From: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
To: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux.dev,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
will@kernel.org, robin.murphy@arm.com, jgg@ziepe.ca,
steven.price@arm.com, Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] dma-direct: Validate DMA mask against canonical DMA addresses
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2026 19:48:14 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <yq5atswgjrkp.fsf@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2a0b6d1b-875a-4075-8fc9-a8534afc9168@arm.com>
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> writes:
> On 20/01/2026 06:42, Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm) wrote:
>> On systems that apply an address encryption tag or mask to DMA addresses,
>> DMA mask validation must be performed against the canonical DMA address.
>> Using a non-canonical (e.g. encrypted or unencrypted) DMA address
>> can incorrectly fail capability checks, since architecture-specific
>> encryption bits are not part of the device’s actual DMA addressing
>> capability. For example, arm64 adds PROT_NS_SHARED to unencrypted DMA
>> addresses.
>>
>> Fix this by validating device DMA masks against __phys_to_dma(), ensuring
>> that the architecture encryption mask does not influence the check.
>>
>> Fixes: b66e2ee7b6c8 ("dma: Introduce generic dma_addr_*crypted helpers")
>
>
>> Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm) <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
>> ---
>> kernel/dma/direct.c | 4 ++--
>> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/dma/direct.c b/kernel/dma/direct.c
>> index 8e04f72baaa3..a5639e9415f5 100644
>> --- a/kernel/dma/direct.c
>> +++ b/kernel/dma/direct.c
>> @@ -580,12 +580,12 @@ int dma_direct_supported(struct device *dev, u64 mask)
>>
>> /*
>> * This check needs to be against the actual bit mask value, so use
>> - * phys_to_dma_unencrypted() here so that the SME encryption mask isn't
>> + * __phys_to_dma() here so that the arch specific encryption mask isn't
>> * part of the check.
>> */
>> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ZONE_DMA))
>> min_mask = min_t(u64, min_mask, zone_dma_limit);
>> - return mask >= phys_to_dma_unencrypted(dev, min_mask);
>> + return mask >= __phys_to_dma(dev, min_mask);
>
> This is wrong, isn't it ? For e.g., for CCA, even though the "Flag" is
> added to the PA, it is really part of the actual "PA" and thus must be
> checked against the full PA ?
>
That is true only when the device is operating in untrusted mode?. For a
trusted device that mask is valid mask right?
-aneesh
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-01-20 14:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-01-20 6:42 [PATCH 1/2] dma-direct: Validate DMA mask against canonical DMA addresses Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-01-20 6:42 ` [PATCH 2/2] dma-direct: Make phys_to_dma() pick encrypted vs unencrypted per device Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-01-20 9:33 ` kernel test robot
2026-01-20 10:49 ` kernel test robot
2026-01-20 9:59 ` [PATCH 1/2] dma-direct: Validate DMA mask against canonical DMA addresses Suzuki K Poulose
2026-01-20 11:59 ` Robin Murphy
2026-01-20 14:25 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-01-20 19:22 ` Robin Murphy
2026-01-21 4:50 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-01-20 14:18 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V [this message]
2026-01-20 14:39 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2026-01-20 15:11 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-01-20 17:11 ` Robin Murphy
2026-01-20 17:54 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-01-20 18:47 ` Robin Murphy
2026-01-20 19:54 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-01-20 10:59 ` kernel test robot
2026-01-20 13:26 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-01-20 15:25 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-01-20 15:43 ` Jason Gunthorpe
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