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From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
To: Linux Audit Discussion <linux-audit@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>,
	netdev@oss.sgi.com, davem@davemloft.net, kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Add audit uid to netlink credentials
Date: Wed, 09 Feb 2005 23:56:09 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1107993369.9154.2.camel@localhost.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050209153816.B24171@build.pdx.osdl.net>

On Wed, 2005-02-09 at 15:38 -0800, Chris Wright wrote:
>> So you also think it should be in the payload?  That would require
>> security_netlink_send to dig into the payload if we wanted to control
>> who can specify other loginuids, as Serge noted.
>
>I just don't see it making sense to add another credential for a special
>case.  The signal code already peaks into the siginfo struct when queueing
>a signal to make sure some user isn't trying to send si_code == SI_KERNEL
>or similar.  Perhaps audit could do that with it's own payload during send.
>No matter how we slice it, it's a special case.

I'm not entirely sure the check is needed anyway. This is a trusted
application sending audit messages. Why shouldn't it be permitted to log
auditable events which were triggered by someone _else_? 

If we want to audit the actions of the userspace logging dæmon itself
and see what it sends, then we can quite happily do so within the audit
framework. That's a _different_ issue, surely?

-- 
dwmw2

  reply	other threads:[~2005-02-09 23:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2005-02-04 16:58 [PATCH] Add audit uid to netlink credentials Serge E. Hallyn
2005-02-08  6:04 ` Patrick McHardy
2005-02-09 13:34   ` Stephen Smalley
2005-02-09 14:10     ` Patrick McHardy
2005-02-09 14:19     ` Alexey Kuznetsov
2005-02-09 16:49       ` Alexey Kuznetsov
2005-02-09 18:52         ` Patrick McHardy
2005-02-09 18:53           ` Stephen Smalley
2005-02-09 14:17 ` David Woodhouse
2005-02-09 14:50   ` Serge Hallyn
2005-02-09 18:23     ` Stephen Smalley
2005-02-09 18:37       ` Chris Wright
2005-02-09 18:40         ` Stephen Smalley
2005-02-09 23:38           ` Chris Wright
2005-02-09 23:56             ` David Woodhouse [this message]
2005-02-10  0:19               ` Chris Wright
2005-02-10  9:20                 ` David Woodhouse
2005-02-10 12:40                 ` Stephen Smalley
2005-02-10 12:49                   ` David Woodhouse
2005-02-10 17:14                   ` Chris Wright
2005-02-10  1:11             ` Chris Wright
2005-02-10 12:36               ` Stephen Smalley
2005-02-10 12:51                 ` Stephen Smalley
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2005-02-10 14:37 Chad Hanson
2005-02-10 14:56 ` David Woodhouse
2005-02-10 17:52   ` Klaus Weidner
2005-02-10 18:10     ` Casey Schaufler
2005-02-10 19:26       ` Klaus Weidner
2005-02-10 15:16 Chad Hanson

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