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From: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de, davem@davemloft.net,
	hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
	peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
	mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
	eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
	scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net,
	eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
	coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Subject: [PATCH v17 02/15] Fix apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS
Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:47 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1333051320-30872-3-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1333051320-30872-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org>

From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
---
 security/apparmor/domain.c |   39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 18c88d0..b81ea10 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -360,10 +360,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (bprm->cred_prepared)
 		return 0;
 
-	/* XXX: no_new_privs is not usable with AppArmor yet */
-	if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
-		return -EPERM;
-
 	cxt = bprm->cred->security;
 	BUG_ON(!cxt);
 
@@ -398,6 +394,11 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 			new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, name);
 		if (!new_profile)
 			goto cleanup;
+		/*
+		 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed
+		 * even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results
+		 * in a further reduction of permissions.
+		 */
 		goto apply;
 	}
 
@@ -459,6 +460,16 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		/* fail exec */
 		error = -EACCES;
 
+	/*
+	 * Policy has specified a domain transition, if no_new_privs then
+	 * fail the exec.
+	 */
+	if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) {
+		aa_put_profile(new_profile);
+		error = -EPERM;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
 	if (!new_profile)
 		goto audit;
 
@@ -613,6 +624,14 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest)
 	const char *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
 	int error = 0;
 
+	/*
+	 * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs.
+	 * There is no exception for unconfined as change_hat is not
+	 * available.
+	 */
+	if (current->no_new_privs)
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	/* released below */
 	cred = get_current_cred();
 	cxt = cred->security;
@@ -754,6 +773,18 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec,
 	cxt = cred->security;
 	profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
 
+	/*
+	 * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs
+	 * and not unconfined.
+	 * Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed even when
+	 * no_new_privs is set because this aways results in a reduction
+	 * of permissions.
+	 */
+	if (current->no_new_privs && !unconfined(profile)) {
+		put_cred(cred);
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+
 	if (ns_name) {
 		/* released below */
 		ns = aa_find_namespace(profile->ns, ns_name);
-- 
1.7.5.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2012-03-29 20:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-03-29 20:01 [PATCH v17 00/15] seccomp_filter: BPF-based syscall filtering Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs Will Drewry
2012-04-06 19:49   ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 19:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-04-06 20:47     ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-06 20:54       ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 21:04         ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-06 21:15           ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 21:32             ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-10 19:12     ` Will Drewry
     [not found]   ` <1333051320-30872-2-git-send-email-wad-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
2012-04-06 19:55     ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 20:01       ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 20:28         ` Jonathan Corbet
2012-04-06 20:37           ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-11 19:31           ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-04-12  0:15             ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-04-12  0:50             ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-16 19:11             ` Rob Landley
2012-04-10 20:37         ` Rob Landley
2012-04-10 19:03       ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry [this message]
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 03/15] sk_run_filter: add BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 04/15] net/compat.c,linux/filter.h: share compat_sock_fprog Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 05/15] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 06/15] arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 07/15] asm/syscall.h: add syscall_get_arch Will Drewry
2012-04-06 20:05   ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:24     ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 08/15] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-03-31  4:40   ` Vladimir Murzin
2012-03-31 18:14     ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 20:23   ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 20:44     ` Kees Cook
2012-04-06 21:05       ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:06         ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-04-06 21:09           ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-08 18:22     ` Indan Zupancic
2012-04-09 19:59       ` Will Drewry
2012-04-10  9:48         ` James Morris
2012-04-10 20:00         ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-10 20:16           ` Will Drewry
2012-04-10 10:34       ` Eric Dumazet
2012-04-10 19:54       ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-10 20:15         ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 09/15] seccomp: remove duplicated failure logging Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:14   ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:26     ` Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:32       ` Kees Cook
2012-04-09 19:33       ` Eric Paris
2012-04-09 19:39         ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 10/15] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:19   ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:19     ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 11/15] signal, x86: add SIGSYS info and make it synchronous Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 12/15] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 13/15] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:24   ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:38     ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [PATCH v17 14/15] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:02 ` [PATCH v17 15/15] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:26   ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:46     ` Will Drewry
2012-04-09 20:47       ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-09 20:58         ` Ryan Ware
2012-04-09 22:47           ` Will Drewry
2012-04-10 17:49             ` Ryan Ware
2012-03-29 23:11 ` [PATCH v17 00/15] seccomp_filter: BPF-based syscall filtering James Morris
2012-04-06 21:28   ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09  3:48     ` James Morris

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