* TCP/IP stack interpretation of acceptable packet @ 2009-02-24 22:59 Oliver Zheng 2009-02-28 15:50 ` Andi Kleen 2009-03-19 0:44 ` [PATCH net-next-2.6] " John Dykstra 0 siblings, 2 replies; 8+ messages in thread From: Oliver Zheng @ 2009-02-24 22:59 UTC (permalink / raw) To: netdev I was investigating behaviour of the TCP/IP stacks and noticed that Linux has a peculiarity. When a packet is received with the correct sequence number but incorrect acknowledgement number (in my tests, it was higher than the correct acknowledgement number), the stack accepts the packet as a valid packet and passes the data up to the application (I do not know whether the ack information is accepted). According to the list of tests described here in the TCP RFC 793 [1], accepting a packet requires the packet to satisfy both sequence and acknowledgement number tests; otherwise, the entirety of the packet (its data and its acknowledgement information confirming reception of previous data) should be dropped. Is this intentional, a bug, or am I misinterpreting something? A nice flow chart that explains this procedure is here [2]. Not to instigate flame, but Windows does this correctly, or at least correctly in my interpretation of the spec. [1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc793#page-69 [2] http://www.medianet.kent.edu/techreports/TR2005-07-22-tcp-EFSM.pdf (page 17) Cheers, Oliver ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: TCP/IP stack interpretation of acceptable packet 2009-02-24 22:59 TCP/IP stack interpretation of acceptable packet Oliver Zheng @ 2009-02-28 15:50 ` Andi Kleen 2009-03-19 0:44 ` [PATCH net-next-2.6] " John Dykstra 1 sibling, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread From: Andi Kleen @ 2009-02-28 15:50 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Oliver Zheng; +Cc: netdev Oliver Zheng <mailinglists+netdev@oliverzheng.com> writes: > I was investigating behaviour of the TCP/IP stacks and noticed that > Linux has a peculiarity. When a packet is received with the correct > sequence number but incorrect acknowledgement number (in my tests, it > was higher than the correct acknowledgement number), the stack accepts > the packet as a valid packet and passes the data up to the application > (I do not know whether the ack information is accepted). According to > the list of tests described here in the TCP RFC 793 [1], accepting a > packet requires the packet to satisfy both sequence and > acknowledgement number tests; otherwise, the entirety of the packet > (its data and its acknowledgement information confirming reception of > previous data) should be dropped. Is this intentional, a bug, or am I > misinterpreting something? A nice flow chart that explains this > procedure is here [2]. Sounds like a bug to me, when the ack is outside the window. -Andi -- ak@linux.intel.com -- Speaking for myself only. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* [PATCH net-next-2.6] Re: TCP/IP stack interpretation of acceptable packet 2009-02-24 22:59 TCP/IP stack interpretation of acceptable packet Oliver Zheng 2009-02-28 15:50 ` Andi Kleen @ 2009-03-19 0:44 ` John Dykstra 2009-03-19 1:47 ` Oliver Zheng 2009-03-23 4:50 ` David Miller 1 sibling, 2 replies; 8+ messages in thread From: John Dykstra @ 2009-03-19 0:44 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Oliver Zheng; +Cc: netdev, Andi Kleen On Tue, 2009-02-24 at 14:59 -0800, Oliver Zheng wrote: > When a packet is received with the correct > sequence number but incorrect acknowledgement number (in my tests, it > was higher than the correct acknowledgement number), the stack accepts > the packet as a valid packet and passes the data up to the application TCP's fast path currently accepts segments who ack data that was never sent. The slow path and processing for states other than ESTABLISHED discard such segments. RFC793 says (Section 3.9) that not only should such segments be discarded, but that an ACK should be sent to the peer. I can't see what that accomplishes, and it seems to badly interact with fast retransmit--under some conditions with crafted packets you can get the two stacks ACKing each other forever. So I left that out of this patch: [PATCH net-next-2.6] tcp: Discard segments that ack data not yet sent Discard incoming packets whose ack field iincludes data not yet sent. This is consistent with RFC 793 Section 3.9. Change tcp_ack() to distinguish between too-small and too-large ack field values. Keep segments with too-large ack fields out of the fast path, and change slow path to discard them. Reported-by: Oliver Zheng <mailinglists+netdev@oliverzheng.com> Signed-off-by: John Dykstra <john.dykstra1@gmail.com> --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index fae78e3..01544cd 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -3587,16 +3587,19 @@ static int tcp_ack(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int flag) u32 prior_fackets; int prior_packets; int frto_cwnd = 0; - - /* If the ack is newer than sent or older than previous acks + + /* If the ack is older than previous acks * then we can probably ignore it. */ - if (after(ack, tp->snd_nxt)) - goto uninteresting_ack; - if (before(ack, prior_snd_una)) goto old_ack; + /* If the ack includes data we haven't sent yet, discard + * this segment (RFC793 Section 3.9). + */ + if (after(ack, tp->snd_nxt)) + goto invalid_ack; + if (after(ack, prior_snd_una)) flag |= FLAG_SND_UNA_ADVANCED; @@ -3686,6 +3689,10 @@ no_queue: tcp_ack_probe(sk); return 1; +invalid_ack: + SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "Ack %u after %u:%u\n", ack, tp->snd_una, tp->snd_nxt); + return -1; + old_ack: if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked) { tcp_sacktag_write_queue(sk, skb, prior_snd_una); @@ -3693,9 +3700,8 @@ old_ack: tcp_try_keep_open(sk); } -uninteresting_ack: - SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "Ack %u out of %u:%u\n", ack, tp->snd_una, tp->snd_nxt); - return 0; + SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "Ack %u before %u:%u\n", ack, tp->snd_una, tp->snd_nxt); + return 0; } /* Look for tcp options. Normally only called on SYN and SYNACK packets. @@ -5158,7 +5164,8 @@ int tcp_rcv_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, */ if ((tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_HP_BITS) == tp->pred_flags && - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq == tp->rcv_nxt) { + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq == tp->rcv_nxt && + !after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq, tp->snd_nxt)) { int tcp_header_len = tp->tcp_header_len; /* Timestamp header prediction: tcp_header_len @@ -5311,8 +5318,8 @@ slow_path: return -res; step5: - if (th->ack) - tcp_ack(sk, skb, FLAG_SLOWPATH); + if (th->ack && tcp_ack(sk, skb, FLAG_SLOWPATH) < 0) + goto discard; tcp_rcv_rtt_measure_ts(sk, skb); @@ -5649,7 +5656,7 @@ int tcp_rcv_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, /* step 5: check the ACK field */ if (th->ack) { - int acceptable = tcp_ack(sk, skb, FLAG_SLOWPATH); + int acceptable = tcp_ack(sk, skb, FLAG_SLOWPATH) > 0; switch (sk->sk_state) { case TCP_SYN_RECV: -- 1.5.4.3 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net-next-2.6] Re: TCP/IP stack interpretation of acceptable packet 2009-03-19 0:44 ` [PATCH net-next-2.6] " John Dykstra @ 2009-03-19 1:47 ` Oliver Zheng 2009-03-23 4:50 ` David Miller 1 sibling, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread From: Oliver Zheng @ 2009-03-19 1:47 UTC (permalink / raw) To: John Dykstra; +Cc: netdev, Andi Kleen On Thu, Mar 19, 2009 at 12:44:53AM +0000, John Dykstra wrote: > RFC793 says (Section 3.9) that not only should such segments be > discarded, but that an ACK should be sent to the peer. I can't see what > that accomplishes, and it seems to badly interact with fast > retransmit--under some conditions with crafted packets you can get the > two stacks ACKing each other forever. So I left that out of this patch: I think part of the original intentions for the response ack is to generate the "ack storm". In certain cases of tcp hijacking where the attacker is trying to resynchronize a tcp session after injecting a packet into the stream, an ack storm raises alerts in intrusion detection systems. Most of the times, built-in measures reset the tcp session given an unusual large number of acks (I'm not sure how or if Linux does this). This was partially the original reason I was looking into this. I noticed that Windows does not send an ack back if the received ack has a higher than expected ack number *and* higher than expected sequence number. For some well crafted tcp hijacking cases, this increases the attack success rate substantially. It's beyond my knowledge of other implications such a response ack would cause. Cheers, Oliver ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net-next-2.6] Re: TCP/IP stack interpretation of acceptable packet 2009-03-19 0:44 ` [PATCH net-next-2.6] " John Dykstra 2009-03-19 1:47 ` Oliver Zheng @ 2009-03-23 4:50 ` David Miller 2009-03-23 12:28 ` Andi Kleen 1 sibling, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread From: David Miller @ 2009-03-23 4:50 UTC (permalink / raw) To: john.dykstra1; +Cc: mailinglists+netdev, netdev, andi From: John Dykstra <john.dykstra1@gmail.com> Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2009 00:44:53 +0000 > [PATCH net-next-2.6] tcp: Discard segments that ack data not yet sent > > Discard incoming packets whose ack field iincludes data not yet sent. > This is consistent with RFC 793 Section 3.9. > > Change tcp_ack() to distinguish between too-small and too-large ack > field values. Keep segments with too-large ack fields out of the fast > path, and change slow path to discard them. > > Reported-by: Oliver Zheng <mailinglists+netdev@oliverzheng.com> > Signed-off-by: John Dykstra <john.dykstra1@gmail.com> I've been mulling over this patch for more than a week :-) Let's put this into net-next-2.6 and let it cook there for a while. It is possible I'll backport this into -stable after some time. Thanks! ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net-next-2.6] Re: TCP/IP stack interpretation of acceptable packet 2009-03-23 4:50 ` David Miller @ 2009-03-23 12:28 ` Andi Kleen 2009-03-23 15:13 ` John Dykstra 2009-03-23 18:58 ` David Miller 0 siblings, 2 replies; 8+ messages in thread From: Andi Kleen @ 2009-03-23 12:28 UTC (permalink / raw) To: David Miller; +Cc: john.dykstra1, mailinglists+netdev, netdev, andi > I've been mulling over this patch for more than a week :-) > > Let's put this into net-next-2.6 and let it cook there for > a while. It is possible I'll backport this into -stable > after some time. One thing that might be useful for the testing period would be explicit printk when such a new discard happens? Otherwise it would be difficult to find out if something really goes wrong. -Andi -- ak@linux.intel.com -- Speaking for myself only. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net-next-2.6] Re: TCP/IP stack interpretation of acceptable packet 2009-03-23 12:28 ` Andi Kleen @ 2009-03-23 15:13 ` John Dykstra 2009-03-23 18:58 ` David Miller 1 sibling, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread From: John Dykstra @ 2009-03-23 15:13 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Andi Kleen; +Cc: David Miller, mailinglists+netdev, netdev On Sun, 2009-03-22 at 21:50 -0700, David Miller wrote: > I've been mulling over this patch for more than a week :-) FWIW, FreeBSD 6.1 discards segments with these over-eager acknowledgment fields. It also sends back the pure ACK that I chose not to add. I didn't look at any other OS's. On Mon, 2009-03-23 at 13:28 +0100, Andi Kleen wrote: > One thing that might be useful for the testing period would > be explicit printk when such a new discard happens? [PATCH net-next-2.6] tcp: Log discarded segments with too-high ack fields Log a rate-limited message when a TCP segment is discarded because its ack field is beyond the last data sent. This logging was suggested by Andi Kleen. Signed-off-by: John Dykstra <john.dykstra1@gmail.com> --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 4 +++- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 01544cd..37343e4 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -3690,7 +3690,9 @@ no_queue: return 1; invalid_ack: - SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "Ack %u after %u:%u\n", ack, tp->snd_una, tp->snd_nxt); + if (printk_ratelimit()) + printk(KERN_NOTICE "Ack %u after %u:%u; segment discarded\n", + ack, tp->snd_una, tp->snd_nxt); return -1; old_ack: -- 1.5.4.3 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net-next-2.6] Re: TCP/IP stack interpretation of acceptable packet 2009-03-23 12:28 ` Andi Kleen 2009-03-23 15:13 ` John Dykstra @ 2009-03-23 18:58 ` David Miller 1 sibling, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread From: David Miller @ 2009-03-23 18:58 UTC (permalink / raw) To: andi; +Cc: john.dykstra1, mailinglists+netdev, netdev From: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2009 13:28:06 +0100 > > I've been mulling over this patch for more than a week :-) > > > > Let's put this into net-next-2.6 and let it cook there for > > a while. It is possible I'll backport this into -stable > > after some time. > > One thing that might be useful for the testing period would > be explicit printk when such a new discard happens? Otherwise > it would be difficult to find out if something really goes wrong. No, thanks. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2009-03-23 18:58 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 8+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2009-02-24 22:59 TCP/IP stack interpretation of acceptable packet Oliver Zheng 2009-02-28 15:50 ` Andi Kleen 2009-03-19 0:44 ` [PATCH net-next-2.6] " John Dykstra 2009-03-19 1:47 ` Oliver Zheng 2009-03-23 4:50 ` David Miller 2009-03-23 12:28 ` Andi Kleen 2009-03-23 15:13 ` John Dykstra 2009-03-23 18:58 ` David Miller
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