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From: tip-bot for Hector Marco-Gisbert <tipbot@zytor.com>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, bp@suse.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	keescook@chromium.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, mingo@kernel.org,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
	hecmargi@upv.es, iripoll@upv.es, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip:x86/urgent] x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2015 11:27:56 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <tip-4e7c22d447bb6d7e37bfe39ff658486ae78e8d77@git.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net>

Commit-ID:  4e7c22d447bb6d7e37bfe39ff658486ae78e8d77
Gitweb:     http://git.kernel.org/tip/4e7c22d447bb6d7e37bfe39ff658486ae78e8d77
Author:     Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
AuthorDate: Sat, 14 Feb 2015 09:33:50 -0800
Committer:  Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CommitDate: Thu, 19 Feb 2015 12:21:36 +0100

x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems

The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on
64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow.

The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file
"fs/binfmt_elf.c":

  static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
  {
           unsigned int random_variable = 0;

           if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
                   !(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
                   random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
                   random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
           }
           return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
           return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
  }

Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int".
Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which
is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):

	  random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;

then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
"random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold
the (22+12) result.

These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to
2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy).

This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved
in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and
stack_maxrandom_size().

The successful fix can be tested with:

  $ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
  7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
  7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
  7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
  7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
  ...

Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff,
rather than always being 7fff.

Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
[ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: CVE-2015-1593
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
 arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 6 +++---
 fs/binfmt_elf.c    | 5 +++--
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
index 919b912..df4552b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
@@ -35,12 +35,12 @@ struct va_alignment __read_mostly va_align = {
 	.flags = -1,
 };
 
-static unsigned int stack_maxrandom_size(void)
+static unsigned long stack_maxrandom_size(void)
 {
-	unsigned int max = 0;
+	unsigned long max = 0;
 	if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
 		!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
-		max = ((-1U) & STACK_RND_MASK) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+		max = ((-1UL) & STACK_RND_MASK) << PAGE_SHIFT;
 	}
 
 	return max;
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
index 02b1691..995986b 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
@@ -645,11 +645,12 @@ out:
 
 static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
 {
-	unsigned int random_variable = 0;
+	unsigned long random_variable = 0;
 
 	if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
 		!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
-		random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
+		random_variable = (unsigned long) get_random_int();
+		random_variable &= STACK_RND_MASK;
 		random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
 	}
 #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP

      parent reply	other threads:[~2015-02-19 19:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-02-14 17:33 [PATCH] ASLR: fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems Kees Cook
2015-02-16 20:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-18  3:27   ` Kees Cook
2015-02-18  9:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2015-02-18 20:11   ` Andrew Morton
2015-02-18 20:19     ` Ingo Molnar
2015-02-18 20:25       ` Borislav Petkov
2015-02-18 20:26         ` Ingo Molnar
2015-02-19 19:27 ` tip-bot for Hector Marco-Gisbert [this message]

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