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From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
To: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@redhat.com>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	Linux Netdev List <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Brandeburg, Jesse" <jesse.brandeburg@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] net: Toeplitz library functions
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 09:10:15 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1380039015.3165.89.camel@edumazet-glaptop> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+mtBx_AcmcNBDhRKVB8YDkSNdOwgJ3CXxBqpgxDw23X3m2rvQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, 2013-09-24 at 08:54 -0700, Tom Herbert wrote:

> The Toeplitz function uses a secret key whose length is based on the
> input length.  96 bits in IPv4, 320 bits in IPv6.  I don't see how an
> attacker can reproduce this if the key is random.  If the problem is
> that devices are not being configured with a sufficiently random key
> (some actually are using a fixed key :-( ), that's a separate issue
> that should be addressed.  It is possible to DoS attack through the
> steering mechanism.

Well, your patch would make sense [1] only if we could use hardware
assistance, but right now we have no idea of how safe are the existing
assistances.

[1] Computing Toeplitz in software is way more expensive than jhash.

Dos attack is quite simple right now, even without knowing if the target
uses or not steering.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2013-09-24 16:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-09-23 22:41 [PATCH 1/2] net: Toeplitz library functions Tom Herbert
2013-09-24  0:03 ` Eric Dumazet
2013-09-24  1:39   ` David Miller
2013-09-24  2:30   ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-09-24  3:35     ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-09-24  5:38       ` Eric Dumazet
2013-09-24  5:45         ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-09-24 13:19           ` [PATCH] net: net_secret should not depend on TCP Eric Dumazet
2013-09-24 15:13             ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-09-24 15:22               ` Eric Dumazet
2013-09-24 15:28                 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-09-24 15:46                   ` Eric Dumazet
2013-09-24 23:51             ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-09-28 22:20               ` David Miller
2013-09-25  9:00             ` [PATCH RFC] random: introduce get_random_bytes_busy_wait_initialized Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-09-25 12:06               ` Eric Dumazet
2013-09-25 13:35                 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-10-02 15:10               ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-10-02 17:18                 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-10-02 19:40                   ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-24 16:01         ` [PATCH 1/2] net: Toeplitz library functions Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-09-24 16:14           ` Eric Dumazet
2013-09-24 16:35             ` Tom Herbert
2013-09-24 16:46               ` Eric Dumazet
2013-09-24 17:02                 ` Ben Hutchings
2013-09-24 17:03                 ` Tom Herbert
2013-09-24 17:34                   ` Eric Dumazet
2013-09-24 17:37                     ` Rick Jones
2013-09-24 17:44                       ` Eric Dumazet
2013-09-24 18:02                     ` Tom Herbert
2013-09-24 18:48                       ` David Miller
2013-09-24 19:42                       ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-09-24  8:32 ` David Laight
2013-09-24 12:24   ` Eric Dumazet
2013-09-24 15:22   ` Tom Herbert
2013-09-24 15:29     ` Eric Dumazet
2013-09-24 15:39     ` David Miller
2013-09-24 15:54       ` Tom Herbert
2013-09-24 16:00         ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-09-24 16:10         ` Eric Dumazet [this message]
2013-09-24 18:03         ` David Miller
2013-09-24 18:06           ` Tom Herbert
2013-09-24 18:10           ` Ben Hutchings
2013-09-24 18:24             ` Tom Herbert
2013-09-24 19:14               ` Eric Dumazet
2013-09-24 18:49             ` David Miller
2013-09-24 18:48           ` Jesse Brandeburg
2013-09-24 19:04             ` Tom Herbert
2013-09-24 16:38   ` Ben Hutchings
2013-09-24 16:32 ` Ben Hutchings

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