[PATCH] rps: fix insufficient bounds checking in store_rps_dev_flow_table_cnt()

[Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>]

Setting a large rps_flow_cnt like 1073741824 (1 << 30) on 32-bit
platform will cause a kernel oops due to insufficient bounds checking.

	if (count > 1<<30) {
		/* Enforce a limit to prevent overflow */
		return -EINVAL;
	}
	count = roundup_pow_of_two(count);
	table = vmalloc(RPS_DEV_FLOW_TABLE_SIZE(count));

Note that the macro RPS_DEV_FLOW_TABLE_SIZE(count) is defined as:

	... + (count * sizeof(struct rps_dev_flow))

where sizeof(struct rps_dev_flow) is 8.  (1 << 30) * 8 will overflow
32 bits.  This patch changes the upper bound to (1 << 28).

Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
---
 net/core/net-sysfs.c |    2 +-
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/core/net-sysfs.c b/net/core/net-sysfs.c
index c71c434..f53a947 100644
--- a/net/core/net-sysfs.c
+++ b/net/core/net-sysfs.c
@@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ static ssize_t store_rps_dev_flow_table_cnt(struct netdev_rx_queue *queue,
 	if (count) {
 		int i;
 
-		if (count > 1<<30) {
+		if (count > 1<<28) {
 			/* Enforce a limit to prevent overflow */
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
-- 
1.7.5.4