Re: DDoS attack causing bad effect on conntrack searches

Patrick McHardy
2010-06-01T10:18:27Z

Eric Dumazet wrote:
> Le mardi 01 juin 2010 à 08:28 +0800, Changli Gao a écrit :
>> On Tue, Jun 1, 2010 at 5:21 AM, Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> I had a look at current conntrack and found the 'unconfirmed' list was
>>> maybe a candidate for a potential blackhole.
>>>
>>> That is, if a reader happens to hit an entry that is moved from regular
>>> hash table slot 'hash' to unconfirmed list,
>> Sorry, but I can't find where we do this things. unconfirmed list is
>> used to track the unconfirmed cts, whose corresponding skbs are still
>> in path from the first to the last netfilter hooks. As soon as the
>> skbs end their travel in netfilter, the corresponding cts will be
>> confirmed(moving ct from unconfirmed list to regular hash table).
>>
>
> So netfilter is a monolithic thing.
>
> When a packet begins its travel into netfilter, you guarantee that no
> other packet can also begin its travel and find an unconfirmed
> conntrack ?

Correct, the unconfirmed list exists only for cleanup.

> I wonder why we use atomic ops then to track the confirmed bit :)

Good question, that looks unnecessary :)

>> unconfirmed list should be small, as networking receiving is in BH.
>
> So according to you, netfilter/ct runs only in input path ?
>
> So I assume a packet is handled by CPU X, creates a new conntrack
> (possibly early droping an old entry that was previously in a standard
> hash chain), inserted in unconfirmed list. _You_ guarantee another CPU
> Y, handling another packet, possibly sent by a hacker reading your
> netdev mails, cannot find the conntrack that was early dropped ?
>
>> How about implementing unconfirmed list as a per cpu variable?
>
> I first implemented such a patch to reduce cache line contention, then I
> asked to myself : What is exactly an unconfirmed conntrack ? Can their
> number be unbounded ? If yes, we have a problem, even on a two cpus
> machine. Using two lists instead of one wont solve the fundamental
> problem.

If a new conntrack is created in PRE_ROUTING or LOCAL_OUT, it will be
added to the unconfirmed list and moved to the hash as soon as the
packet passes POST_ROUTING. This means the number of unconfirmed entries
created by the network is bound by the number of CPUs due to BH
processing. The number created by locally generated packets is unbound
in case of preemptible kernels however.

> The real question is, why do we need this unconfirmed 'list' in the
> first place. Is it really a private per cpu thing ? Can you prove this,
> in respect of lockless lookups, and things like NFQUEUE ?

Its used for cleaning up conntracks not in the hash table yet on
module unload (or manual flush). It is supposed to be write-only
during regular operation.

> Each conntrack object has two list anchors. One for IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL,
> one for IP_CT_DIR_REPLY.
>
> Unconfirmed list use the first anchor. This means another cpu can
> definitely find an unconfirmed item in a regular hash chain, since we
> dont respect an RCU grace period before re-using an object.
>
> If memory was not a problem, we probably would use a third anchor to
> avoid this, or regular RCU instead of SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU variant.

So I guess we should check the CONFIRMED bit when searching
in the hash table.
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