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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+git@google.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com>,
	Dionna Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
	Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, llvm@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 07/11] efi/libstub: Add generic support for parsing mem_encrypt=
Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2024 13:28:00 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <fccd8544-76ab-4723-9616-ff4bc783b692@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMj1kXG_sQ-+ULtvE7SqD0DYe3p9=tP8K9VPgfiR-0Z55A9vVw@mail.gmail.com>

On 2/19/24 11:06, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Mon, 19 Feb 2024 at 18:00, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 2/13/24 06:41, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>>> From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
>>>
>>> Parse the mem_encrypt= command line parameter from the EFI stub if
>>> CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT=y, so that it can be passed to the early
>>> boot code by the arch code in the stub.
>>>
>>> This avoids the need for the core kernel to do any string parsing very
>>> early in the boot.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
>>> ---
>>>    drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 8 ++++++++
>>>    drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h         | 2 +-
>>>    2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c
>>> index bfa30625f5d0..3dc2f9aaf08d 100644
>>> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c
>>> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c
>>> @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ static bool efi_noinitrd;
>>>    static bool efi_nosoftreserve;
>>>    static bool efi_disable_pci_dma = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_DISABLE_PCI_DMA);
>>>
>>> +int efi_mem_encrypt;
>>> +
>>>    bool __pure __efi_soft_reserve_enabled(void)
>>>    {
>>>        return !efi_nosoftreserve;
>>> @@ -75,6 +77,12 @@ efi_status_t efi_parse_options(char const *cmdline)
>>>                        efi_noinitrd = true;
>>>                } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) && !strcmp(param, "no5lvl")) {
>>>                        efi_no5lvl = true;
>>> +             } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT) &&
>>> +                        !strcmp(param, "mem_encrypt") && val) {
>>> +                     if (parse_option_str(val, "on"))
>>> +                             efi_mem_encrypt = 1;
>>> +                     else if (parse_option_str(val, "off"))
>>> +                             efi_mem_encrypt = -1;
>>
>> With CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT having recently been
>> removed, I'm not sure what parsing for mem_encrypt=off does.
>>
>> (Same thing in the next patch.)
>>
> 
> We have to deal with both mem_encrypt=on and mem_encrypt=off occurring
> on the command line. efi_parse_options() may be called more than once,
> i.e., when there is a default command line baked into the image that
> can be overridden at runtime. So if the baked in one has
> mem_encrypt=on, mem_encrypt=off appearing later should counter that.
> 
> The same applies to the next patch, although the decompressor appears
> to ignore the built-in command line entirely (I made a note of that in
> the commit log)

Ah, makes sense.

Thanks,
Tom


  reply	other threads:[~2024-02-20 19:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-13 12:41 [PATCH v4 00/11] x86: Confine early 1:1 mapped startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-13 12:41 ` [PATCH v4 01/11] x86/startup_64: Simplify global variable accesses in GDT/IDT programming Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-13 20:05   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-13 21:53     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-14  7:28       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15 13:52         ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-13 12:41 ` [PATCH v4 02/11] x86/startup_64: Replace pointer fixups with RIP-relative references Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-17 12:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-17 13:58     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-17 16:10       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-19  9:55         ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-19 10:45           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-19 10:01       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-19 10:47         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-13 12:41 ` [PATCH v4 03/11] x86/startup_64: Simplify CR4 handling in startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-19 10:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-13 12:41 ` [PATCH v4 04/11] x86/startup_64: Defer assignment of 5-level paging global variables Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-20 18:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-20 23:33     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-21 10:09       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-21 10:20         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-21 11:12           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-21 11:21             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-21 11:23               ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-13 12:41 ` [PATCH v4 05/11] x86/startup_64: Simplify calculation of initial page table address Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-13 12:41 ` [PATCH v4 06/11] x86/startup_64: Simplify virtual switch on primary boot Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-13 12:41 ` [PATCH v4 07/11] efi/libstub: Add generic support for parsing mem_encrypt= Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-19 17:00   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-02-19 17:06     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-20 19:28       ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2024-02-13 12:41 ` [PATCH v4 08/11] x86/boot: Move mem_encrypt= parsing to the decompressor Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-13 12:41 ` [PATCH v4 09/11] x86/sme: Move early SME kernel encryption handling into .head.text Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-13 12:41 ` [PATCH v4 10/11] x86/sev: Move early startup code into .head.text section Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-13 12:41 ` [PATCH v4 11/11] x86/startup_64: Drop global variables keeping track of LA57 state Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-14 15:24   ` Brian Gerst
2024-02-14 15:44     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-14 20:25       ` Brian Gerst

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