Re: [PATCH 1/5] Define the function to write sock's security context to seq_file.

[Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>]

On Mon, 2011-08-08 at 17:32 +0800, Rongqing Li wrote:
> On 08/05/2011 09:56 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > I'm not sure it is a good idea to output nothing if permission is denied
> > to the socket, as opposed to some well-defined string indicating that
> > condition.  Particularly if someone later adds another field to
> > the /proc files after the context; we don't want the contents of that
> > field to be interpreted as the context if permission was denied.
> >
> 
>  From your review, I redesign the output information as below.
> 
> when disable SELinux, print "(none)" in proc
> when enable  SELinux, no error on getting security context, print the 
> real security context
> when enable  SELinux, there is error on getting security context, print 
> "??"
> 
> Do you think it is OK?

It appears that netstat presently displays a "-" if it cannot obtain the
security context or pid/program name information, so perhaps you should
follow that convention whenever you cannot obtain a security context
regardless of the particular reason. Note that your logic shouldn't be
based on whether or not SELinux is enabled/disabled per se, but rather
based on whether the security module provides security contexts, which
can be determined by checking whether the secid is set to a non-zero
value by security_sk_getsecid().  The audit system (kernel/audit*.c)
uses similar logic to decide whether or not to log task security
contexts.

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency