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* [syzbot] [crypto?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in crypto_sha3_final (2)
@ 2023-07-04  5:36 syzbot
  2023-07-04  9:05 ` Herbert Xu
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-07-04  5:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: davem, herbert, linux-crypto, linux-kernel, netdev,
	syzkaller-bugs

Hello,

syzbot found the following issue on:

HEAD commit:    ae230642190a Merge branch 'af_unix-followup-fixes-for-so_p..
git tree:       net-next
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=11d7cc7f280000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=c9bf1936936ca698
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e436ef6c393283630f64
compiler:       gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2

Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this issue yet.

Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/8c060db03f09/disk-ae230642.raw.xz
vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/1b9b937ece91/vmlinux-ae230642.xz
kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/0c7eb1c82bf0/bzImage-ae230642.xz

IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+e436ef6c393283630f64@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in crypto_sha3_final+0x5e3/0x650 crypto/sha3_generic.c:220
Write of size 1 at addr ffff88802edbd4e3 by task syz-executor.4/14380

CPU: 0 PID: 14380 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-syzkaller-01948-gae230642190a #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:351
 print_report mm/kasan/report.c:462 [inline]
 kasan_report+0x11c/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:572
 crypto_sha3_final+0x5e3/0x650 crypto/sha3_generic.c:220
 shash_final_unaligned+0x154/0x220 crypto/shash.c:157
 shash_finup_unaligned+0x5b/0x70 crypto/shash.c:191
 crypto_shash_finup+0xdc/0x160 crypto/shash.c:212
 shash_ahash_finup+0xdf/0x3a0 crypto/shash.c:333
 crypto_ahash_op crypto/ahash.c:303 [inline]
 crypto_ahash_op crypto/ahash.c:292 [inline]
 crypto_ahash_finup+0xed/0x1e0 crypto/ahash.c:332
 hash_sendmsg+0x9d0/0x1150 crypto/algif_hash.c:149
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xde/0x190 net/socket.c:747
 sock_write_iter+0x295/0x3d0 net/socket.c:1128
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1868 [inline]
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]
 vfs_write+0x945/0xd50 fs/read_write.c:584
 ksys_write+0x1ec/0x250 fs/read_write.c:637
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f81fd88c389
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f81fe5e8168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f81fd9ac120 RCX: 00007f81fd88c389
RDX: 000000000000010f RSI: 0000000020000300 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007f81fd8d7493 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fff1397ccff R14: 00007f81fe5e8300 R15: 0000000000022000
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 14377:
 kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:374 [inline]
 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:333 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0xa2/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:383
 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:196 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:966 [inline]
 __kmalloc+0x5e/0x190 mm/slab_common.c:979
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:563 [inline]
 sock_kmalloc+0xb2/0x100 net/core/sock.c:2683
 hash_accept_parent_nokey+0x54/0x2e0 crypto/algif_hash.c:416
 hash_accept_parent+0x60/0x80 crypto/algif_hash.c:443
 af_alg_accept+0x172/0x5d0 crypto/af_alg.c:436
 do_accept+0x380/0x510 net/socket.c:1871
 __sys_accept4_file net/socket.c:1912 [inline]
 __sys_accept4+0x9a/0x120 net/socket.c:1942
 __do_sys_accept net/socket.c:1959 [inline]
 __se_sys_accept net/socket.c:1956 [inline]
 __x64_sys_accept+0x75/0xb0 net/socket.c:1956
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Last potentially related work creation:
 kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbc/0xd0 mm/kasan/generic.c:491
 __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x99/0x7e0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2627
 netlink_release+0xcde/0x1e40 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:828
 __sock_release+0xcd/0x290 net/socket.c:653
 sock_close+0x1c/0x20 net/socket.c:1385
 __fput+0x27c/0xa90 fs/file_table.c:321
 task_work_run+0x16f/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:179
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
 do_exit+0xaa3/0x29b0 kernel/exit.c:874
 do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1024
 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1035 [inline]
 __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1033 [inline]
 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3e/0x50 kernel/exit.c:1033
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Second to last potentially related work creation:
 kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbc/0xd0 mm/kasan/generic.c:491
 __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x99/0x7e0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2627
 netlink_release+0xcde/0x1e40 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:828
 __sock_release+0xcd/0x290 net/socket.c:653
 sock_close+0x1c/0x20 net/socket.c:1385
 __fput+0x27c/0xa90 fs/file_table.c:321
 task_work_run+0x16f/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:179
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
 do_exit+0xaa3/0x29b0 kernel/exit.c:874
 do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1024
 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1035 [inline]
 __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1033 [inline]
 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3e/0x50 kernel/exit.c:1033
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802edbd000
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 123 bytes to the right of
 allocated 1128-byte region [ffff88802edbd000, ffff88802edbd468)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea0000bb6e00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88802edb9000 pfn:0x2edb8
head:ffffea0000bb6e00 order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 00fff00000010200 ffff888012442000 ffffea0001df1e00 dead000000000002
raw: ffff88802edb9000 0000000080080007 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x1d20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC|__GFP_HARDWALL), pid 5043, tgid 5043 (syz-executor.4), ts 168507470584, free_ts 0
 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline]
 post_alloc_hook+0x2db/0x350 mm/page_alloc.c:1731
 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1738 [inline]
 get_page_from_freelist+0xf41/0x2c00 mm/page_alloc.c:3502
 __alloc_pages+0x1cb/0x4a0 mm/page_alloc.c:4768
 alloc_pages+0x1aa/0x270 mm/mempolicy.c:2279
 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:1851 [inline]
 allocate_slab+0x25f/0x390 mm/slub.c:1998
 new_slab mm/slub.c:2051 [inline]
 ___slab_alloc+0xa91/0x1400 mm/slub.c:3192
 __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x56/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3291
 __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3344 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3441 [inline]
 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x136/0x320 mm/slub.c:3490
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:965 [inline]
 __kmalloc+0x4e/0x190 mm/slab_common.c:979
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:563 [inline]
 sk_prot_alloc+0x140/0x290 net/core/sock.c:2077
 sk_alloc+0x3a/0x7f0 net/core/sock.c:2130
 __netlink_create+0x63/0x380 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:649
 netlink_create+0x3b1/0x5f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:712
 __sock_create+0x380/0x850 net/socket.c:1535
 sock_create net/socket.c:1586 [inline]
 __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1623 [inline]
 __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1608 [inline]
 __sys_socket+0x133/0x250 net/socket.c:1651
 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1664 [inline]
 __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1662 [inline]
 __x64_sys_socket+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1662
page_owner free stack trace missing

