From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754785AbXKJVEv (ORCPT ); Sat, 10 Nov 2007 16:04:51 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1754106AbXKJVEm (ORCPT ); Sat, 10 Nov 2007 16:04:42 -0500 Received: from cantor2.suse.de ([195.135.220.15]:35618 "EHLO mx2.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754058AbXKJVEm (ORCPT ); Sat, 10 Nov 2007 16:04:42 -0500 To: Crispin Cowan Cc: Arjan van de Ven , Linux Kernel Mailing List , LSM ML , apparmor-dev Subject: Re: AppArmor Security Goal From: Andi Kleen References: <473380AD.5070801@crispincowan.com> Date: Sat, 10 Nov 2007 22:04:35 +0100 In-Reply-To: <473380AD.5070801@crispincowan.com> (Crispin Cowan's message of "Thu\, 08 Nov 2007 13\:33\:33 -0800") Message-ID: User-Agent: Gnus/5.11 (Gnus v5.11) Emacs/22.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Crispin Cowan writes: The document should be a good base for a merge. > * A confined process can operate on a file descriptor passed to it > by an unconfined process, even if it manipulates a file not in the > confined process's profile. To block this attack, confine the > process that passed the file descriptor. That is the only thing that tripped me up a bit while reading the document. Can you expand a bit on the reasons why the fd is not rechecked in the context of the target process? Best do it in a new version of the document. -Andi