From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: David Woodhouse Subject: Re: [PATCH] Add audit uid to netlink credentials Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2005 12:49:39 +0000 Message-ID: <1108039780.19262.533.camel@hades.cambridge.redhat.com> References: <20050204165840.GA2320@IBM-BWN8ZTBWA01.austin.ibm.com> <1107958621.19262.524.camel@hades.cambridge.redhat.com> <1107960659.4837.9.camel@serge> <1107973381.17568.97.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <20050209103747.Y24171@build.pdx.osdl.net> <1107974448.17568.108.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <20050209153816.B24171@build.pdx.osdl.net> <1107993369.9154.2.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20050209161946.F24171@build.pdx.osdl.net> <1108039217.22172.31.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: Linux Audit Discussion , netdev@oss.sgi.com, davem@davemloft.net, kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru To: Stephen Smalley In-Reply-To: <1108039217.22172.31.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> Sender: netdev-bounce@oss.sgi.com Errors-to: netdev-bounce@oss.sgi.com List-Id: netdev.vger.kernel.org On Thu, 2005-02-10 at 07:40 -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote: > To be precise, isn't it true that someone with only CAP_AUDIT_WRITE > would only be able to spoof loginuids in the AUDIT_USER messages they > generate? The loginuid on any syscall audit messages for the task would > still be the one associated with the task's audit context, so that would > not be spoofable. Correct. -- dwmw2