From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Mathias Krause Subject: [PATCH 05/14] Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in getsockopt(BT_SECURITY) Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2012 23:31:48 +0200 Message-ID: <1345066317-22512-6-git-send-email-minipli@googlemail.com> References: <1345066317-22512-1-git-send-email-minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Mathias Krause , Marcel Holtmann , Gustavo Padovan , Johan Hedberg To: "David S. Miller" Return-path: In-Reply-To: <1345066317-22512-1-git-send-email-minipli@googlemail.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: netdev.vger.kernel.org The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the key_size member of struct bt_security before copying it to userland -- that for leaking one byte kernel stack. Initialize key_size with 0 to avoid the info leak. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause Cc: Marcel Holtmann Cc: Gustavo Padovan Cc: Johan Hedberg --- net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c index 7e1e596..64f55ca 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c @@ -822,6 +822,7 @@ static int rfcomm_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, c } sec.level = rfcomm_pi(sk)->sec_level; + sec.key_size = 0; len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(sec)); if (copy_to_user(optval, (char *) &sec, len)) -- 1.7.10.4