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* [PATCH 3/10] Fix leaking of kernel heap addresses in net/
@ 2010-11-12  1:07 Dan Rosenberg
  2010-11-12  1:20 ` Thomas Graf
  2010-11-12 15:11 ` Ben Hutchings
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Dan Rosenberg @ 2010-11-12  1:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: David S. Miller, Oliver Hartkopp, Alexey Kuznetsov, Urs Thuermann,
	Hideaki 

diff --git a/net/ipv4/raw.c b/net/ipv4/raw.c
index 1f85ef2..0ac8ff2 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/raw.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/raw.c
@@ -948,13 +948,26 @@ static void raw_sock_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, struct sock *sp, int i)
 	__u16 destp = 0,
 	      srcp  = inet->inet_num;
 
-	seq_printf(seq, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
-		" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %lu %d %p %d\n",
-		i, src, srcp, dest, destp, sp->sk_state,
-		sk_wmem_alloc_get(sp),
-		sk_rmem_alloc_get(sp),
-		0, 0L, 0, sock_i_uid(sp), 0, sock_i_ino(sp),
-		atomic_read(&sp->sk_refcnt), sp, atomic_read(&sp->sk_drops));
+	/* Only expose kernel addresses to privileged readers */
+	if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+		seq_printf(seq, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
+			" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %lu %d %p %d\n",
+			i, src, srcp, dest, destp, sp->sk_state,
+			sk_wmem_alloc_get(sp),
+			sk_rmem_alloc_get(sp),
+			0, 0L, 0, sock_i_uid(sp), 0, sock_i_ino(sp),
+			atomic_read(&sp->sk_refcnt),
+			sp, atomic_read(&sp->sk_drops));
+	else
+		seq_printf(seq, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
+			" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %lu %d %d %d\n",
+			i, src, srcp, dest, destp, sp->sk_state,
+			sk_wmem_alloc_get(sp),
+			sk_rmem_alloc_get(sp),
+			0, 0L, 0, sock_i_uid(sp), 0, sock_i_ino(sp),
+			atomic_read(&sp->sk_refcnt),
+			0, atomic_read(&sp->sk_drops));
+
 }
 
 static int raw_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index 8f8527d..a37eeb4 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -2388,24 +2388,47 @@ static void get_openreq4(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
 	const struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
 	int ttd = req->expires - jiffies;
 
-	seq_printf(f, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
-		" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %u %d %p%n",
-		i,
-		ireq->loc_addr,
-		ntohs(inet_sk(sk)->inet_sport),
-		ireq->rmt_addr,
-		ntohs(ireq->rmt_port),
-		TCP_SYN_RECV,
-		0, 0, /* could print option size, but that is af dependent. */
-		1,    /* timers active (only the expire timer) */
-		jiffies_to_clock_t(ttd),
-		req->retrans,
-		uid,
-		0,  /* non standard timer */
-		0, /* open_requests have no inode */
-		atomic_read(&sk->sk_refcnt),
-		req,
-		len);
+	/* Only expose kernel addresses to privileged readers */
+	if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+		seq_printf(f, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
+			" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %u %d %p%n",
+			i,
+			ireq->loc_addr,
+			ntohs(inet_sk(sk)->inet_sport),
+			ireq->rmt_addr,
+			ntohs(ireq->rmt_port),
+			TCP_SYN_RECV,
+			0, 0, /* could print option size,
+				 but that is af dependent. */
+			1,    /* timers active (only the expire timer) */
+			jiffies_to_clock_t(ttd),
+			req->retrans,
+			uid,
+			0,  /* non standard timer */
+			0, /* open_requests have no inode */
+			atomic_read(&sk->sk_refcnt),
+			req,
+			len);
+	else
+		seq_printf(f, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
+			" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %u %d %d%n",
+			i,
+			ireq->loc_addr,
+			ntohs(inet_sk(sk)->inet_sport),
+			ireq->rmt_addr,
+			ntohs(ireq->rmt_port),
+			TCP_SYN_RECV,
+			0, 0, /* could print option size,
+				 but that is af dependent. */
+			1,    /* timers active (only the expire timer) */
+			jiffies_to_clock_t(ttd),
+			req->retrans,
+			uid,
+			0,  /* non standard timer */
+			0, /* open_requests have no inode */
+			atomic_read(&sk->sk_refcnt),
+			0,
+			len);
 }
 
 static void get_tcp4_sock(struct sock *sk, struct seq_file *f, int i, int *len)
@@ -2443,24 +2466,46 @@ static void get_tcp4_sock(struct sock *sk, struct seq_file *f, int i, int *len)
 		 */
 		rx_queue = max_t(int, tp->rcv_nxt - tp->copied_seq, 0);
 
-	seq_printf(f, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX "
-			"%08X %5d %8d %lu %d %p %lu %lu %u %u %d%n",
-		i, src, srcp, dest, destp, sk->sk_state,
-		tp->write_seq - tp->snd_una,
-		rx_queue,
-		timer_active,
-		jiffies_to_clock_t(timer_expires - jiffies),
-		icsk->icsk_retransmits,
-		sock_i_uid(sk),
-		icsk->icsk_probes_out,
-		sock_i_ino(sk),
-		atomic_read(&sk->sk_refcnt), sk,
-		jiffies_to_clock_t(icsk->icsk_rto),
-		jiffies_to_clock_t(icsk->icsk_ack.ato),
-		(icsk->icsk_ack.quick << 1) | icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong,
-		tp->snd_cwnd,
-		tcp_in_initial_slowstart(tp) ? -1 : tp->snd_ssthresh,
-		len);
+	/* Only expose kernel addresses to privileged readers */
+	if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+		seq_printf(f, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X %02X %08X:%08X "
+			"%02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %lu %d %p %lu %lu %u %u %d%n",
+			i, src, srcp, dest, destp, sk->sk_state,
+			tp->write_seq - tp->snd_una,
+			rx_queue,
+			timer_active,
+			jiffies_to_clock_t(timer_expires - jiffies),
+			icsk->icsk_retransmits,
+			sock_i_uid(sk),
+			icsk->icsk_probes_out,
+			sock_i_ino(sk),
+			atomic_read(&sk->sk_refcnt), sk,
+			jiffies_to_clock_t(icsk->icsk_rto),
+			jiffies_to_clock_t(icsk->icsk_ack.ato),
+			(icsk->icsk_ack.quick << 1) | icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong,
+			tp->snd_cwnd,
+			tcp_in_initial_slowstart(tp) ? -1 : tp->snd_ssthresh,
+			len);
+	else
+		seq_printf(f, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X %02X %08X:%08X "
+			"%02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %lu %d %d %lu %lu %u %u %d%n",
+			i, src, srcp, dest, destp, sk->sk_state,
+			tp->write_seq - tp->snd_una,
+			rx_queue,
+			timer_active,
+			jiffies_to_clock_t(timer_expires - jiffies),
+			icsk->icsk_retransmits,
+			sock_i_uid(sk),
+			icsk->icsk_probes_out,
+			sock_i_ino(sk),
+			atomic_read(&sk->sk_refcnt), 0,
+			jiffies_to_clock_t(icsk->icsk_rto),
+			jiffies_to_clock_t(icsk->icsk_ack.ato),
+			(icsk->icsk_ack.quick << 1) | icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong,
+			tp->snd_cwnd,
+			tcp_in_initial_slowstart(tp) ? -1 : tp->snd_ssthresh,
+			len);
+
 }
 
 static void get_timewait4_sock(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw,
@@ -2478,11 +2523,20 @@ static void get_timewait4_sock(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw,
 	destp = ntohs(tw->tw_dport);
 	srcp  = ntohs(tw->tw_sport);
 
-	seq_printf(f, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
-		" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %d %d %p%n",
-		i, src, srcp, dest, destp, tw->tw_substate, 0, 0,
-		3, jiffies_to_clock_t(ttd), 0, 0, 0, 0,
-		atomic_read(&tw->tw_refcnt), tw, len);
+	/* Only expose kernel addresses to privileged readers */
+	if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+		seq_printf(f, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
+			" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %d %d %p%n",
+			i, src, srcp, dest, destp, tw->tw_substate, 0, 0,
+			3, jiffies_to_clock_t(ttd), 0, 0, 0, 0,
+			atomic_read(&tw->tw_refcnt), tw, len);
+	else
+		seq_printf(f, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
+			" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %d %d %d%n",
+			i, src, srcp, dest, destp, tw->tw_substate, 0, 0,
+			3, jiffies_to_clock_t(ttd), 0, 0, 0, 0,
+			atomic_read(&tw->tw_refcnt), 0, len);
+
 }
 
 #define TMPSZ 150
diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c
index 28cb2d7..41c391d 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
@@ -2045,14 +2045,26 @@ static void udp4_format_sock(struct sock *sp, struct seq_file *f,
 	__u16 destp	  = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
 	__u16 srcp	  = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
 
-	seq_printf(f, "%5d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
-		" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %lu %d %p %d%n",
-		bucket, src, srcp, dest, destp, sp->sk_state,
-		sk_wmem_alloc_get(sp),
-		sk_rmem_alloc_get(sp),
-		0, 0L, 0, sock_i_uid(sp), 0, sock_i_ino(sp),
-		atomic_read(&sp->sk_refcnt), sp,
-		atomic_read(&sp->sk_drops), len);
+	/* Only expose kernel addresses to privileged readers */
+	if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+		seq_printf(f, "%5d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
+			" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %lu %d %p %d%n",
+			bucket, src, srcp, dest, destp, sp->sk_state,
+			sk_wmem_alloc_get(sp),
+			sk_rmem_alloc_get(sp),
+			0, 0L, 0, sock_i_uid(sp), 0, sock_i_ino(sp),
+			atomic_read(&sp->sk_refcnt), sp,
+			atomic_read(&sp->sk_drops), len);
+	else
+		seq_printf(f, "%5d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
+			" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %lu %d %d %d%n",
+			bucket, src, srcp, dest, destp, sp->sk_state,
+			sk_wmem_alloc_get(sp),
+			sk_rmem_alloc_get(sp),
+			0, 0L, 0, sock_i_uid(sp), 0, sock_i_ino(sp),
+			atomic_read(&sp->sk_refcnt), 0,
+			atomic_read(&sp->sk_drops), len);
+
 }
 
 int udp4_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)




^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 3/10] Fix leaking of kernel heap addresses in net/
  2010-11-12  1:07 [PATCH 3/10] Fix leaking of kernel heap addresses in net/ Dan Rosenberg
@ 2010-11-12  1:20 ` Thomas Graf
  2010-11-12  1:24   ` Dan Rosenberg
  2010-11-12 15:11 ` Ben Hutchings
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Graf @ 2010-11-12  1:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dan Rosenberg
  Cc: David S. Miller, Oliver Hartkopp, Alexey Kuznetsov, Urs Thuermann,
	Hideaki YOSHIFUJI, Patrick McHardy, James Morris,
	Remi Denis-Courmont, Pekka Savola (ipv6), Sridhar Samudrala,
	Vlad Yasevich, Tejun Heo, Eric Dumazet, Li Zefan, Joe Perches,
	Stephen Hemminger, Jamal Hadi Salim, Eric W. Biederman,
	Alexey Dobriyan, Jiri Pirko, Johannes Berg, Daniel Lezcano,
	Pavel 

On Thu, Nov 11, 2010 at 08:07:03PM -0500, Dan Rosenberg wrote:
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/raw.c b/net/ipv4/raw.c
> index 1f85ef2..0ac8ff2 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/raw.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/raw.c
> @@ -948,13 +948,26 @@ static void raw_sock_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, struct sock *sp, int i)
>  	__u16 destp = 0,
>  	      srcp  = inet->inet_num;
>  
> -	seq_printf(seq, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
> -		" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %lu %d %p %d\n",
> -		i, src, srcp, dest, destp, sp->sk_state,
> -		sk_wmem_alloc_get(sp),
> -		sk_rmem_alloc_get(sp),
> -		0, 0L, 0, sock_i_uid(sp), 0, sock_i_ino(sp),
> -		atomic_read(&sp->sk_refcnt), sp, atomic_read(&sp->sk_drops));
> +	/* Only expose kernel addresses to privileged readers */
> +	if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> +		seq_printf(seq, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
> +			" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %lu %d %p %d\n",
> +			i, src, srcp, dest, destp, sp->sk_state,
> +			sk_wmem_alloc_get(sp),
> +			sk_rmem_alloc_get(sp),
> +			0, 0L, 0, sock_i_uid(sp), 0, sock_i_ino(sp),
> +			atomic_read(&sp->sk_refcnt),
> +			sp, atomic_read(&sp->sk_drops));
> +	else
> +		seq_printf(seq, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
> +			" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %lu %d %d %d\n",
> +			i, src, srcp, dest, destp, sp->sk_state,
> +			sk_wmem_alloc_get(sp),
> +			sk_rmem_alloc_get(sp),
> +			0, 0L, 0, sock_i_uid(sp), 0, sock_i_ino(sp),
> +			atomic_read(&sp->sk_refcnt),
> +			0, atomic_read(&sp->sk_drops));

