From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (lindbergh.monkeyblade.net [23.128.96.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6F651E56C for ; Thu, 17 Aug 2023 08:55:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: from out30-132.freemail.mail.aliyun.com (out30-132.freemail.mail.aliyun.com [115.124.30.132]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 96BDD210E for ; Thu, 17 Aug 2023 01:55:09 -0700 (PDT) X-Alimail-AntiSpam:AC=PASS;BC=-1|-1;BR=01201311R161e4;CH=green;DM=||false|;DS=||;FP=0|-1|-1|-1|0|-1|-1|-1;HT=ay29a033018046050;MF=xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com;NM=1;PH=DS;RN=12;SR=0;TI=SMTPD_---0VpzJTPH_1692262506; Received: from localhost(mailfrom:xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com fp:SMTPD_---0VpzJTPH_1692262506) by smtp.aliyun-inc.com; Thu, 17 Aug 2023 16:55:07 +0800 Message-ID: <1692262495.4482832-3-xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH net] net: do not allow gso_size to be set to GSO_BY_FRAGS Date: Thu, 17 Aug 2023 16:54:55 +0800 From: Xuan Zhuo To: Eric Dumazet Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, Eric Dumazet , syzbot , Xin Long , Marcelo Ricardo Leitner , Willem de Bruijn , "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Jason Wang , "David S . Miller" , Jakub Kicinski , Paolo Abeni References: <20230816142158.1779798-1-edumazet@google.com> In-Reply-To: <20230816142158.1779798-1-edumazet@google.com> X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00, ENV_AND_HDR_SPF_MATCH,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, UNPARSEABLE_RELAY,USER_IN_DEF_SPF_WL autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: On Wed, 16 Aug 2023 14:21:58 +0000, Eric Dumazet wrote: > One missing check in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() allowed > syzbot to crash kernels again [1] > > Do not allow gso_size to be set to GSO_BY_FRAGS (0xffff), > because this magic value is used by the kernel. > > [1] > general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000e: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN > KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000070-0x0000000000000077] > CPU: 0 PID: 5039 Comm: syz-executor401 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc5-next-20230809-syzkaller #0 > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023 > RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0x1a52/0x3ef0 net/core/skbuff.c:4500 > Code: 00 00 00 e9 ab eb ff ff e8 6b 96 5d f9 48 8b 84 24 00 01 00 00 48 8d 78 70 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e ea 21 00 00 48 8b 84 24 00 01 > RSP: 0018:ffffc90003d3f1c8 EFLAGS: 00010202 > RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 000000000001fffe RCX: 0000000000000000 > RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffffffff882a3115 RDI: 0000000000000070 > RBP: ffffc90003d3f378 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 000000000000ffff > R10: 000000000000ffff R11: 5ee4a93e456187d6 R12: 000000000001ffc6 > R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000008 R15: 000000000000ffff > FS: 00005555563f2380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > CR2: 0000000020020000 CR3: 000000001626d000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > Call Trace: > > udp6_ufo_fragment+0x9d2/0xd50 net/ipv6/udp_offload.c:109 > ipv6_gso_segment+0x5c4/0x17b0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:120 > skb_mac_gso_segment+0x292/0x610 net/core/gso.c:53 > __skb_gso_segment+0x339/0x710 net/core/gso.c:124 > skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline] > validate_xmit_skb+0x3a5/0xf10 net/core/dev.c:3625 > __dev_queue_xmit+0x8f0/0x3d60 net/core/dev.c:4329 > dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3082 [inline] > packet_xmit+0x257/0x380 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 > packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3087 [inline] > packet_sendmsg+0x24c7/0x5570 net/packet/af_packet.c:3119 > sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline] > sock_sendmsg+0xd9/0x180 net/socket.c:750 > ____sys_sendmsg+0x6ac/0x940 net/socket.c:2496 > ___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2550 > __sys_sendmsg+0x117/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2579 > do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] > do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd > RIP: 0033:0x7ff27cdb34d9 > > Fixes: 3953c46c3ac7 ("sk_buff: allow segmenting based on frag sizes") > Reported-by: syzbot > Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet > Cc: Xin Long > Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner > Cc: Willem de Bruijn > Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" > Cc: Jason Wang > Cc: Xuan Zhuo Reviewed-by: Xuan Zhuo Thanks. > --- > include/linux/virtio_net.h | 4 ++++ > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/include/linux/virtio_net.h b/include/linux/virtio_net.h > index bdf8de2cdd935d31449b78e1b9c67fdcdc537bf2..7b4dd69555e497497460dcf5d72737fe5c09fd53 100644 > --- a/include/linux/virtio_net.h > +++ b/include/linux/virtio_net.h > @@ -155,6 +155,10 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, > if (gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP) > nh_off -= thlen; > > + /* Kernel has a special handling for GSO_BY_FRAGS. */ > + if (gso_size == GSO_BY_FRAGS) > + return -EINVAL; > + > /* Too small packets are not really GSO ones. */ > if (skb->len - nh_off > gso_size) { > shinfo->gso_size = gso_size; > -- > 2.41.0.694.ge786442a9b-goog >