* [PATCH] ALSA: rawmidi: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
@ 2019-03-20 21:15 Gustavo A. R. Silva
2019-03-21 12:24 ` Takashi Iwai
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva @ 2019-03-20 21:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jaroslav Kysela, Takashi Iwai
Cc: alsa-devel, linux-kernel, Gustavo A. R. Silva
info->stream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
sound/core/rawmidi.c:604 __snd_rawmidi_info_select() warn: potential spectre issue 'rmidi->streams' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing info->stream before using it to index
rmidi->streams.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
---
sound/core/rawmidi.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sound/core/rawmidi.c b/sound/core/rawmidi.c
index ee601d7f0926..c0690d1ecd55 100644
--- a/sound/core/rawmidi.c
+++ b/sound/core/rawmidi.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <sound/rawmidi.h>
#include <sound/info.h>
#include <sound/control.h>
@@ -601,6 +602,7 @@ static int __snd_rawmidi_info_select(struct snd_card *card,
return -ENXIO;
if (info->stream < 0 || info->stream > 1)
return -EINVAL;
+ info->stream = array_index_nospec(info->stream, 2);
pstr = &rmidi->streams[info->stream];
if (pstr->substream_count == 0)
return -ENOENT;
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] ALSA: rawmidi: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
2019-03-20 21:15 [PATCH] ALSA: rawmidi: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability Gustavo A. R. Silva
@ 2019-03-21 12:24 ` Takashi Iwai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Takashi Iwai @ 2019-03-21 12:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Gustavo A. R. Silva ; +Cc: Jaroslav Kysela, alsa-devel, linux-kernel
On Wed, 20 Mar 2019 22:15:24 +0100,
Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
>
> info->stream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>
> sound/core/rawmidi.c:604 __snd_rawmidi_info_select() warn: potential spectre issue 'rmidi->streams' [r] (local cap)
>
> Fix this by sanitizing info->stream before using it to index
> rmidi->streams.
>
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Applied, thanks.
Takashi
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