From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4C74C28727C; Thu, 21 Aug 2025 21:15:59 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1755810960; cv=none; b=OrU9jtgH5bCFln34wbmQUU5eWXdcxXVnPFjYV7JNLwToi/7DQBIJXwoqBk/74sbp13KbWOFAptWxR8odMY4DFE91dTGB0Uc7/dj0T6fXqEL8qyLLV3eQQQFYZ/BGXDG9od39EQRIPUjMFhXOCavSeKztceKFHRVrbs6dOCzLGaw= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1755810960; c=relaxed/simple; bh=4LtsjHz9BcVqdxPkFUx7SaoCYcFLL8+ez7eFd3R308E=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=YwRTrstxbqaAxfQqrSEvBrR78ClMr/BOkftXXeeC4l+u4pO9yeOXSqgs4m4PzaO50JcnfUAa3vcYv/4IEcJQQhDB/q95HYpKLm8NZ9uxv6EKVmSMilBG1Gq1H6ELQUoXw4/Ej8W0jChYf9K5EvmDAJkcv9qudoll6RdEnieVnsk= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=kYpJcCs8; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="kYpJcCs8" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B17A5C4CEEB; Thu, 21 Aug 2025 21:15:57 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1755810959; bh=4LtsjHz9BcVqdxPkFUx7SaoCYcFLL8+ez7eFd3R308E=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:From; b=kYpJcCs84Ml5F/mOSa5JNH7aoT3ZCEwJwZc/Ft+KJ6l/cgxUrSPBWmHacFdassTrT PYS55nFl49ygm11sjVaLE87javh99kop8ID2Zpw61yKCn5766hIatJRgdmMPYxrso4 OTgkdB2R7zq2M9vECMMgS51TeE4rKClLvVzV0dPYg6eObHf7Mvb1wT8+EZF5a0qHE+ Wqn3tH0U/Mj38R5vcmdp5Km1gy6RqLWT3unBfN9YCprM1vdAcOQMLPGADx+4u2beUX 5osQGNRSv0XKh3s4UPIPDXRjtEjTkCT3uxC+TBEVFV2Rq6BT0P30OTwMAZiSNm7lNj 9ixGcBru3AhVg== From: Nathan Chancellor Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2025 14:15:39 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v2 02/12] arch/Kconfig: Drop always true condition from RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: llvm@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <20250821-bump-min-llvm-ver-15-v2-2-635f3294e5f0@kernel.org> References: <20250821-bump-min-llvm-ver-15-v2-0-635f3294e5f0@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: <20250821-bump-min-llvm-ver-15-v2-0-635f3294e5f0@kernel.org> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Arnd Bergmann , Kees Cook , Nick Desaulniers , Bill Wendling , Justin Stitt , llvm@lists.linux.dev, patches@lists.linux.dev, Nathan Chancellor , linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org X-Mailer: b4 0.15-dev X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=933; i=nathan@kernel.org; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=4LtsjHz9BcVqdxPkFUx7SaoCYcFLL8+ez7eFd3R308E=; b=owGbwMvMwCUmm602sfCA1DTG02pJDBnLe5ruzi1g+azLzX49b6aHFffSpQ+dmi7zKr9UsPe3y 3gxWfBbRykLgxgXg6yYIkv1Y9XjhoZzzjLeODUJZg4rE8gQBi5OAZhIrgzDH54G+8fLrug+fCYV zRGqkTt9en08a/tLcWcR811Hn7PNn8TwT43z6Dn37X+vOi15w3bFyPGaruYjoYsJGdWzX3K7uNR /5QcA X-Developer-Key: i=nathan@kernel.org; a=openpgp; fpr=2437CB76E544CB6AB3D9DFD399739260CB6CB716 Now that the minimum supported version of LLVM for building the kernel has been bumped to 15.0.0, the second depends line in RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET is always true, so it can be removed. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor --- Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org --- arch/Kconfig | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index d1b4ffd6e085..4935c4c26f09 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -1475,7 +1475,6 @@ config RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET bool "Support for randomizing kernel stack offset on syscall entry" if EXPERT default y depends on HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET - depends on INIT_STACK_NONE || !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION >= 140000 help The kernel stack offset can be randomized (after pt_regs) by roughly 5 bits of entropy, frustrating memory corruption -- 2.50.1