From: Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v3 3/5] net: af_unix: useful handling of LSM denials on SCM_RIGHTS
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 14:17:14 +0200 (CEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <158151977.3525022.1782821834050@kpc.webmail.kpnmail.nl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260630-getoppt-granit-gekrochen-78244e8979d9@brauner>
> Op 30-06-2026 11:58 CEST schreef Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>:
>
>
> > Right now if some LSM such as Smack denies an AF_UNIX socket peer to
> > receive an SCM_RIGHTS fd, the SCM_RIGHTS fd array will be cut short at
> > that point, and MSG_CTRUNC is set on return of recvmsg(). This is
> > highly problematic behaviour, because it leaves the receiver
> > wondering what happened. As per man page MSG_CTRUNC is supposed to
> > indicate that the control buffer was sized too short, but suddenly
> > a permission error might result in the exact same flag being set.
> > Moreover, the receiver has no chance to determine how many fds got
> > originally sent and how many were suppressed.[1]
> >
> > Add a SO_RIGHTS_NOTRUNC option to UNIX sockets to enable more useful
> > handling of LSM denials when receiving SCM_RIGHTS messages: instead of
> > truncating the message at the first blocked fd, keep every fd slot
> > and store the LSM errno in the blocked slot.
> >
> > [1]: https://github.com/uapi-group/kernel-features#useful-handling-of-lsm-denials-on-scm_rights
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl>
> >
> > diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
> > index 34f53dde65ce..bb1b3dee02e8 100644
> > --- a/include/net/af_unix.h
> > +++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
> > @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ struct unix_sock {
> > struct scm_stat scm_stat;
> > int inq_len;
> > bool recvmsg_inq;
> > + bool scm_rights_notrunc;
> > #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AF_UNIX_OOB)
> > struct sk_buff *oob_skb;
> > #endif
> > diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> > index c52519669349..761cda0803fb 100644
> > --- a/include/net/scm.h
> > +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> > @@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ struct scm_cookie {
> > #endif
> > };
> >
> > -void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
> > -void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
> > +void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, bool notrunc);
> > +void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, bool notrunc);
> > int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
> > void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm);
> > struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
> > @@ -108,11 +108,18 @@ void scm_recv_unix(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
> > struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags);
> >
> > static inline int scm_recv_one_fd(struct file *f, int __user *ufd,
> > - unsigned int flags)
> > + unsigned int flags, bool notrunc)
> > {
> > + bool filtered;
> > + int error;
> > +
> > if (!ufd)
> > return -EFAULT;
> > - return receive_fd(f, ufd, flags);
> > +
> > + error = receive_fd_filtered(f, ufd, flags, &filtered);
> > + if (filtered && notrunc)
> > + return put_user(error, ufd);
>
> This helper makes no sense to me. The boolean return argument is just
> really nasty and you need an additional put_user() as well. At this
> point, just drop receive_fd() and open-code it instead of using another
> custom helper. Something like the completely untested:
>
It's not very pretty no. I thought about several different options but they
all kinda suck.
You could override the error returned from the LSM to -EACCES. Since nothing
else in receive_fd() produces this, if you get it you can be sure that you had
an LSM fd block. However, this masks the real returned error and is also a bit
fragile if receive_fd() does ever return -EACCES in another path (unlikely but still).
You can also signal blocking by setting the ufd to the security_file_receive() error
no matter the socket option. But this does change userspace.
But open-coding might be a better idea.
I also choose to not put -EPERM as sentinel as suggested first, but use the
actual LSM error. Agreed?
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index 761cda0803fb..171b5ccd0b77 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -116,10 +116,22 @@ static inline int scm_recv_one_fd(struct file *f, int __user *ufd,
> if (!ufd)
> return -EFAULT;
>
> - error = receive_fd_filtered(f, ufd, flags, &filtered);
> - if (filtered && notrunc)
> - return put_user(error, ufd);
> - return error;
> + error = security_file_receive(file);
> + if (error)
> + return notrunc ? put_user(error, ufd) : error;
> +
> + FD_PREPARE(fdf, flags, f);
> + if (fdf.err)
> + return fdf.err;
> + get_file(f);
> +
> + error = put_user(fd_prepare_fd(fdf), ufd);
> + if (error)
> + return error;
> +
> + __receive_sock(f);
> + return fd_publish(fdf);
> }
>
> --
> Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-30 12:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-29 19:43 [PATCH net-next v3 0/5] af_unix: useful handling of LSM denials on SCM_RIGHTS Jori Koolstra
2026-06-29 19:43 ` [PATCH net-next v3 1/5] net: scm: move scm_detach_fds() from common path to scm_recv_unix() Jori Koolstra
2026-06-29 19:43 ` [PATCH net-next v3 2/5] vfs: add function receive_fd_filtered() that makes LSM filtering explicit Jori Koolstra
2026-06-29 19:43 ` [PATCH net-next v3 3/5] net: af_unix: useful handling of LSM denials on SCM_RIGHTS Jori Koolstra
2026-06-30 9:58 ` Christian Brauner
2026-06-30 12:17 ` Jori Koolstra [this message]
2026-07-01 7:44 ` Christian Brauner
2026-06-30 16:43 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-06-29 19:43 ` [PATCH net-next v3 4/5] net: af_unix: replace copy_from_sockptr() with copy_safe_from_sockptr() Jori Koolstra
2026-06-30 16:18 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-06-29 19:43 ` [PATCH net-next v3 5/5] selftest: Add tests for useful handling of LSM denials on SCM_RIGHTS Jori Koolstra
2026-06-30 14:17 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-06-30 14:35 ` Jori Koolstra
2026-06-30 16:23 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-07-01 7:38 ` Christian Brauner
2026-07-01 9:31 ` Jori Koolstra
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