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88802edbd380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff88802edbd400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc
>ffff88802edbd480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                                       ^
 ffff88802edbd500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff88802edbd580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================


---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.

syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.

If the bug is already fixed, let syzbot know by replying with:
#syz fix: exact-commit-title

If you want to change bug's subsystems, reply with:
#syz set subsystems: new-subsystem
(See the list of subsystem names on the web dashboard)

If the bug is a duplicate of another bug, reply with:
#syz dup: exact-subject-of-another-report

If you want to undo deduplication, reply with:
#syz undup

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in crypto_sha3_final (2)
  2023-07-04  5:36 [syzbot] [crypto?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in crypto_sha3_final (2) syzbot
@ 2023-07-04  9:05 ` Herbert Xu
  2023-07-07  8:13   ` David Howells
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Herbert Xu @ 2023-07-04  9:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: syzbot
  Cc: davem, linux-crypto, linux-kernel, netdev, syzkaller-bugs,
	David Howells

On Mon, Jul 03, 2023 at 10:36:40PM -0700, syzbot wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> syzbot found the following issue on:
> 
> HEAD commit:    ae230642190a Merge branch 'af_unix-followup-fixes-for-so_p..
> git tree:       net-next
> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=11d7cc7f280000
> kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=c9bf1936936ca698
> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e436ef6c393283630f64
> compiler:       gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2
> 
> Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this issue yet.

Adding David Howell to the cc.

