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From: Scott A Crosby <scrosby@cs.rice.edu>
To: "David S. Miller" <davem@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Algoritmic Complexity Attacks and 2.4.20 the dcache code
Date: 30 May 2003 01:46:12 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <oydof1l2aq3.fsf@bert.cs.rice.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20030529.232440.122068039.davem@redhat.com>

On Thu, 29 May 2003 23:24:40 -0700 (PDT), "David S. Miller" <davem@redhat.com> writes:

>    From: Scott A Crosby <scrosby@cs.rice.edu>
>    Date: 30 May 2003 00:04:24 -0500
>    
>    Have you seen the current dcache function?
>    
>    /* Linux dcache */
>    #define HASH_3(hi,ho,c)  ho=(hi + (c << 4) + (c >> 4)) * 11
>    
> Awesome, moving the Jenkins will actually save us some
> cycles :-)

Tricky though, because what if you want to hash more than 64 bits? You
have to somehow chain Jenkin's together.

Let H(a,b,c) be a jenkin's hash that does  '' mix(a,b,c) ; return a ''

Let a,b,c,d,e be inputs to be hashed, and R,S,T,U be random keys.


Its not safe to do anything like

 H(H(a,b,c),H(d,e,f),R)

Because an attacker can brute-force to find tuples (a,b,c),
(a',b',c'), ... so that H(a,b,c) == H(a',b',c') == ....

A better approach (which I make with no formal analysis of its
quality) might be to construct this:

 H(a,b,R) ^ H(c,d,S) ^ H(e,f,T)

Perhaps the best approach is to visit Usenix Security 2003 this August
and ask the experts there.

Scott

  reply	other threads:[~2003-05-30  6:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2003-05-29 20:42 Algoritmic Complexity Attacks and 2.4.20 the dcache code Scott A Crosby
2003-05-30  3:57 ` David S. Miller
2003-05-30  4:29   ` Ingo Molnar
2003-05-30 18:16     ` Timothy Miller
2003-05-30 18:53       ` Scott A Crosby
2003-05-30  5:04   ` Scott A Crosby
2003-05-30  6:24     ` David S. Miller
2003-05-30  6:46       ` Scott A Crosby [this message]
2003-05-30  6:56         ` David S. Miller
2003-05-30  8:59       ` Alex Riesen
2003-05-30  9:00         ` David S. Miller
2003-05-30 15:05           ` Scott A Crosby
2003-05-31  6:18             ` David S. Miller
2003-05-31  8:02               ` Willy TARREAU
2003-05-31  8:12                 ` David S. Miller
2003-05-31  8:56                   ` Willy Tarreau
2003-05-31  8:58                     ` David S. Miller
2003-05-31  8:58                   ` David Schwartz
2003-05-31  9:01                     ` David S. Miller
2003-05-31  6:30           ` William Lee Irwin III
2003-05-31  6:33             ` David S. Miller
2003-05-31  6:41               ` William Lee Irwin III
2003-05-31  6:45                 ` David S. Miller
2003-05-31 18:40                   ` Aaron Lehmann
2003-05-30  4:02 ` Ingo Molnar
2003-05-30  4:42   ` Scott A Crosby
2003-05-30  5:01     ` David S. Miller
2003-05-30 13:48 ` Nikita Danilov
2003-06-01  1:15 ` Daniel Phillips

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