From: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
To: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
Cc: Richard Palethorpe <rpalethorpe@suse.com>, ltp@lists.linux.it
Subject: Re: [LTP] [PATCH v2] fsconfig: New case cover CVE-2022-0185
Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2023 15:15:44 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y+UAENJVDUSDPAay@pevik> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230209131902.12260-1-wegao@suse.com>
Hi Wei,
There is still problem with ntfs:
tst_test.c:1634: TINFO: === Testing on ntfs ===
tst_test.c:1093: TINFO: Formatting /dev/loop0 with ntfs opts='' extra opts=''
The partition start sector was not specified for /dev/loop0 and it could not be obtained automatically. It has been set to 0.
The number of sectors per track was not specified for /dev/loop0 and it could not be obtained automatically. It has been set to 0.
The number of heads was not specified for /dev/loop0 and it could not be obtained automatically. It has been set to 0.
To boot from a device, Windows needs the 'partition start sector', the 'sectors per track' and the 'number of heads' to be set.
Windows will not be able to boot from this device.
fsconfig03.c:29: TBROK: fsopen() failed: ENODEV (19)
Therefore I'd skip it:
.skip_filesystems = (const char *const []){"ntfs", NULL},
> There are reproducers available for CVE-2022-0185
> https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/01/25/14
nit: I'd also change the commit message subject (i.e. first line) to something like
"fsconfig03: New test CVE-2022-0185"
(have taht 03)
> has links or even a zip file for an exploit
> https://github.com/Crusaders-of-Rust/CVE-2022-0185
nit: also add blank line here (readability).
> The exploits are kind of complicated as they try to be complete,
> but the exploitation vector is the fsconfig() syscall,
> this case used for add some coverage to that to detect it.
> Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
...
> +++ b/runtest/syscalls
> @@ -383,6 +383,7 @@ fremovexattr02 fremovexattr02
> fsconfig01 fsconfig01
> fsconfig02 fsconfig02
> +fsconfig03 fsconfig03
There should be *also* entry in runtest/cve:
CVE-2022-0185 fsconfig03
...
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fsconfig/fsconfig03.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
> +/*
> + * Copyright (c) 2023 Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
If you used code from elsewhere (although rewritten), you should add the
copyright of the author.
> + */
> +
> +/*\
> + * [Description]
> + *
> + * Test add some coverage to CVE-2022-0185.
> + * Try to trigger a crash.
> + * References links:
> + * https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/01/25/14
> + * https://github.com/Crusaders-of-Rust/CVE-2022-0185
> + */
I suggest something like this (you would understand me if you had run 'cd
metadata && make' and then had ../looked at resulted ../docparse/metadata.html):
/*\
* [Description]
*
* Test for CVE-2022-0185.
*
* References links:
* - https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/01/25/14
* - https://github.com/Crusaders-of-Rust/CVE-2022-0185
*/
> +
> +#include "tst_test.h"
> +#include "lapi/fsmount.h"
> +
> +#define MNTPOINT "mntpoint"
> +
> +static int fd = -1;
> +
> +static void setup(void)
> +{
> + fsopen_supported_by_kernel();
> +
> + TEST(fd = fsopen(tst_device->fs_type, 0));
> + if (fd == -1)
> + tst_brk(TBROK | TTERRNO, "fsopen() failed");
> +
> +}
> +
> +static void cleanup(void)
> +{
> + if (fd != -1)
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
> +}
> +
> +static void run(void)
> +{
> + char *val = "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
> +
> + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 5000; i++)
> + TEST(fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "\x00", val, 0));
@Richie, interesting, make check cannot detect FSCONFIG_SET_STRING
(from <linux/mount.h> or <sys/mount.h>):
CHECK testcases/kernel/syscalls/fsconfig/fsconfig03.c
fsconfig03.c:44:17: error: undefined identifier 'FSCONFIG_SET_STRING'
> +
> + tst_res(TPASS | TTERRNO, "Try fsconfig overflow on %s done! Failed as expected", tst_device->fs_type);
> +}
> +
> +static struct tst_test test = {
> + .test_all = run,
> + .setup = setup,
> + .cleanup = cleanup,
> + .needs_root = 1,
> + .format_device = 1,
> + .mntpoint = MNTPOINT,
> + .all_filesystems = 1,
> + .min_kver = "5.17",
You probably add it because 722d94847de29 comes from 5.17-rc1, but that should
go away, because this fix has been backported to (at least) sles kernels (which
are older).
> + .tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
> + {"linux-git", "722d94847de29"},
> + {"CVE", "2020-29373"},
IMHO CVE-2020-29373 is about io_uring
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-29373
Does it really belong to this test? If yes, it has another kernel fix.
And you don't mention it in docparse description.
> + {"CVE", "2022-0185"},
> + {}
> + }
> +};
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-09 14:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-29 11:50 [LTP] [PATCH v1] fsconfig: New case cover CVE-2022-0185 Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-01 12:49 ` Petr Vorel
2023-02-06 10:38 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-06 16:19 ` Petr Vorel
2023-02-08 9:01 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-08 15:48 ` Petr Vorel
2023-02-09 2:25 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-09 10:10 ` Cyril Hrubis
2023-02-09 11:37 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-06 16:42 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-09 13:19 ` [LTP] [PATCH v2] " Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-09 14:15 ` Petr Vorel [this message]
2023-02-09 14:27 ` Cyril Hrubis
2023-02-09 14:40 ` Petr Vorel
2023-02-09 14:53 ` Cyril Hrubis
2023-02-09 14:35 ` Petr Vorel
2023-02-09 14:52 ` Cyril Hrubis
2023-02-09 15:18 ` Petr Vorel
2023-02-10 8:22 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-10 9:00 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-13 1:09 ` [LTP] [PATCH v3] fsconfig03: New test CVE-2022-0185 Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-14 11:05 ` Richard Palethorpe
2023-02-16 9:42 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-16 12:09 ` Richard Palethorpe
2023-02-16 12:54 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-16 23:52 ` [LTP] [PATCH v4] " Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-17 7:48 ` Petr Vorel
2023-02-17 8:47 ` Petr Vorel
2023-02-17 9:19 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-27 16:20 ` Richard Palethorpe
2023-02-28 3:22 ` [LTP] [PATCH v5] " Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-28 3:27 ` [LTP] [PATCH v6] " Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-28 8:49 ` Richard Palethorpe
2023-03-01 13:46 ` Martin Doucha
2023-03-01 14:12 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-03-02 1:45 ` [LTP] [PATCH v7] fsconfig03: SKIP check return value for old kernel Wei Gao via ltp
2023-03-02 10:00 ` Petr Vorel
2023-03-02 10:45 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-03-02 10:03 ` Petr Vorel
2023-03-04 2:03 ` [LTP] [PATCH v8] " Wei Gao via ltp
2023-03-07 9:23 ` Petr Vorel
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=Y+UAENJVDUSDPAay@pevik \
--to=pvorel@suse.cz \
--cc=ltp@lists.linux.it \
--cc=rpalethorpe@suse.com \
--cc=wegao@suse.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox