From: Andrea Cervesato via ltp <ltp@lists.linux.it>
To: "Wei Gao" <wegao@suse.com>, <ltp@lists.linux.it>
Subject: Re: [LTP] [PATCH v5] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2026 14:21:53 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <DGI4B1B5F1L9.16IITENATKJVZ@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250723154610.3860563-1-wegao@suse.com>
Hi!
On Wed Jul 23, 2025 at 5:46 PM CEST, Wei Gao via ltp wrote:
> This commit adds test cases to verify the security restrictions for opening
> FIFOs and regular files in world-writable sticky directories.
>
> Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
> ---
> runtest/syscalls | 1 +
> testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore | 1 +
> testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c | 124 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 126 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
>
> diff --git a/runtest/syscalls b/runtest/syscalls
> index 3531c2a3c..0de9bfaef 100644
> --- a/runtest/syscalls
> +++ b/runtest/syscalls
> @@ -984,6 +984,7 @@ open12 open12
> open13 open13
> open14 open14
> open15 open15
> +open16 open16
>
> openat01 openat01
> openat02 openat02
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
> index af5997572..d2cacc02e 100644
> --- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
> @@ -13,3 +13,4 @@
> /open13
> /open14
> /open15
> +/open16
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000..6e01dde26
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
> +/*
> + * Copyright (c) 2023 Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
> + */
> +
> +/*\
> + * Verify disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world
> + * writable sticky directories
> + */
> +
> +#include <pwd.h>
> +#include <stdlib.h>
> +#include "tst_test.h"
> +#include "tst_safe_file_at.h"
> +
> +#define FILENAME "setuid04_testfile"
Never used.
> +#define DIR "ltp_tmp_check1"
> +#define TEST_FILE "test_file_1"
> +#define TEST_FIFO "test_fifo_1"
> +#define LTP_USR_UID1 1000
> +#define LTP_USR_UID2 1001
If target is to have a UID that doesn't belong to the current user,
we can just have:
pw = SAFE_GETPWNAM("nobody");
and use the provided UID.
> +#define PROTECTED_REGULAR "/proc/sys/fs/protected_regular"
> +#define PROTECTED_FIFOS "/proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos"
> +#define TEST_FIFO_PATH DIR "/" TEST_FIFO
> +
> +static int dir_fd;
Not initialized to -1.
> +
> +static void run(void)
> +{
> + SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "0");
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "0");
> +
> + if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID1);
> +
> + int fd = SAFE_OPENAT(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777);
> +
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
> +
> + SAFE_MKFIFO(TEST_FIFO_PATH, 0777);
> +
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + tst_reap_children();
> +
> + if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
> +
> + int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
> +
> + if (TST_PASS)
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
> +
> + fd = TST_EXP_FD(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
> +
> + if (TST_PASS)
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
> +
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + tst_reap_children();
> +
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "1");
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "1");
> +
> + if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
> +
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + tst_reap_children();
> +
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "2");
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "2");
> + SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0020 | S_ISVTX);
> +
> + if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
> +
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + tst_reap_children();
> + SAFE_UNLINK(TEST_FIFO_PATH);
> +}
> +
> +static void setup(void)
> +{
> + umask(0);
> + SAFE_MKDIR(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
> + dir_fd = SAFE_OPEN(DIR, O_DIRECTORY);
> +}
> +
> +static void cleanup(void)
> +{
> + if (dir_fd != -1)
> + SAFE_CLOSE(dir_fd);
> +}
> +
> +static struct tst_test test = {
> + .setup = setup,
> + .cleanup = cleanup,
> + .needs_root = 1,
> + .test_all = run,
> + .needs_tmpdir = 1,
> + .forks_child = 1,
> + .save_restore = (const struct tst_path_val[]) {
> + {PROTECTED_REGULAR, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
> + {PROTECTED_FIFOS, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
> + {}
> + },
> + .tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
> + {"linux-git", "30aba6656f61"},
> + {}
> + }
> +};
--
Andrea Cervesato
SUSE QE Automation Engineer Linux
andrea.cervesato@suse.com
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-18 13:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-09 11:20 [LTP] [PATCH v1] open15: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files Wei Gao via ltp
2023-12-08 15:34 ` Cyril Hrubis
2023-12-27 13:05 ` [LTP] [PATCH v2] " Wei Gao via ltp
2024-02-26 13:37 ` Cyril Hrubis
2024-06-03 12:55 ` [LTP] [PATCH v3] " Wei Gao via ltp
2025-02-21 10:01 ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
2025-03-19 14:23 ` [LTP] [PATCH v4] open16: " Wei Gao via ltp
2025-07-11 12:04 ` Cyril Hrubis
2025-07-23 15:46 ` [LTP] [PATCH v5] " Wei Gao via ltp
2026-02-18 13:21 ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp [this message]
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