Re: [PATCH net-next] [RFC] netns: enable cross-ve Unix sockets

["Denis V. Lunev" <den@openvz.org>]

On Wed, 2008-10-01 at 15:46 +0200, Daniel Lezcano wrote:
> Denis V. Lunev wrote:
> > On Wed, 2008-10-01 at 14:31 +0200, Daniel Lezcano wrote:
> >> Pavel Emelyanov wrote:
> >>>> So there are 2 cases:
> >>>>   * full isolation : restriction on VPS
> >>>>   * partial isolation : no restriction but *perhaps* problem when migrating
> >>>>
> >>>> Looks like we need an option per namespace to reduce the isolation for 
> >>>> af_unix sockets :)
> >>>>   - on (default): current behaviour => full isolation
> >>>>   - off : partial isolation
> >>> You mean some sysctl, that enables/disables this check in unix_find_socket_byinode?
> >> Yes.
> > 
> > I do not see much sense with sysctl as:
> > - check (cross-connected sockets) is required as we can start namespace
> >   with already opened socket
> 
> Check when checkpointing ? If you inherit a socket from your parent 
> namespace, this socket belongs to your parent and you should not 
> checkpoint it, no ?
> 
> In case you allow cross-connected sockets, this check is mandatory I agree.
> 
> > - this kind of sharing is not implicit but explicit as normal isolated
> >   containers _must_ have separate filesystems. In this case this
> >   sharing requires explicit host administrator action to link socket
> >   between containers
> 
> What are "normal isolated containers" ? Are they OpenVZ containers ? 
> These containers belong to the system containers family. What happens 
> with application containers, if I want to share the filesystem without 
> breaking the isolation of the afunix sockets ?

then you are doomed as you will have a FIFO opened from 2 namespaces and
checking the absences of external references is still mandatory

> The current code provides full isolation and this is in mainline. I 
> don't think it is reasonable to change that. What I propose is to keep 
> the current behaviour.
> 
> When you create a network namespace, you can change the behaviour inside 
> this namespace via /proc/sys/net/unix/isolated (for example).
> 
> This option allows:
> 1 - to connect to af_unix not belonging to the container
> 2 - to accept af_unix connection from outside the container (avoid a 
> container to forbid the checkpoint of another container);

this should be at least per/namespace option controlled from parent
container from my POW