* [PATCH v2] openvswitch: allow management from inside user namespaces @ 2016-02-02 0:31 Tycho Andersen [not found] ` <1454373073-12530-1-git-send-email-tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org> 0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread From: Tycho Andersen @ 2016-02-02 0:31 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Pravin Shelar, David S. Miller Cc: netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA, linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, Eric Biederman, Justin Pettit Operations with the GENL_ADMIN_PERM flag fail permissions checks because this flag means we call netlink_capable, which uses the init user ns. Instead, let's introduce a new flag, GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM for operations which should be allowed inside a user namespace. The motivation for this is to be able to run openvswitch in unprivileged containers. I've tested this and it seems to work, but I really have no idea about the security consequences of this patch, so thoughts would be much appreciated. v2: use the GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM flag instead of a check in each function Reported-by: James Page <james.page-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org> Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org> CC: Eric Biederman <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org> CC: Pravin Shelar <pshelar-LZ6Gd1LRuIk@public.gmane.org> CC: Justin Pettit <jpettit-l0M0P4e3n4LQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> CC: "David S. Miller" <davem-fT/PcQaiUtIeIZ0/mPfg9Q@public.gmane.org> --- include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h | 1 + net/netlink/genetlink.c | 6 ++++-- net/openvswitch/datapath.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h b/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h index c3363ba..5512c90 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct genlmsghdr { #define GENL_CMD_CAP_DO 0x02 #define GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP 0x04 #define GENL_CMD_CAP_HASPOL 0x08 +#define GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM 0x10 /* * List of reserved static generic netlink identifiers: diff --git a/net/netlink/genetlink.c b/net/netlink/genetlink.c index f830326..6bbb3eb 100644 --- a/net/netlink/genetlink.c +++ b/net/netlink/genetlink.c @@ -576,8 +576,10 @@ static int genl_family_rcv_msg(struct genl_family *family, if (ops == NULL) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - if ((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) && - !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + if (((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) && + !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) || + ((ops->flags & GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM) && + !netlink_ns_capable(skb, net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))) return -EPERM; if ((nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) == NLM_F_DUMP) { diff --git a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c index deadfda..d6f7fe9 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c @@ -654,7 +654,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy packet_policy[OVS_PACKET_ATTR_MAX + 1] = { static const struct genl_ops dp_packet_genl_ops[] = { { .cmd = OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE, - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ .policy = packet_policy, .doit = ovs_packet_cmd_execute } @@ -1391,12 +1391,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy flow_policy[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_MAX + 1] = { static const struct genl_ops dp_flow_genl_ops[] = { { .cmd = OVS_FLOW_CMD_NEW, - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ .policy = flow_policy, .doit = ovs_flow_cmd_new }, { .cmd = OVS_FLOW_CMD_DEL, - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ .policy = flow_policy, .doit = ovs_flow_cmd_del }, @@ -1407,7 +1407,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops dp_flow_genl_ops[] = { .dumpit = ovs_flow_cmd_dump }, { .cmd = OVS_FLOW_CMD_SET, - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ .policy = flow_policy, .doit = ovs_flow_cmd_set, }, @@ -1777,12 +1777,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy datapath_policy[OVS_DP_ATTR_MAX + 1] = { static const struct genl_ops dp_datapath_genl_ops[] = { { .cmd = OVS_DP_CMD_NEW, - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ .policy = datapath_policy, .doit = ovs_dp_cmd_new }, { .cmd = OVS_DP_CMD_DEL, - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ .policy = datapath_policy, .doit = ovs_dp_cmd_del }, @@ -1793,7 +1793,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops dp_datapath_genl_ops[] = { .dumpit = ovs_dp_cmd_dump }, { .cmd = OVS_DP_CMD_SET, - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ .policy = datapath_policy, .doit = ovs_dp_cmd_set, }, @@ -2158,12 +2158,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy vport_policy[OVS_VPORT_ATTR_MAX + 1] = { static const struct genl_ops dp_vport_genl_ops[] = { { .cmd = OVS_VPORT_CMD_NEW, - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ .policy = vport_policy, .doit = ovs_vport_cmd_new }, { .cmd = OVS_VPORT_CMD_DEL, - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ .policy = vport_policy, .doit = ovs_vport_cmd_del }, @@ -2174,7 +2174,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops dp_vport_genl_ops[] = { .dumpit = ovs_vport_cmd_dump }, { .cmd = OVS_VPORT_CMD_SET, - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ .policy = vport_policy, .doit = ovs_vport_cmd_set, }, -- 2.5.0 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
[parent not found: <1454373073-12530-1-git-send-email-tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>]
