From: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de, davem@davemloft.net,
hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net,
eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@chromium.org,
jmorris@namei.org, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Subject: [PATCH v17 13/15] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support
Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:58 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1333051320-30872-14-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1333051320-30872-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org>
This change adds support for a new ptrace option, PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP,
and a new return value for seccomp BPF programs, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE.
When a tracer specifies the PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP ptrace option, the
tracer will be notified, via PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, for any syscall that
results in a BPF program returning SECCOMP_RET_TRACE. The 16-bit
SECCOMP_RET_DATA mask of the BPF program return value will be passed as
the ptrace_message and may be retrieved using PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG.
If the subordinate process is not using seccomp filter, then no
system call notifications will occur even if the option is specified.
If there is no tracer with PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP when SECCOMP_RET_TRACE
is returned, the system call will not be executed and an -ENOSYS errno
will be returned to userspace.
This change adds a dependency on the system call slow path. Any future
efforts to use the system call fast path for seccomp filter will need to
address this restriction.
v17: - rebase onto refactored ptrace code now in -linus
v16: - update PT_TRACE_MASK to 0xbf4 so that STOP isn't clear on SETOPTIONS call (indan@nul.nu)
[note PT_TRACE_MASK disappears in linux-next]
v15: - add audit support for non-zero return codes
- clean up style (indan@nul.nu)
v14: - rebase/nochanges
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
(Brings back a change to ptrace.c and the masks.)
v12: - rebase to linux-next
- use ptrace_event and update arch/Kconfig to mention slow-path dependency
- drop all tracehook changes and inclusion (oleg@redhat.com)
v11: - invert the logic to just make it a PTRACE_SYSCALL accelerator
(indan@nul.nu)
v10: - moved to PTRACE_O_SECCOMP / PT_TRACE_SECCOMP
v9: - n/a
v8: - guarded PTRACE_SECCOMP use with an ifdef
v7: - introduced
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
---
arch/Kconfig | 11 ++++++-----
include/linux/ptrace.h | 5 ++++-
include/linux/seccomp.h | 1 +
kernel/seccomp.c | 12 +++++++++++-
4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index a24d213..fafefe6 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -216,15 +216,16 @@ config HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE
config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
bool
help
- This symbol should be selected by an architecure if it provides:
- asm/syscall.h:
+ An arch should select this symbol if it provides all of these things:
- syscall_get_arch()
- syscall_get_arguments()
- syscall_rollback()
- syscall_set_return_value()
- SIGSYS siginfo_t support must be implemented.
- __secure_computing_int()/secure_computing()'s return value must be
- checked, with -1 resulting in the syscall being skipped.
+ - SIGSYS siginfo_t support
+ - uses __secure_computing_int() or secure_computing()
+ - secure_computing is called from a ptrace_event()-safe context
+ - secure_computing return value is checked and a return value of -1
+ results in the system call being skipped immediately.
config SECCOMP_FILTER
def_bool y
diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h
index 5c71962..597e4fd 100644
--- a/include/linux/ptrace.h
+++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
#define PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC 4
#define PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK_DONE 5
#define PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT 6
+#define PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP 7
/* Extended result codes which enabled by means other than options. */
#define PTRACE_EVENT_STOP 128
@@ -69,8 +70,9 @@
#define PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC (1 << PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC)
#define PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORKDONE (1 << PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK_DONE)
#define PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT (1 << PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT)
+#define PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP (1 << PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)
-#define PTRACE_O_MASK 0x0000007f
+#define PTRACE_O_MASK 0x000000ff
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
@@ -98,6 +100,7 @@
#define PT_TRACE_EXEC PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC)
#define PT_TRACE_VFORK_DONE PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK_DONE)
#define PT_TRACE_EXIT PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT)
+#define PT_TRACE_SECCOMP PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)
/* single stepping state bits (used on ARM and PA-RISC) */
#define PT_SINGLESTEP_BIT 31
diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index ecec06c..41ff13b 100644
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL 0x00000000U /* kill the task immediately */
#define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP 0x00030000U /* disallow and force a SIGSYS */
#define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO 0x00050000U /* returns an errno */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE 0x7ff00000U /* pass to a tracer or disallow */
#define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW 0x7fff0000U /* allow */
/* Masks for the return value sections. */
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 9a59c93..4b5affa 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
#include <asm/syscall.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
@@ -398,7 +399,7 @@ int __secure_computing_int(int this_syscall)
case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
ret = seccomp_run_filters(this_syscall);
data = ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
- switch (code & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) {
+ switch (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) {
case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
/* Set the low-order 16-bits as a errno. */
syscall_set_return_value(current, task_pt_regs(current),
@@ -410,6 +411,15 @@ int __secure_computing_int(int this_syscall)
/* Let the filter pass back 16 bits of data. */
seccomp_send_sigsys(this_syscall, data);
goto skip;
+ case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
+ /* Skip these calls if there is no tracer. */
+ if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP))
+ goto skip;
+ /* Allow the BPF to provide the event message */
+ ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, data);
+ if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
+ break;
+ return 0;
case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
return 0;
case SECCOMP_RET_KILL:
--
1.7.5.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-03-29 20:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-03-29 20:01 [PATCH v17 00/15] seccomp_filter: BPF-based syscall filtering Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs Will Drewry
2012-04-06 19:49 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 19:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-04-06 20:47 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-06 20:54 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 21:04 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-06 21:15 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 21:32 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-10 19:12 ` Will Drewry
[not found] ` <1333051320-30872-2-git-send-email-wad-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
2012-04-06 19:55 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 20:01 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 20:28 ` Jonathan Corbet
2012-04-06 20:37 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-11 19:31 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-04-12 0:15 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-04-12 0:50 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-16 19:11 ` Rob Landley
2012-04-10 20:37 ` Rob Landley
2012-04-10 19:03 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 02/15] Fix apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 03/15] sk_run_filter: add BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 04/15] net/compat.c,linux/filter.h: share compat_sock_fprog Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 05/15] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 06/15] arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 07/15] asm/syscall.h: add syscall_get_arch Will Drewry
2012-04-06 20:05 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:24 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 08/15] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-03-31 4:40 ` Vladimir Murzin
2012-03-31 18:14 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 20:23 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 20:44 ` Kees Cook
2012-04-06 21:05 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:06 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-04-06 21:09 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-08 18:22 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-04-09 19:59 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-10 9:48 ` James Morris
2012-04-10 20:00 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-10 20:16 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-10 10:34 ` Eric Dumazet
2012-04-10 19:54 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-10 20:15 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 09/15] seccomp: remove duplicated failure logging Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:14 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:26 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:32 ` Kees Cook
2012-04-09 19:33 ` Eric Paris
2012-04-09 19:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 10/15] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:19 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:19 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 11/15] signal, x86: add SIGSYS info and make it synchronous Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 12/15] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry [this message]
2012-04-06 21:24 ` [PATCH v17 13/15] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:38 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 14/15] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:02 ` [PATCH v17 15/15] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:26 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:46 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-09 20:47 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-09 20:58 ` Ryan Ware
2012-04-09 22:47 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-10 17:49 ` Ryan Ware
2012-03-29 23:11 ` [PATCH v17 00/15] seccomp_filter: BPF-based syscall filtering James Morris
2012-04-06 21:28 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 3:48 ` James Morris
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