 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2011-01-02 14:39                   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-12-17 15:56   ` [RFC 1/5] user namespaces: Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace Alexey Dobriyan
2010-12-17 16:00     ` Alexey Dobriyan
2010-12-17 16:17       ` Serge Hallyn
2010-12-17 16:12     ` Serge Hallyn
2010-12-17 17:31   ` Greg KH
2010-12-17 19:26     ` Eric W. Biederman
2010-12-17 19:58       ` Greg KH
2010-12-17 20:40         ` Eric W. Biederman
2010-12-17 23:15           ` Greg KH
2010-12-18  6:32             ` Eric W. Biederman
2010-12-18 17:56               ` Greg KH
2010-12-17 19:46     ` Serge Hallyn
2010-12-17 19:57       ` Greg KH

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