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From: tip-bot for Andrey Ryabinin <tipbot@zytor.com>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: bp@suse.de, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, toshi.kani@hp.com,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, bp@alien8.de, mcgrof@suse.com,
	dvlasenk@redhat.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org,
	aryabinin@virtuozzo.com, oleg@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org,
	hpa@zytor.com, brgerst@gmail.com, luto@amacapital.net,
	mingo@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de
Subject: [tip:x86/mm] x86/kasan: Write protect kasan zero shadow
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2016 08:07:10 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <tip-063fb3e56f6dd29b2633b678b837e1d904200e6f@git.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1452516679-32040-3-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>

Commit-ID:  063fb3e56f6dd29b2633b678b837e1d904200e6f
Gitweb:     http://git.kernel.org/tip/063fb3e56f6dd29b2633b678b837e1d904200e6f
Author:     Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
AuthorDate: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 15:51:19 +0300
Committer:  Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitDate: Tue, 9 Feb 2016 13:33:14 +0100

x86/kasan: Write protect kasan zero shadow

After kasan_init() executed, no one is allowed to write to kasan_zero_page,
so write protect it.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1452516679-32040-3-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
index 303e470..1b1110f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
@@ -125,10 +125,16 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)
 
 	/*
 	 * kasan_zero_page has been used as early shadow memory, thus it may
-	 * contain some garbage. Now we can clear it, since after the TLB flush
-	 * no one should write to it.
+	 * contain some garbage. Now we can clear and write protect it, since
+	 * after the TLB flush no one should write to it.
 	 */
 	memset(kasan_zero_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PTE; i++) {
+		pte_t pte = __pte(__pa(kasan_zero_page) | __PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+		set_pte(&kasan_zero_pte[i], pte);
+	}
+	/* Flush TLBs again to be sure that write protection applied. */
+	__flush_tlb_all();
 
 	init_task.kasan_depth = 0;
 	pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-02-09 16:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-01-08 23:15 [RFC 00/13] x86/mm: PCID and INVPCID Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 01/13] x86/paravirt: Turn KASAN off for parvirt.o Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-10 18:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-01-11 12:51     ` Andrey Ryabinin
2016-01-11 12:51       ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/kasan: clear kasan_zero_page after TLB flush Andrey Ryabinin
2016-01-18 22:24         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-02-09 16:06         ` [tip:x86/mm] x86/kasan: Clear " tip-bot for Andrey Ryabinin
2016-01-11 12:51       ` [PATCH 2/2] x86/kasan: write protect kasan zero shadow Andrey Ryabinin
2016-01-18 22:24         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-02-09 16:07         ` tip-bot for Andrey Ryabinin [this message]
2016-01-29 10:35       ` [RFC 01/13] x86/paravirt: Turn KASAN off for parvirt.o Borislav Petkov
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 02/13] x86/mm: Add INVPCID helpers Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 03/13] x86/mm: Add a noinvpcid option to turn off INVPCID Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 04/13] x86/mm: If INVPCID is available, use it to flush global mappings Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 05/13] x86/mm: Add barriers and document switch_mm-vs-flush synchronization Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-03 17:42   ` Nadav Amit
2016-06-09 17:24     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 19:45       ` Nadav Amit
2016-09-06  1:22   ` Wanpeng Li
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 06/13] x86/mm: Disable PCID on 32-bit kernels Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 07/13] x86/mm: Add nopcid to turn off PCID Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 08/13] x86/mm: Teach CR3 readers about PCID Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 09/13] x86/mm: Disable interrupts when flushing the TLB using CR3 Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:41   ` Linus Torvalds
2016-01-09  0:18     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-09  2:20       ` Linus Torvalds
2016-01-11 10:51         ` Ingo Molnar
2016-01-13 23:32           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-13 23:35         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-13 23:43           ` Dave Hansen
2016-01-13 23:51             ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-13 23:56               ` Dave Hansen
2016-01-14  0:34                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 10/13] x86/mm: Factor out remote TLB flushing Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 11/13] x86/mm: Build arch/x86/mm/tlb.c even on !SMP Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:55   ` Dave Hansen
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 12/13] x86/mm: Uninline switch_mm Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 13/13] x86/mm: Try to preserve old TLB entries using PCID Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-09  0:27   ` Dave Hansen
2016-01-09  2:19     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:31 ` [RFC 00/13] x86/mm: PCID and INVPCID Linus Torvalds
2016-01-08 23:36   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:42     ` Linus Torvalds

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