Thanks,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in crypto_sha3_final (2)
  2023-07-04  9:05 ` Herbert Xu
@ 2023-07-07  8:13   ` David Howells
  2023-07-07  8:13     ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2023-07-07  8:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Herbert Xu
  Cc: dhowells, syzbot, davem, linux-crypto, linux-kernel, netdev,
	syzkaller-bugs

I'm pretty certain this is the same as:

	https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=689ec3afb1ef07b766b2

as I sometimes see the same trace when running the reproducer from there.
---

#syz test: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

    crypto: algif/hash: Fix race between MORE and non-MORE sends
    
    The 'MSG_MORE' state of the previous sendmsg() is fetched without the
    socket lock held, so two sendmsg calls can race.  This can be seen with a
    large sendfile() as that now does a series of sendmsg() calls, and if a
    write() comes in on the same socket at an inopportune time, it can flip the
    state.
    
    Fix this by moving the fetch of ctx->more inside the socket lock.
    
    Fixes: c662b043cdca ("crypto: af_alg/hash: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES")
    Reported-by: syzbot+689ec3afb1ef07b766b2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000554b8205ffdea64e@google.com/
    Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
    cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
    cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
    cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
    cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
    cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
    cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org

diff --git a/crypto/algif_hash.c b/crypto/algif_hash.c
index 0ab43e149f0e..82c44d4899b9 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_hash.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_hash.c
@@ -68,13 +68,15 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 	struct hash_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
 	ssize_t copied = 0;
 	size_t len, max_pages, npages;
-	bool continuing = ctx->more, need_init = false;
+	bool continuing, need_init = false;
 	int err;
 
 	max_pages = min_t(size_t, ALG_MAX_PAGES,
 			  DIV_ROUND_UP(sk->sk_sndbuf, PAGE_SIZE));
 
 	lock_sock(sk);
+	continuing = ctx->more;
+
 	if (!continuing) {
 		/* Discard a previous request that wasn't marked MSG_MORE. */
 		hash_free_result(sk, ctx);


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in crypto_sha3_final (2)
  2023-07-07  8:13   ` David Howells
@ 2023-07-07  8:13     ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-07-07  8:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: dhowells
  Cc: davem, dhowells, herbert, linux-crypto, linux-kernel, netdev,
	syzkaller-bugs

> I'm pretty certain this is the same as:
>
> 	https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=689ec3afb1ef07b766b2
>
> as I sometimes see the same trace when running the reproducer from there.
> ---
>
> #syz test: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

This crash does not have a reproducer. I cannot test it.

>
>     crypto: algif/hash: Fix race between MORE and non-MORE sends
>     
>     The 'MSG_MORE' state of the previous sendmsg() is fetched without the
>     socket lock held, so two sendmsg calls can race.  This can be seen with a
>     large sendfile() as that now does a series of sendmsg() calls, and if a
>     write() comes in on the same socket at an inopportune time, it can flip the
>     state.
>     
>     Fix this by moving the fetch of ctx->more inside the socket lock.
>     
>     Fixes: c662b043cdca ("crypto: af_alg/hash: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES")
>     Reported-by: syzbot+689ec3afb1ef07b766b2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>     Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000554b8205ffdea64e@google.com/
>     Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
>     cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
>     cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
>     cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
>     cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
>     cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
>     cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
>     cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
>
> diff --git a/crypto/algif_hash.c b/crypto/algif_hash.c
> index 0ab43e149f0e..82c44d4899b9 100644
> --- a/crypto/algif_hash.c
> +++ b/crypto/algif_hash.c
> @@ -68,13 +68,15 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
>  	struct hash_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
>  	ssize_t copied = 0;
>  	size_t len, max_pages, npages;
> -	bool continuing = ctx->more, need_init = false;
> +	bool continuing, need_init = false;
>  	int err;
>  
>  	max_pages = min_t(size_t, ALG_MAX_PAGES,
>  			  DIV_ROUND_UP(sk->sk_sndbuf, PAGE_SIZE));
>  
>  	lock_sock(sk);
> +	continuing = ctx->more;
> +
>  	if (!continuing) {
>  		/* Discard a previous request that wasn't marked MSG_MORE. */
>  		hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2023-07-07  8:13 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2023-07-04  5:36 [syzbot] [crypto?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in crypto_sha3_final (2) syzbot
2023-07-04  9:05 ` Herbert Xu
2023-07-07  8:13   ` David Howells
2023-07-07  8:13     ` syzbot

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