From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id ; Mon, 22 Apr 2002 18:51:35 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id ; Mon, 22 Apr 2002 18:51:32 -0400 Received: from mailout08.sul.t-online.com ([194.25.134.20]:62642 "EHLO mailout08.sul.t-online.com") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id ; Mon, 22 Apr 2002 18:51:22 -0400 To: "Saxena, Sunil" Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Initial process CPU state was Re: SSE related security hole In-Reply-To: <9287DC1579B0D411AA2F009027F44C3F171C1A9E@FMSMSX41> From: Andi Kleen Date: 23 Apr 2002 00:51:09 +0200 Message-ID: User-Agent: Gnus/5.070095 (Pterodactyl Gnus v0.95) Emacs/20.7 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org "Saxena, Sunil" writes: Hallo Sunil, > We recognized that there is a discrepancy in the individual instruction > descriptions in Vol 2 where it is indicated that the instruction would > generate a UD#. We will be rectifying this discrepancy in the next revision > of Vol 2 as well as via the monthly Specification Updates. Could you quickly describe what the Intel recommended way is to clear the whole CPU at the beginning of a process? Is there a better way than "save state with fxsave at bootup and restore into each new process"? After all it would be a bit unfortunate to have instructions which are transparently tolerant to new CPU state (fxsave/fxrstor for context switching), but no matching way to clear the same state for security reasons. Using the bootup FXSAVE image would make linux depend on the BIOS for this (so in the worst case when the bios doesn't clear e.g. the XMM registers or some future registers each process could see the state of some previous boot after a warm boot) Another way would be to do a fxsave after clearing of known state (x87,MMX, SSE) at OS bootup and then afterwards set all the so far reserved parts of the FXSAVE image to zero. Then restore this image later into each new process. This would avoid any BIOS/direct warmboot dependencies. It would work assuming that all future IA32 state can be safely initialized with zeroes via FXRSTOR. Is this a safe assumption? Thanks, -Andi