From: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4/6] seccomp: add a way to access filters via bpf fds
Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2015 10:04:22 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1441382664-17437-5-git-send-email-tycho.andersen@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1441382664-17437-1-git-send-email-tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
This patch adds a way for a process that is "real root" to access the
seccomp filters of another process. The process first does a
PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER_FD to get an fd with that process' seccomp filter
attached, and then iterates on this with PTRACE_SECCOMP_NEXT_FILTER using
bpf(BPF_PROG_DUMP) to dump the actual program at each step.
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
CC: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
CC: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
CC: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CC: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CC: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
---
include/linux/bpf.h | 12 ++++++++++
include/linux/seccomp.h | 14 +++++++++++
include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h | 3 +++
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++-
kernel/ptrace.c | 7 ++++++
kernel/seccomp.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index 4383476..30682dc 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ void bpf_register_prog_type(struct bpf_prog_type_list *tl);
void bpf_register_map_type(struct bpf_map_type_list *tl);
struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd);
+int bpf_prog_set(u32 ufd, struct bpf_prog *new);
+int bpf_new_fd(struct bpf_prog *prog, int flags);
void bpf_prog_put(struct bpf_prog *prog);
void bpf_prog_put_rcu(struct bpf_prog *prog);
@@ -175,6 +177,16 @@ static inline struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd)
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
}
+static inline int bpf_prog_set(u32 ufd, struct bpf_prog *new)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static inline int bpf_new_fd(struct bpf_prog *prog, int flags)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
static inline void bpf_prog_put(struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
}
diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index f426503..d1a86ed 100644
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -95,4 +95,18 @@ static inline void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
return;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER) && defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE)
+extern long seccomp_get_filter_fd(struct task_struct *child);
+extern long seccomp_next_filter(struct task_struct *child, u32 fd);
+#else
+static inline long seccomp_get_filter_fd(struct task_struct *child)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+static inline long seccomp_next_filter(struct task_struct *child, u32 fd)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER && CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */
#endif /* _LINUX_SECCOMP_H */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h b/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h
index a7a6979..dfd7d2e 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
#define PTRACE_SYSCALL 24
+#define PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER_FD 40
+#define PTRACE_SECCOMP_NEXT_FILTER 41
+
/* 0x4200-0x4300 are reserved for architecture-independent additions. */
#define PTRACE_SETOPTIONS 0x4200
#define PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG 0x4201
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index ee580d0..58e7421 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -506,6 +506,30 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_prog_get);
+int bpf_prog_set(u32 ufd, struct bpf_prog *new)
+{
+ struct fd f;
+ struct bpf_prog *prog;
+
+ f = fdget(ufd);
+
+ prog = get_prog(f);
+ if (!IS_ERR(prog) && prog)
+ bpf_prog_put(prog);
+
+ atomic_inc(&new->aux->refcnt);
+ f.file->private_data = new;
+ fdput(f);
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_prog_set);
+
+int bpf_new_fd(struct bpf_prog *prog, int flags)
+{
+ return anon_inode_getfd("bpf-prog", &bpf_prog_fops, prog, flags);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_new_fd);
+
/* last field in 'union bpf_attr' used by this command */
#define BPF_PROG_LOAD_LAST_FIELD kern_version
@@ -572,7 +596,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr)
if (err < 0)
goto free_used_maps;
- err = anon_inode_getfd("bpf-prog", &bpf_prog_fops, prog, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
+ err = bpf_new_fd(prog, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
if (err < 0)
/* failed to allocate fd */
goto free_used_maps;
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 787320d..4e4b534 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -1016,6 +1016,13 @@ int ptrace_request(struct task_struct *child, long request,
break;
}
#endif
+
+ case PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER_FD:
+ return seccomp_get_filter_fd(child);
+
+ case PTRACE_SECCOMP_NEXT_FILTER:
+ return seccomp_next_filter(child, data);
+
default:
break;
}
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index acfe1fb..a2c5b32 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/pid.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
@@ -814,6 +816,61 @@ static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
}
#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER) && defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE)
+long seccomp_get_filter_fd(struct task_struct *child)
+{
+ long fd;
+ struct seccomp_filter *filter;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ if (child->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ filter = child->seccomp.filter;
+
+ fd = bpf_new_fd(filter->prog, O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd > 0)
+ atomic_inc(&filter->prog->aux->refcnt);
+
+ return fd;
+}
+
+long seccomp_next_filter(struct task_struct *child, u32 fd)
+{
+ struct seccomp_filter *cur;
+ struct bpf_prog *prog;
+ long ret = -ESRCH;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ if (child->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ prog = bpf_prog_get(fd);
+ if (IS_ERR(prog)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(prog);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (cur = child->seccomp.filter; cur; cur = cur->prev) {
+ if (cur->prog == prog) {
+ if (!cur->prev)
+ ret = -ENOENT;
+ else
+ ret = bpf_prog_set(fd, cur->prev->prog);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ bpf_prog_put(prog);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
/* Common entry point for both prctl and syscall. */
static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
const char __user *uargs)
--
2.1.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-09-04 16:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-09-04 16:04 c/r of seccomp filters via underlying eBPF Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 1/6] ebpf: add a seccomp program type Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:17 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 21:09 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:34 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-04 21:06 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 21:08 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-09 15:50 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 16:07 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-09 16:09 ` Daniel Borkmann
2015-09-09 16:37 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-09 16:52 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-09 17:27 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-09 17:31 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 16:07 ` Daniel Borkmann
2015-09-04 21:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-09 16:13 ` Daniel Borkmann
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 2/6] seccomp: make underlying bpf ref counted as well Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 21:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 3/6] ebpf: add a way to dump an eBPF program Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:17 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-04 20:45 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:50 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-04 20:58 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 21:00 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 21:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-04 22:28 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 23:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-05 0:27 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 22:34 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 23:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-10 0:13 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-10 0:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-10 0:58 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 23:27 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-05 0:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-04 20:27 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 20:42 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 16:04 ` Tycho Andersen [this message]
2015-09-04 20:26 ` [PATCH 4/6] seccomp: add a way to access filters via bpf fds Kees Cook
2015-09-04 20:29 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 20:58 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 5/6] seccomp: add a way to attach a filter via eBPF fd Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:40 ` Alexei Starovoitov
[not found] ` <1441382664-17437-6-git-send-email-tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-04 20:41 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <CAGXu5jKke44txdYqEgPRrkn8SyWGjJuHxT2qMdq2ztp_16mQyw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-05 7:13 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
[not found] ` <55EA95FE.7000006-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-08 13:40 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 0:07 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <CAGXu5jKS0yX92XXhL6ZkqMrxkqFpPyyBd7wbsvEEx4rqZ0VG6g-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-09 14:47 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 15:14 ` Alexei Starovoitov
[not found] ` <20150909151402.GA3429-2RGepAHry04KGsCuBW9QBvb0xQGhdpdCAL8bYrjMMd8@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-09 15:55 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 6/6] ebpf: allow BPF_REG_X in src_reg conditional jumps Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 21:06 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 22:43 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-05 4:12 ` Alexei Starovoitov
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