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From: Andrea Cervesato via ltp <ltp@lists.linux.it>
To: Li Wang <liwang@redhat.com>, Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Cc: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>,
	ltp@lists.linux.it
Subject: Re: [LTP] [PATCH v3 09/11] Add landlock04 test
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2024 09:12:39 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <fc172149-12e9-45c3-9411-ab158fa7d747@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f4e9dadd-5f5f-48f0-ba1d-58ad71bf51f2@suse.com>

Hi!

it seems like the landlock() support in kernel 6.6 is different than the 
one in 6.7. The reason why we see that error in kernel <=6.6 is related 
to how landlock is handling the rules set according to the rule we want 
to enable.

Let's suppose we want to enable the execution for a file. What we should 
be able to do, is to consider __ALL__ the rules available for landlock, 
then to enable EXEC only for a specific file. Then, if we make any other 
operation that is not EXEC, we should have a permission error. This 
translates to:

- set ruleset_attr->handled_access_fs for all available 
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_* rules
- set path_beneath_attr->allowed_access to LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXEC | 
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ (we need to read in order to execute) for a binary
- enforce the rules inside a sandbox containing the binary
- execute the binary will work
- do any other operation inside the sandbox and obtain a permissions error
- at this point, any new rule that is added, will update the list of 
landlock rules, enabling the sandbox permissions

For some reasons that I don't know (and this is evident from kselftests 
as well), if the initial rules set (ruleset_attr->handled_access_fs) is 
not identical to the rules we are going to enable 
(path_beneath_attr->allowed_access), landlock_add_rule() will fail with 
EINVAL. And this is our case for all kernels <=6.6.

I really have no idea why this happens and maybe we need to contact the 
landlock developers.

Andrea

On 7/24/24 15:47, Andrea Cervesato wrote:
> Hi Li,
>
> thanks for checking. Mmmh I don't know if it's because they added 
> LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT. It sounds strange to me, since that would 
> break all the other features.
>
> Andrea
>
> On 7/24/24 14:12, Li Wang wrote:
>> Hi Petr, Andrea,
>>
>> On Wed, Jul 17, 2024 at 1:27 AM Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> wrote:
>>
>>     Hi Andrea,
>>
>>     ...
>>     > +static void enable_exec_libs(const int ruleset_fd)
>>     > +{
>>     > +     FILE *fp;
>>     > +     char line[1024];
>>     > +     char path[PATH_MAX];
>>     > +     char dependency[8][PATH_MAX];
>>     > +     int count = 0;
>>     > +     int duplicate = 0;
>>     > +
>>     > +     fp = SAFE_FOPEN("/proc/self/maps", "r");
>>     > +
>>     > +     while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp)) {
>>     > +             if (strstr(line, ".so") == NULL)
>>     > +                     continue;
>>     > +
>>     > +             SAFE_SSCANF(line, "%*x-%*x %*s %*x %*s %*d %s",
>>     path);
>>     > +
>>     > +             for (int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
>>     > +                     if (strcmp(path, dependency[i]) == 0) {
>>     > +                             duplicate = 1;
>>     > +                             break;
>>     > +                     }
>>     > +             }
>>     > +
>>     > +             if (duplicate) {
>>     > +                     duplicate = 0;
>>     > +                     continue;
>>     > +             }
>>     > +
>>     > +             strncpy(dependency[count], path, PATH_MAX);
>>     > +             count++;
>>     > +
>>     > +             tst_res(TINFO, "Enable read/exec permissions for
>>     %s", path);
>>     > +
>>     > +             path_beneath_attr->allowed_access =
>>     > +                     LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
>>     > +                     LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE;
>>     > +             path_beneath_attr->parent_fd = SAFE_OPEN(path,
>>     O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC);
>>     > +
>>     > +             SAFE_LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE(
>>     > +                     ruleset_fd,
>>     > +                     LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH,
>>     > +                     path_beneath_attr,
>>     > +                     0);
>>
>>     Unfortunately, on 6.6.15-amd64 kernel (random Debian machine) it
>>     fails (after
>>     fresh boot) with:
>>
>>     ...
>>     tst_supported_fs_types.c:97: TINFO: Kernel supports tmpfs
>>     tst_supported_fs_types.c:49: TINFO: mkfs is not needed for tmpfs
>>     tst_test.c:1746: TINFO: === Testing on ext2 ===
>>     tst_test.c:1111: TINFO: Formatting /dev/loop1 with ext2 opts=''
>>     extra opts=''
>>     mke2fs 1.47.0 (5-Feb-2023)
>>     tst_test.c:1123: TINFO: Mounting /dev/loop1 to
>>     /tmp/LTP_lant6WbKJ/sandbox fstyp=ext2 flags=0
>>     landlock_common.h:30: TINFO: Landlock ABI v3
>>     landlock04.c:151: TINFO: Testing LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE
>>     landlock04.c:123: TINFO: Enable read/exec permissions for
>>     /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
>>     landlock04.c:131: TBROK: landlock_add_rule(3, 1, 0xf7f13ff4, 0):
>>     EINVAL (22)
>>
>>
>> Possibly that's because the 'LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH'  was
>> refactored from the v6.7 mainline kernel, so it can't add the rule 
>> correctly
>> with older kernels.
>>
>> commit 0e0fc7e8eb4a11bd9f89a9c74bc7c0e144c56203
>> Author: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>> Date:   Thu Oct 26 09:47:46 2023 +0800
>>
>>     landlock: Refactor landlock_add_rule() syscall
>>
>> But this is my guess (through reading the code), I didn't do more to
>> verify that by installing such a kernel.
>>
>>
>> -- 
>> Regards,
>> Li Wang
>
>

-- 
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp

  reply	other threads:[~2024-07-25  7:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-07-11 11:18 [LTP] [PATCH v3 00/11] landlock testing suite Andrea Cervesato
2024-07-11 11:18 ` [LTP] [PATCH v3 01/11] Add landlock syscalls definitions Andrea Cervesato
2024-07-11 11:18 ` [LTP] [PATCH v3 02/11] Add lapi/landlock.h fallback Andrea Cervesato
2024-07-11 11:18 ` [LTP] [PATCH v3 03/11] Added three more SAFE_* macros for landlock sandbox: Andrea Cervesato
2024-07-11 11:18 ` [LTP] [PATCH v3 04/11] Add SAFE_PRCTL macro Andrea Cervesato
2024-07-11 20:06   ` Petr Vorel
2024-07-11 11:18 ` [LTP] [PATCH v3 05/11] Add landlock01 test Andrea Cervesato
2024-07-11 20:40   ` Petr Vorel
2024-07-12  2:11     ` Li Wang
2024-07-12  3:03       ` Li Wang
2024-07-12  7:57         ` Petr Vorel
2024-07-12  8:28           ` Li Wang
2024-07-12  9:22             ` Petr Vorel
2024-07-12  7:07       ` Petr Vorel
2024-07-11 11:18 ` [LTP] [PATCH v3 06/11] Add landlock02 test Andrea Cervesato
2024-07-11 20:32   ` Petr Vorel
2024-07-16 16:59     ` Petr Vorel
2024-07-11 11:18 ` [LTP] [PATCH v3 07/11] Add landlock03 test Andrea Cervesato
2024-07-16 17:15   ` Petr Vorel
2024-07-11 11:18 ` [LTP] [PATCH v3 08/11] Add CAP_MKNOD fallback in lapi/capability.h Andrea Cervesato
2024-07-12  7:49   ` Li Wang
2024-07-11 11:18 ` [LTP] [PATCH v3 09/11] Add landlock04 test Andrea Cervesato
2024-07-12  7:50   ` Li Wang
2024-07-16 17:27   ` Petr Vorel
2024-07-24 10:41     ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
2024-07-24 12:12     ` Li Wang
2024-07-24 13:30       ` Petr Vorel
2024-07-24 13:37         ` Li Wang
2024-07-24 13:41           ` Petr Vorel
2024-07-24 13:41           ` Li Wang
2024-07-24 13:47       ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
2024-07-25  7:12         ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp [this message]
     [not found]           ` <54317d90-ec53-49ff-bbff-15200f09c8d2@suse.com>
2024-07-25  9:06             ` [LTP] LTP landlock test is failing for all kernels <= 6.6 Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-25  9:17               ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
2024-07-11 11:18 ` [LTP] [PATCH v3 10/11] Add landlock05 test Andrea Cervesato
2024-07-11 11:18 ` [LTP] [PATCH v3 11/11] Add landlock06 test Andrea Cervesato

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