From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: jamal Subject: Re: tcp vulnerability? haven't seen anything on it here... Date: 22 Apr 2004 10:27:02 -0400 Sender: netdev-bounce@oss.sgi.com Message-ID: <1082644022.1099.40.camel@jzny.localdomain> References: <1082640135.1059.93.camel@jzny.localdomain> Reply-To: hadi@cyberus.ca Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: "David S. Miller" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@oss.sgi.com, cfriesen@nortelnetworks.com, =?ISO-8859-1?Q?J=F6rn?= Engel Return-path: To: Giuliano Pochini In-Reply-To: Errors-to: netdev-bounce@oss.sgi.com List-Id: netdev.vger.kernel.org On Thu, 2004-04-22 at 09:46, Giuliano Pochini wrote: > On Thu, 22 Apr 2004, jamal wrote: > > > On Thu, 2004-04-22 at 04:23, Giuliano Pochini wrote: > > > > > Yes, but it is possible, expecially for long sessions. > > > > In other words, 80% or more of internet traffic would not be affected > > still using http1.0 would not be affected. > > And for something like a huge download to just regular joe, this is more > > of a nuisance assuming some kiddie has access between you and the > > server. > > No, TCP/IP is 100% vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attach. > There is no cure for that. Unless its a private network with locked vaults for the pipes, any network is vulnerable. I am not trying to downplay the relevance of this; all i am saying is it may a little overhyped with the media being involved. Its infact harder to create this attack compared to a simple SYN attack. On Thu, 2004-04-22 at 09:58, Florian Weimer wrote: jamal writes: > > > OTOH, long lived BGP sessions are affected assuming you are going across > > hostile path to your peer. > > Hostile path is not required. Not at all. 8-( > > Unless i misunderstood: You need someone/thing to see about 64K packets within a single flow to make the predicition so the attack is succesful. Sure to have access to such capability is to be in a hostile path, no? ;-> > And it's not BGP specific. You might be able to use this attack to > split IRC networks, too. However, it's a bit harder in this case > because IRC servers usually use more random source ports. Any long lived flow with close to fixed ports. FTP from kernel.org could be vulnerable - get a better client and its just becomes a nuisance. 80% of the internet traffic is still TCP/HTTP1.0 which is very short lived (there could be changes lately - these are numbers from a while back) i.e you wont see more than 8 packets i.e it is highly unlikely your traffic there is affected even if you used fixed ports. cheers, jamal