From: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de, davem@davemloft.net,
hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net,
eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@chromium.org,
jmorris@namei.org, John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Subject: [PATCH v17 02/15] Fix apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS
Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:47 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1333051320-30872-3-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1333051320-30872-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org>
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
---
security/apparmor/domain.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 18c88d0..b81ea10 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -360,10 +360,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (bprm->cred_prepared)
return 0;
- /* XXX: no_new_privs is not usable with AppArmor yet */
- if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
- return -EPERM;
-
cxt = bprm->cred->security;
BUG_ON(!cxt);
@@ -398,6 +394,11 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, name);
if (!new_profile)
goto cleanup;
+ /*
+ * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed
+ * even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results
+ * in a further reduction of permissions.
+ */
goto apply;
}
@@ -459,6 +460,16 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
/* fail exec */
error = -EACCES;
+ /*
+ * Policy has specified a domain transition, if no_new_privs then
+ * fail the exec.
+ */
+ if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) {
+ aa_put_profile(new_profile);
+ error = -EPERM;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
if (!new_profile)
goto audit;
@@ -613,6 +624,14 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest)
const char *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
int error = 0;
+ /*
+ * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs.
+ * There is no exception for unconfined as change_hat is not
+ * available.
+ */
+ if (current->no_new_privs)
+ return -EPERM;
+
/* released below */
cred = get_current_cred();
cxt = cred->security;
@@ -754,6 +773,18 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec,
cxt = cred->security;
profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+ /*
+ * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs
+ * and not unconfined.
+ * Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed even when
+ * no_new_privs is set because this aways results in a reduction
+ * of permissions.
+ */
+ if (current->no_new_privs && !unconfined(profile)) {
+ put_cred(cred);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
if (ns_name) {
/* released below */
ns = aa_find_namespace(profile->ns, ns_name);
--
1.7.5.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-03-29 20:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-03-29 20:01 [PATCH v17 00/15] seccomp_filter: BPF-based syscall filtering Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs Will Drewry
2012-04-06 19:49 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 19:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-04-06 20:47 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-06 20:54 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 21:04 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-06 21:15 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 21:32 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-10 19:12 ` Will Drewry
[not found] ` <1333051320-30872-2-git-send-email-wad-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
2012-04-06 19:55 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 20:01 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 20:28 ` Jonathan Corbet
2012-04-06 20:37 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-11 19:31 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-04-12 0:15 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-04-12 0:50 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-16 19:11 ` Rob Landley
2012-04-10 20:37 ` Rob Landley
2012-04-10 19:03 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry [this message]
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 03/15] sk_run_filter: add BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 04/15] net/compat.c,linux/filter.h: share compat_sock_fprog Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 05/15] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 06/15] arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 07/15] asm/syscall.h: add syscall_get_arch Will Drewry
2012-04-06 20:05 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:24 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 08/15] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-03-31 4:40 ` Vladimir Murzin
2012-03-31 18:14 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 20:23 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 20:44 ` Kees Cook
2012-04-06 21:05 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:06 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-04-06 21:09 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-08 18:22 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-04-09 19:59 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-10 9:48 ` James Morris
2012-04-10 20:00 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-10 20:16 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-10 10:34 ` Eric Dumazet
2012-04-10 19:54 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-10 20:15 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 09/15] seccomp: remove duplicated failure logging Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:14 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:26 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:32 ` Kees Cook
2012-04-09 19:33 ` Eric Paris
2012-04-09 19:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 10/15] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:19 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:19 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 11/15] signal, x86: add SIGSYS info and make it synchronous Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 12/15] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 13/15] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:24 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:38 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 14/15] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:02 ` [PATCH v17 15/15] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:26 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:46 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-09 20:47 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-09 20:58 ` Ryan Ware
2012-04-09 22:47 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-10 17:49 ` Ryan Ware
2012-03-29 23:11 ` [PATCH v17 00/15] seccomp_filter: BPF-based syscall filtering James Morris
2012-04-06 21:28 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 3:48 ` James Morris
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