From: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
To: davem@davemloft.net
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, kuba@kernel.org, gospo@broadcom.com
Subject: [PATCH net-next 04/10] bnxt_en: allow promiscuous mode for trusted VFs
Date: Sat, 24 Apr 2021 16:14:25 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1619295271-30853-5-git-send-email-michael.chan@broadcom.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1619295271-30853-1-git-send-email-michael.chan@broadcom.com>
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From: Edwin Peer <edwin.peer@broadcom.com>
Firmware previously only allowed promiscuous mode for VFs associated with
a default VLAN. It is now possible to enable promiscuous mode for a VF
having no VLAN configured provided that it is trusted. In such cases the
VF will see all packets received by the PF, irrespective of destination
MAC or VLAN.
Note, it is necessary to query firmware at the time of bnxt_promisc_ok()
instead of in bnxt_hwrm_func_qcfg() because the trusted status might be
altered by the PF after the VF has been configured. This check must now
also be deferred because the firmware call sleeps.
Signed-off-by: Edwin Peer <edwin.peer@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 11 +++++++----
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c | 6 +++---
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
index dcf1598afac2..9862f517960d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
@@ -8340,11 +8340,11 @@ static int bnxt_alloc_rfs_vnics(struct bnxt *bp)
#endif
}
-/* Allow PF and VF with default VLAN to be in promiscuous mode */
+/* Allow PF, trusted VFs and VFs with default VLAN to be in promiscuous mode */
static bool bnxt_promisc_ok(struct bnxt *bp)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_BNXT_SRIOV
- if (BNXT_VF(bp) && !bp->vf.vlan)
+ if (BNXT_VF(bp) && !bp->vf.vlan && !bnxt_is_trusted_vf(bp, &bp->vf))
return false;
#endif
return true;
@@ -8441,7 +8441,7 @@ static int bnxt_init_chip(struct bnxt *bp, bool irq_re_init)
if (bp->dev->flags & IFF_BROADCAST)
vnic->rx_mask |= CFA_L2_SET_RX_MASK_REQ_MASK_BCAST;
- if ((bp->dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC) && bnxt_promisc_ok(bp))
+ if (bp->dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC)
vnic->rx_mask |= CFA_L2_SET_RX_MASK_REQ_MASK_PROMISCUOUS;
if (bp->dev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI) {
@@ -10485,7 +10485,7 @@ static void bnxt_set_rx_mode(struct net_device *dev)
CFA_L2_SET_RX_MASK_REQ_MASK_ALL_MCAST |
CFA_L2_SET_RX_MASK_REQ_MASK_BCAST);
- if ((dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC) && bnxt_promisc_ok(bp))
+ if (dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC)
mask |= CFA_L2_SET_RX_MASK_REQ_MASK_PROMISCUOUS;
uc_update = bnxt_uc_list_updated(bp);
@@ -10561,6 +10561,9 @@ static int bnxt_cfg_rx_mode(struct bnxt *bp)
}
skip_uc:
+ if ((vnic->rx_mask & CFA_L2_SET_RX_MASK_REQ_MASK_PROMISCUOUS) &&
+ !bnxt_promisc_ok(bp))
+ vnic->rx_mask &= ~CFA_L2_SET_RX_MASK_REQ_MASK_PROMISCUOUS;
rc = bnxt_hwrm_cfa_l2_set_rx_mask(bp, 0);
if (rc && vnic->mc_list_count) {
netdev_info(bp->dev, "Failed setting MC filters rc: %d, turning on ALL_MCAST mode\n",
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c
index a217316228f4..4da52f812585 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int bnxt_hwrm_func_qcfg_flags(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
int rc;
bnxt_hwrm_cmd_hdr_init(bp, &req, HWRM_FUNC_QCFG, -1, -1);
- req.fid = cpu_to_le16(vf->fw_fid);
+ req.fid = cpu_to_le16(BNXT_PF(bp) ? vf->fw_fid : 0xffff);
mutex_lock(&bp->hwrm_cmd_lock);
rc = _hwrm_send_message(bp, &req, sizeof(req), HWRM_CMD_TIMEOUT);
if (rc) {
@@ -125,9 +125,9 @@ static int bnxt_hwrm_func_qcfg_flags(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
return 0;
}
-static bool bnxt_is_trusted_vf(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
+bool bnxt_is_trusted_vf(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
{
- if (!(bp->fw_cap & BNXT_FW_CAP_TRUSTED_VF))
+ if (BNXT_PF(bp) && !(bp->fw_cap & BNXT_FW_CAP_TRUSTED_VF))
return !!(vf->flags & BNXT_VF_TRUST);
bnxt_hwrm_func_qcfg_flags(bp, vf);
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.h
index 629641bf6fc5..995535e4c11b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.h
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ int bnxt_set_vf_vlan(struct net_device *, int, u16, u8, __be16);
int bnxt_set_vf_bw(struct net_device *, int, int, int);
int bnxt_set_vf_link_state(struct net_device *, int, int);
int bnxt_set_vf_spoofchk(struct net_device *, int, bool);
+bool bnxt_is_trusted_vf(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf);
int bnxt_set_vf_trust(struct net_device *dev, int vf_id, bool trust);
int bnxt_sriov_configure(struct pci_dev *pdev, int num_vfs);
int bnxt_cfg_hw_sriov(struct bnxt *bp, int *num_vfs, bool reset);
--
2.18.1
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-04-24 20:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-04-24 20:14 [PATCH net-next 00/10] bnxt_en: Updates for net-next Michael Chan
2021-04-24 20:14 ` [PATCH net-next 01/10] bnxt_en: report signal mode in link up messages Michael Chan
2021-04-24 20:14 ` [PATCH net-next 02/10] bnxt_en: Add a new phy_flags field to the main driver structure Michael Chan
2021-04-24 20:14 ` [PATCH net-next 03/10] bnxt_en: Add support for fw managed link down feature Michael Chan
2021-04-24 20:14 ` Michael Chan [this message]
2021-04-24 20:14 ` [PATCH net-next 05/10] bnxt_en: allow VF config ops when PF is closed Michael Chan
2021-04-24 20:14 ` [PATCH net-next 06/10] bnxt_en: Move bnxt_approve_mac() Michael Chan
2021-04-24 20:14 ` [PATCH net-next 07/10] bnxt_en: Call bnxt_approve_mac() after the PF gives up control of the VF MAC Michael Chan
2021-04-24 20:14 ` [PATCH net-next 08/10] bnxt_en: Add PCI IDs for Hyper-V VF devices Michael Chan
2021-04-24 20:14 ` [PATCH net-next 09/10] bnxt_en: Support IFF_SUPP_NOFCS feature to transmit without ethernet FCS Michael Chan
2021-04-24 20:14 ` [PATCH net-next 10/10] bnxt_en: Implement .ndo_features_check() Michael Chan
2021-04-24 21:52 ` Jakub Kicinski
2021-04-24 23:28 ` Michael Chan
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