From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
To: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, mst@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devices
Date: Thu, 06 Dec 2012 10:36:11 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <10346047.LWlqqejLmO@sifl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <9040763.QsllgCP7TP@jason-thinkpad-t430s>
On Thursday, December 06, 2012 06:29:54 PM Jason Wang wrote:
> On Wednesday, December 05, 2012 03:26:19 PM Paul Moore wrote:
> > This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced
> > with the multiqueue patchset. The problem stems from the fact that the
> > multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its
> > associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the
> > device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted
> > for the life of the userspace connection (fd open). For non-persistent
> > devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause
> > the tun device to lose its SELinux label.
> >
> > We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the
> > tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g.
> > SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun
> > device. In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new
> > approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook,
> > security_tun_dev_create_queue(), to approve requests to create a new
> > TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE.
> >
> > The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the
> > other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls. This patch makes
> > use of the recently added "tun_socket:create_queue" permission to
> > restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation. On older SELinux
> > policies which do not define the "tun_socket:create_queue" permission
> > the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according
> > to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
...
> > @@ -4425,20 +4452,19 @@ static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct
> > sock
> > *sk) * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling *
> > protocols were being used */
> >
> > - /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we ...
> > -
> > - sksec->sid = current_sid();
> > + sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
>
> Since both tun_set_iff() and tun_set_queue() would call this. I wonder when
> it is called by tun_set_queue() we need some checking just like what we
> done in v1, otherwise it's unconditionally in TUNSETQUEUE. Or we can add
> them in selinux_tun_dev_create_queue()?
In all the cases that call tun_attach() we have a new socket which needs to be
labeled based on the tun->security label, yes? That is what the
security_tun_dev_attach() code does, there is no need for access control at
this point as the operation has already been authorized by either
security_tun_dev_create() (new device), security_tun_dev_create_queue() (new
queue), or security_tun_dev_open() (opening persistent device).
I think we are all set, or am I missing something?
> > sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
> >
> > +
> > + return 0;
> >
> > }
--
paul moore
security and virtualization @ redhat
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-12-06 15:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-12-05 20:25 [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] Fix some multiqueue TUN problems Paul Moore
2012-12-05 20:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] tun: correctly report an error in tun_flow_init() Paul Moore
2012-12-06 10:31 ` Jason Wang
2012-12-06 15:46 ` Paul Moore
2012-12-05 20:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] selinux: add the "create_queue" permission to the "tun_socket" class Paul Moore
2012-12-05 20:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devices Paul Moore
2012-12-06 10:29 ` Jason Wang
2012-12-06 15:36 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2012-12-07 5:29 ` Jason Wang
2012-12-06 10:33 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2012-12-06 13:51 ` Jason Wang
2012-12-06 14:12 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2012-12-06 15:46 ` Paul Moore
2012-12-06 16:12 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2012-12-06 16:56 ` Paul Moore
2012-12-06 20:57 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2012-12-06 21:09 ` Paul Moore
2012-12-07 12:25 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2012-12-10 17:04 ` Paul Moore
2012-12-10 17:26 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2012-12-10 17:33 ` Paul Moore
2012-12-10 17:50 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2012-12-10 18:42 ` Eric Paris
2012-12-10 22:21 ` Paul Moore
2012-12-10 22:43 ` Paul Moore
2012-12-11 6:41 ` Jason Wang
2012-12-12 9:10 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2012-12-07 5:41 ` Jason Wang
2012-12-12 9:22 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2012-12-12 18:49 ` Paul Moore
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