From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
To: Jesse Brandeburg <jesse.brandeburg@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>,
Yevgeny Petrilin <yevgenyp@mellanox.co.il>,
"davem@davemloft.net" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"netdev@vger.kernel.org" <netdev@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/7] mlx4_en: Adding rxhash support
Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2011 21:05:53 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1318964753.2407.7.camel@edumazet-laptop> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAEuXFEwzoC-L7Agr3Ssq9M-QN2w+t=rxjVvt9oJwQ2pQw7To8w@mail.gmail.com>
Le mardi 18 octobre 2011 à 11:49 -0700, Jesse Brandeburg a écrit :
> On Tue, Oct 18, 2011 at 8:36 AM, Stephen Hemminger
> <shemminger@vyatta.com> wrote:
> > On Tue, 18 Oct 2011 08:59:44 +0000
> > Yevgeny Petrilin <yevgenyp@mellanox.co.il> wrote:
> >> There is no gain in random values,
> >> I'll make the change to have static value for RSS function.
> >>
> >> We might consider how to ensure consistency across the different drivers in this aspect.
> >
> > The key should be part of the network device core. Almost all hardware just
> > implements the Microsoft standard, and if all drivers used same key they should
> > come up with the same hash.
> >
> > Although using the same key all the time makes testing easier.
> > The risk of using the same key is that it makes it easier for an attacker to
> > create a set of addresses that all map to the same CPU which would make a DoS
> > attack work better. Therefore the key should be randomly generated at boot time.
>
> Stephen, I respectfully disagree with your position here. The risk of
> using the same key is that a malicious user could target a particular
> queue with a DoS attack, but how is that different than any single
> queue device? NAPI protects a single queue against (a network
> interrupt based) DoS. I do not think we should be generating a random
> key at boot time, and because of the way NAPI mitigates load, we are
> okay. The gain from from the far simpler setup (and reproducability)
> outweighs the risk until someone can show damage due to this
> theoretical DoS attack.
Note : This policy could be up to the admin :
1) We could let admin chose a known hash for reproducability
ethtool .... rss_hash xxxxxxxx:yyyyyyyy:zzzzzzzz:....
2) We could have a 'rss_perturb N ' ethtool option, to randomly reshufle
things every N seconds, for people really afraid ;)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-10-18 19:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-10-17 20:18 [PATCH 6/7] mlx4_en: Adding rxhash support Yevgeny Petrilin
2011-10-18 1:48 ` Eric Dumazet
2011-10-18 7:36 ` Yevgeny Petrilin
2011-10-18 8:34 ` Eric Dumazet
2011-10-18 8:59 ` Yevgeny Petrilin
2011-10-18 15:36 ` Stephen Hemminger
2011-10-18 18:49 ` Jesse Brandeburg
2011-10-18 19:05 ` Eric Dumazet [this message]
2011-10-18 19:35 ` Ben Hutchings
2011-10-19 14:57 ` Ben Hutchings
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1318964753.2407.7.camel@edumazet-laptop \
--to=eric.dumazet@gmail.com \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=jesse.brandeburg@gmail.com \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=shemminger@vyatta.com \
--cc=yevgenyp@mellanox.co.il \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox