From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
To: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: "Марк Коренберг" <socketpair@gmail.com>,
"David Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Fwd: Simple kernel attack using socketpair. easy, 100% reproductiblle, works under guest. no way to protect :(
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 2010 07:23:31 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1290752611.2678.3.camel@edumazet-laptop> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4CEF39AF.6090605@cn.fujitsu.com>
Le vendredi 26 novembre 2010 à 12:38 +0800, Shan Wei a écrit :
> Eric Dumazet wrote, at 11/25/2010 10:11 PM:
> > Le jeudi 25 novembre 2010 à 13:35 +0500, Марк Коренберг a écrit :
> >> quick and dirty fix will be not to allow to pass unix socket inside
> >> unix socket. I think it would not break much applications.
> >
> > Really, if it was not needed, net/unix/garbage.c would not exist at
> > all...
> >
> > It is needed by some apps.
> >
> >
> > [PATCH] af_unix: limit recursion level
> >
> > Its easy to eat all kernel memory and trigger NMI watchdog, using an
> > exploit program that queues unix sockets on top of others.
> >
> > lkml ref : http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/11/25/8
> >
> > This mechanism is used in applications, one choice we have is to have a
> > recursion limit.
> >
> > Other limits might be needed as well (if we queue other types of files),
> > since the passfd mechanism is currently limited by socket receive queue
> > sizes only.
> >
> > Add a recursion_level to unix socket, allowing up to 4 levels.
> >
> > Each time we send an unix socket through sendfd mechanism, we copy its
> > recursion level (plus one) to receiver. This recursion level is cleared
> > when socket receive queue is emptied.
> >
> > Reported-by: Марк Коренберг <socketpair@gmail.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
>
> This problem is same as that reported with title "Unix socket local DOS (OOM)", right?
> After applied this patch, this program can be killed now. but still eat 100% cpu.
>
Not the same problem, but a different one.
In this case, we queue files on top of another and never give a chance
to free them, unless the program dies (and full memory eaten)
And yes, its eating 100% cpu, since it has no sleep inside, like
for (;;) ;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-11-26 6:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <AANLkTikCeddPFRGojPGuB6oq3xGYgovtm8r4=WhjEDpe@mail.gmail.com>
2010-11-25 6:28 ` Simple kernel attack using socketpair. easy, 100% reproductiblle, works under guest. no way to protect :( Eric Dumazet
2010-11-25 6:52 ` Марк Коренберг
[not found] ` <1290668246.2798.93.camel@edumazet-laptop>
[not found] ` <AANLkTinQa8BCH-k0m=ndu4u8L-kCiD00jYjKvsvoxK2E@mail.gmail.com>
2010-11-25 7:52 ` Fwd: " Марк Коренберг
2010-11-25 8:16 ` Eric Dumazet
2010-11-25 8:35 ` Марк Коренберг
2010-11-25 14:11 ` Eric Dumazet
2010-11-26 4:38 ` Shan Wei
2010-11-26 6:23 ` Eric Dumazet [this message]
2010-11-26 7:52 ` Shan Wei
2010-11-26 7:41 ` Shan Wei
2010-11-26 8:22 ` Eric Dumazet
2010-11-26 8:59 ` Eric Dumazet
2010-11-29 17:46 ` David Miller
2010-11-29 18:01 ` Eric Dumazet
[not found] ` <AANLkTinRhmiVoVR5ibWOKe-OhY4fYUs_PHSATjxMGqg9@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <1290670889.2798.127.camel@edumazet-laptop>
2010-11-25 8:05 ` Марк Коренберг
2010-11-25 7:14 ` Eric Dumazet
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