* Re: [PATCH v2] openvswitch: allow management from inside user namespaces [not found] ` <1454373073-12530-1-git-send-email-tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org> @ 2016-02-02 18:34 ` Serge Hallyn 0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread From: Serge Hallyn @ 2016-02-02 18:34 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Tycho Andersen Cc: netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA, linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, Pravin Shelar, Eric Biederman, Justin Pettit, David S. Miller Quoting Tycho Andersen (tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org): > Operations with the GENL_ADMIN_PERM flag fail permissions checks because > this flag means we call netlink_capable, which uses the init user ns. > > Instead, let's introduce a new flag, GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM for operations > which should be allowed inside a user namespace. > > The motivation for this is to be able to run openvswitch in unprivileged > containers. I've tested this and it seems to work, but I really have no > idea about the security consequences of this patch, so thoughts would be > much appreciated. > > v2: use the GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM flag instead of a check in each function > > Reported-by: James Page <james.page-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org> > Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org> > CC: Eric Biederman <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org> > CC: Pravin Shelar <pshelar-LZ6Gd1LRuIk@public.gmane.org> > CC: Justin Pettit <jpettit-l0M0P4e3n4LQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> > CC: "David S. Miller" <davem-fT/PcQaiUtIeIZ0/mPfg9Q@public.gmane.org> > --- > include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h | 1 + > net/netlink/genetlink.c | 6 ++++-- > net/openvswitch/datapath.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- > 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h b/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h > index c3363ba..5512c90 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h > @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct genlmsghdr { > #define GENL_CMD_CAP_DO 0x02 > #define GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP 0x04 > #define GENL_CMD_CAP_HASPOL 0x08 > +#define GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM 0x10 > > /* > * List of reserved static generic netlink identifiers: > diff --git a/net/netlink/genetlink.c b/net/netlink/genetlink.c > index f830326..6bbb3eb 100644 > --- a/net/netlink/genetlink.c > +++ b/net/netlink/genetlink.c > @@ -576,8 +576,10 @@ static int genl_family_rcv_msg(struct genl_family *family, > if (ops == NULL) > return -EOPNOTSUPP; > > - if ((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) && > - !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) > + if (((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) && > + !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) || Seems like this would be a lot clearer if you split it up, i.e.: /* CAP_NET_ADMIN required against initial user_ns */ if ((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) && !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; /* CAP_NET_ADMIN required against device user_ns */ if ((ops->flags & GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM) && !netlink_ns_capable(skb, net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; > + ((ops->flags & GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM) && > + !netlink_ns_capable(skb, net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))) > return -EPERM; > > if ((nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) == NLM_F_DUMP) { > diff --git a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c > index deadfda..d6f7fe9 100644 > --- a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c > +++ b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c > @@ -654,7 +654,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy packet_policy[OVS_PACKET_ATTR_MAX + 1] = { > > static const struct genl_ops dp_packet_genl_ops[] = { > { .cmd = OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE, > - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ Hm, I'd like to suggest adding 'over netns', but I guess that breaks 80 cols... > .policy = packet_policy, > .doit = ovs_packet_cmd_execute > } > @@ -1391,12 +1391,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy flow_policy[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_MAX + 1] = { > > static const struct genl_ops dp_flow_genl_ops[] = { > { .cmd = OVS_FLOW_CMD_NEW, > - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > .policy = flow_policy, > .doit = ovs_flow_cmd_new > }, > { .cmd = OVS_FLOW_CMD_DEL, > - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > .policy = flow_policy, > .doit = ovs_flow_cmd_del > }, > @@ -1407,7 +1407,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops dp_flow_genl_ops[] = { > .dumpit = ovs_flow_cmd_dump > }, > { .cmd = OVS_FLOW_CMD_SET, > - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > .policy = flow_policy, > .doit = ovs_flow_cmd_set, > }, > @@ -1777,12 +1777,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy datapath_policy[OVS_DP_ATTR_MAX + 1] = { > > static const struct genl_ops dp_datapath_genl_ops[] = { > { .cmd = OVS_DP_CMD_NEW, > - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > .policy = datapath_policy, > .doit = ovs_dp_cmd_new > }, > { .cmd = OVS_DP_CMD_DEL, > - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > .policy = datapath_policy, > .doit = ovs_dp_cmd_del > }, > @@ -1793,7 +1793,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops dp_datapath_genl_ops[] = { > .dumpit = ovs_dp_cmd_dump > }, > { .cmd = OVS_DP_CMD_SET, > - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > .policy = datapath_policy, > .doit = ovs_dp_cmd_set, > }, > @@ -2158,12 +2158,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy vport_policy[OVS_VPORT_ATTR_MAX + 1] = { > > static const struct genl_ops dp_vport_genl_ops[] = { > { .cmd = OVS_VPORT_CMD_NEW, > - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > .policy = vport_policy, > .doit = ovs_vport_cmd_new > }, > { .cmd = OVS_VPORT_CMD_DEL, > - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > .policy = vport_policy, > .doit = ovs_vport_cmd_del > }, > @@ -2174,7 +2174,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops dp_vport_genl_ops[] = { > .dumpit = ovs_vport_cmd_dump > }, > { .cmd = OVS_VPORT_CMD_SET, > - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > .policy = vport_policy, > .doit = ovs_vport_cmd_set, > }, > -- > 2.5.0 > > _______________________________________________ > Containers mailing list > Containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2016-02-02 18:34 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 2+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2016-02-02 0:31 [PATCH v2] openvswitch: allow management from inside user namespaces Tycho Andersen [not found] ` <1454373073-12530-1-git-send-email-tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org> 2016-02-02 18:34 ` Serge Hallyn
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox; as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).