From: Wangyufen <wangyufen@huawei.com>
To: <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Wang Yufen <wangyufen@huawei.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/8] Add file_ns_capable() helper function for open-time capability checking
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 16:22:24 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1406276549-6616-4-git-send-email-wangyufen@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1406276549-6616-1-git-send-email-wangyufen@huawei.com>
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Nothing is using it yet, but this will allow us to delay the open-time
checks to use time, without breaking the normal UNIX permission
semantics where permissions are determined by the opener (and the file
descriptor can then be passed to a different process, or the process can
drop capabilities).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen@huawei.com>
---
include/linux/capability.h | 3 ++-
kernel/capability.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 12d52de..7273027 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
#define CAP_TO_MASK(x) (1 << ((x) & 31)) /* mask for indexed __u32 */
#ifdef __KERNEL__
-
+struct file;
struct dentry;
struct user_namespace;
@@ -548,6 +548,7 @@ extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
extern bool capable(int cap);
extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool nsown_capable(int cap);
+extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 3f1adb6..cc8c4845 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -393,6 +393,30 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
/**
+ * file_ns_capable - Determine if the file's opener had a capability in effect
+ * @file: The file we want to check
+ * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if task that opened the file had a capability in effect
+ * when the file was opened.
+ *
+ * This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV because the caller may not
+ * actually be privileged.
+ */
+bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+{
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cap_valid(cap)))
+ return false;
+
+ if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap) == 0)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_ns_capable);
+
+/**
* capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
* @cap: The capability to be tested for
*
--
1.8.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-07-25 8:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-07-25 8:22 [PATCH v2 0/8] Backport to stable-3.4 for fix CVE-2014-0181 Wangyufen
2014-07-25 8:22 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] netlink: Make the sending netlink socket availabe in NETLINK_CB Wangyufen
2014-07-25 8:22 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] userns: make each net (net_ns) belong to a user_ns Wangyufen
2014-07-25 8:22 ` Wangyufen [this message]
2014-07-25 8:22 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] netlink: Rename netlink_capable netlink_allowed Wangyufen
2014-07-25 8:22 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] net: Add variants of capable for use on on sockets Wangyufen
2014-07-25 8:22 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] net: Add variants of capable for use on netlink messages Wangyufen
2014-07-25 8:22 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of " Wangyufen
2014-07-31 22:06 ` Jonathan Toppins
2014-08-15 7:38 ` wangyufen
2014-08-15 9:24 ` wangyufen
2014-07-25 8:22 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] netlink: Only check file credentials for implicit destinations Wangyufen
2014-07-29 0:14 ` [PATCH v2 0/8] Backport to stable-3.4 for fix CVE-2014-0181 David Miller
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