If we really have to do this. At least don't duplicate all this code. Do
the check in the printf argument:

	seq_printf(seq, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
		...
		capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) ? sp : 0,

I would even move the decision whether to expose kernel addresses or not
to a function so we can change behavior in one place.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 3/10] Fix leaking of kernel heap addresses in net/
  2010-11-12  1:20 ` Thomas Graf
@ 2010-11-12  1:24   ` Dan Rosenberg
  2010-11-12  1:44     ` Thomas Graf
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Dan Rosenberg @ 2010-11-12  1:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Thomas Graf
  Cc: David S. Miller, Oliver Hartkopp, Alexey Kuznetsov, Urs Thuermann,
	Hideaki YOSHIFUJI, Patrick McHardy, James Morris,
	Remi Denis-Courmont, Pekka Savola (ipv6), Sridhar Samudrala,
	Vlad Yasevich, Tejun Heo, Eric Dumazet, Li Zefan, Joe Perches,
	Stephen Hemminger, Jamal Hadi Salim, Eric W. Biederman,
	Alexey Dobriyan, Jiri Pirko, Johannes Berg, Daniel Lezcano,
	Pavel 


> 
> If we really have to do this. At least don't duplicate all this code. Do
> the check in the printf argument:
> 
> 	seq_printf(seq, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
> 		...
> 		capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) ? sp : 0,
> 
> I would even move the decision whether to expose kernel addresses or not
> to a function so we can change behavior in one place.

I wrote it this way because the format specifier must also be changed,
or the %p output will print "(null)", which cannot be parsed by
userspace programs expecting "(nil)" or 0.  I could include another
check inside the format specifier, but that seemed pretty ugly.  But
then again, it's ugly either way.

-Dan


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 3/10] Fix leaking of kernel heap addresses in net/
  2010-11-12  1:24   ` Dan Rosenberg
@ 2010-11-12  1:44     ` Thomas Graf
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Graf @ 2010-11-12  1:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dan Rosenberg
  Cc: David S. Miller, Oliver Hartkopp, Alexey Kuznetsov, Urs Thuermann,
	Hideaki YOSHIFUJI, Patrick McHardy, James Morris,
	Remi Denis-Courmont, Pekka Savola (ipv6), Sridhar Samudrala,
	Vlad Yasevich, Tejun Heo, Eric Dumazet, Li Zefan, Joe Perches,
	Stephen Hemminger, Jamal Hadi Salim, Eric W. Biederman,
	Alexey Dobriyan, Jiri Pirko, Johannes Berg, Daniel Lezcano,
	Pavel 

On Thu, Nov 11, 2010 at 08:24:09PM -0500, Dan Rosenberg wrote:
> > If we really have to do this. At least don't duplicate all this code. Do
> > the check in the printf argument:
> > 
> > 	seq_printf(seq, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
> > 		...
> > 		capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) ? sp : 0,
> > 
> > I would even move the decision whether to expose kernel addresses or not
> > to a function so we can change behavior in one place.
> 
> I wrote it this way because the format specifier must also be changed,
> or the %p output will print "(null)", which cannot be parsed by
> userspace programs expecting "(nil)" or 0.  I could include another
> check inside the format specifier, but that seemed pretty ugly.  But
> then again, it's ugly either way.

Considering the amount of duplication you are about to do, you may
want to think about adding a new pointer format extension then. We
already have special '%p' modes for IPv6 addresse, MAC addresses and
various other pointer types. It wouldn't be hard to add one which
does not print (null).

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 3/10] Fix leaking of kernel heap addresses in net/
  2010-11-12  1:07 [PATCH 3/10] Fix leaking of kernel heap addresses in net/ Dan Rosenberg
  2010-11-12  1:20 ` Thomas Graf
@ 2010-11-12 15:11 ` Ben Hutchings
  2010-11-12 15:14   ` Dan Rosenberg
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2010-11-12 15:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dan Rosenberg
  Cc: David S. Miller, Oliver Hartkopp, Alexey Kuznetsov, Urs Thuermann,
	Hideaki YOSHIFUJI, Patrick McHardy, James Morris,
	Remi Denis-Courmont, Pekka Savola (ipv6), Sridhar Samudrala,
	Vlad Yasevich, Tejun Heo, Eric Dumazet, Li Zefan, Joe Perches,
	Stephen Hemminger, Jamal Hadi Salim, Eric W. Biederman,
	Alexey Dobriyan, Jiri Pirko, Johannes Berg, Daniel Lezcano,
	Pavel 

On Thu, 2010-11-11 at 20:07 -0500, Dan Rosenberg wrote:
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/raw.c b/net/ipv4/raw.c
> index 1f85ef2..0ac8ff2 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/raw.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/raw.c
[...]
> +	/* Only expose kernel addresses to privileged readers */
> +	if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> +		seq_printf(seq, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
> +			" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %lu %d %p %d\n",
> +			i, src, srcp, dest, destp, sp->sk_state,
> +			sk_wmem_alloc_get(sp),
> +			sk_rmem_alloc_get(sp),
> +			0, 0L, 0, sock_i_uid(sp), 0, sock_i_ino(sp),
> +			atomic_read(&sp->sk_refcnt),
> +			sp, atomic_read(&sp->sk_drops));
> +	else
> +		seq_printf(seq, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
> +			" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %lu %d %d %d\n",
> +			i, src, srcp, dest, destp, sp->sk_state,
> +			sk_wmem_alloc_get(sp),
> +			sk_rmem_alloc_get(sp),
> +			0, 0L, 0, sock_i_uid(sp), 0, sock_i_ino(sp),
> +			atomic_read(&sp->sk_refcnt),
> +			0, atomic_read(&sp->sk_drops));
[...]

This could just be written as:

	seq_printf(seq, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
		" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %lu %d %lx %d\n",
		i, src, srcp, dest, destp, sp->sk_state,
		sk_wmem_alloc_get(sp),
		sk_rmem_alloc_get(sp),
		0, 0L, 0, sock_i_uid(sp), 0, sock_i_ino(sp),
		atomic_read(&sp->sk_refcnt),
		capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) ? (unsigned long)sp : 0UL,
		atomic_read(&sp->sk_drops));

Similarly for other formats that you want to make conditional on
CAP_NET_ADMIN.

Ben.

-- 
Ben Hutchings, Senior Software Engineer, Solarflare Communications
Not speaking for my employer; that's the marketing department's job.
They asked us to note that Solarflare product names are trademarked.


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 3/10] Fix leaking of kernel heap addresses in net/
  2010-11-12 15:11 ` Ben Hutchings
@ 2010-11-12 15:14   ` Dan Rosenberg
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Dan Rosenberg @ 2010-11-12 15:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ben Hutchings
  Cc: David S. Miller, Oliver Hartkopp, Alexey Kuznetsov, Urs Thuermann,
	Hideaki YOSHIFUJI, Patrick McHardy, James Morris,
	Remi Denis-Courmont, Pekka Savola (ipv6), Sridhar Samudrala,
	Vlad Yasevich, Tejun Heo, Eric Dumazet, Li Zefan, Joe Perches,
	Stephen Hemminger, Jamal Hadi Salim, Eric W. Biederman,
	Alexey Dobriyan, Jiri Pirko, Johannes Berg, Daniel Lezcano,
	Pavel 


> 
> Similarly for other formats that you want to make conditional on
> CAP_NET_ADMIN.

I wanted to avoid a %p output of "(null)" in case userspace tools
couldn't handle that, but I agree this is much nicer looking.  I'm
currently putting together a new format specifier instead, as per the
suggestions of Eric and David.

-Dan


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

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Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2010-11-12  1:07 [PATCH 3/10] Fix leaking of kernel heap addresses in net/ Dan Rosenberg
2010-11-12  1:20 ` Thomas Graf
2010-11-12  1:24   ` Dan Rosenberg
2010-11-12  1:44     ` Thomas Graf
2010-11-12 15:11 ` Ben Hutchings
2010-11-12 15:14   ` Dan Rosenberg

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