From: netdev-bot+sashiko@kernel.org
To: steffen.klassert@secunet.com
Cc: davem@davemloft.net, kuba@kernel.org,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, netdev@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 02/14] xfrm: interface: validate the IP header on xmit
Date: Tue, 03 Nov 2026 08:05:00 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <179369310046.488856.2145189284558172500@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261102100451.2505200-3-steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential
issue(s) to consider.
Critical: 0 · High: 0 · Medium: 1 · Low: 0
If you believe none of the issues are legitimate, please reply to each
issue of Medium severity or higher and explain why the AI is wrong.
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(one such reply per series is enough).
- [Medium] In xfrmi_xmit() (net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c), the new
header checks look only at skb->protocol.
--
xfrm: interface: validate the IP header on xmit
This patch adds a pskb_inet_may_pull() call to xfrmi_xmit(). It also
drops packets whose IP version does not match skb->protocol, and IPv4
packets with a malformed ihl. The aim is to stop xfrm4_transport_output()
from working on an unvalidated header when packets are injected into an
xfrmi device.
> diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c
> index 688306bf62c5a..9835fbe63ccb8 100644
> --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c
> +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c
> @@ -531,8 +531,13 @@ static netdev_tx_t xfrmi_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
>
> memset(&fl, 0, sizeof(fl));
>
> + if (!pskb_inet_may_pull(skb))
> + goto tx_err;
> +
> switch (skb->protocol) {
> case htons(ETH_P_IPV6):
> + if (ipv6_hdr(skb)->version != 6)
> + goto tx_err;
> memset(IP6CB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IP6CB(skb)));
> xfrm_decode_session(dev_net(dev), skb, &fl, AF_INET6);
> if (!dst) {
[Severity: Medium]
Can an skb marked ETH_P_IPV6 pass this check and still reach
xfrm4_transport_output()?
The new check in xfrmi_xmit() looks only at skb->protocol. The transform
that actually runs is picked by the dst family, and then by
x->props.family.
When skb_dst(skb) is already set, xfrmi_xmit() skips the route lookup.
The dst family is never compared with the header that was just checked.
In collect_md mode, xfrmi_xmit2() also swaps in a different dst after
this check:
net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c:xfrmi_xmit2() {
...
if (md_info->dst_orig) {
struct dst_entry *tmp_dst = dst;
dst = md_info->dst_orig;
skb_dst_set(skb, dst);
...
}
xfrm_lookup_with_ifid() then takes the policy/state family from that
dst, not from the packet:
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:xfrm_lookup_with_ifid() {
...
u16 family = dst_orig->ops->family;
...
}
A tc BPF program could reach this with the following sequence:
bpf_skb_set_xfrm_info()
info->dst_orig = skb_dst(skb); /* IPv4 rtable */
attaches the per-cpu metadata dst
bpf_skb_change_proto(skb, ETH_P_IPV6)
skb_valid_dst() is false for DST_METADATA, so the metadata dst
and the IPv4 dst_orig are both kept
program writes an IPv6 header with version 6
xfrmi_xmit() /* dst != NULL, only version check runs */
xfrmi_xmit2() /* collect_md swaps in IPv4 dst_orig */
xfrm_lookup_with_ifid() /* family is AF_INET */
...
xfrm_outer_mode_output()
xfrm4_transport_output()
A plain IPv4 rtable does not survive bpf_skb_change_proto(), because it
drops non-metadata dsts. So this appears limited to the metadata dst
ordering above.
With an AF_INET transport mode state, xfrm4_transport_output() takes ihl
from the low nibble of the IPv6 header's first byte. That nibble is the
top four bits of the traffic class, so it can be anything from 0 to 15:
net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c:xfrm4_transport_output() {
struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
int ihl = iph->ihl * 4;
...
__skb_pull(skb, ihl);
memmove(skb_network_header(skb), iph, ihl);
...
}
pskb_inet_may_pull() only made 40 bytes linear for IPv6. For a small
packet, skb->len can wrap and the memmove() can read past the end of the
data. If the skb has paged data and a linear length under 60 bytes,
__skb_pull() hits BUG() instead.
One step has not been confirmed end to end. It is not certain that an
AF_INET policy/state lookup matches a flowi that xfrm_decode_session()
filled in as IPv6. It looks plausible with a 0/0 selector, because the
ip4 address fields overlay ip6 address bytes that the sender controls.
This path also needs CAP_BPF/CAP_NET_ADMIN, a collect_md xfrmi, and an
AF_INET transport mode SA and policy.
The commit message says:
"xfrm4_transport_output() uses iph->ihl for __skb_pull() and memmove()
and expects the header to be valid."
Would it make sense to also drop packets whose final dst family (after
the collect_md dst_orig swap) does not match skb->protocol, so this path
is covered too?
[ ... ]
--
Sashiko AI review · https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20261102100451.2505200-2-steffen.klassert%40secunet.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-03 8:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-02 10:03 [PATCH 0/14] pull request (net): ipsec 2026-11-02 Steffen Klassert
2026-11-02 10:03 ` [PATCH 01/14] xfrm: retry inexact policy lookup after node reinsertion Steffen Klassert
2026-11-02 8:09 ` netdev-bot+sinfo
2026-11-03 12:30 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
2026-11-02 10:04 ` [PATCH 02/14] xfrm: interface: validate the IP header on xmit Steffen Klassert
2026-11-03 8:05 ` netdev-bot+sashiko [this message]
2026-11-03 9:34 ` Steffen Klassert
2026-11-02 10:04 ` [PATCH 03/14] xfrm: zero-initialise km_event in the replay-notify path Steffen Klassert
2026-11-02 10:04 ` [PATCH 04/14] xfrm: espintcp: reorder operations within espintcp_init_sk Steffen Klassert
2026-11-03 8:05 ` netdev-bot+sashiko
2026-11-02 10:04 ` [PATCH 05/14] xfrm: state: reject mark with bits outside its mask on add Steffen Klassert
2026-11-03 8:05 ` netdev-bot+sashiko
2026-11-02 10:04 ` [PATCH 06/14] xfrm: state: reject mark with bits outside its mask on ALLOCSPI Steffen Klassert
2026-11-03 8:05 ` netdev-bot+sashiko
2026-11-02 10:04 ` [PATCH 07/14] xfrm: policy: reject mark with bits outside its mask on add Steffen Klassert
2026-11-03 8:05 ` netdev-bot+sashiko
2026-11-03 9:37 ` Steffen Klassert
2026-11-02 10:04 ` [PATCH 08/14] xfrm: state: exact mark/mask match for SPI-keyed control-plane SA lookups Steffen Klassert
2026-11-03 8:05 ` netdev-bot+sashiko
2026-11-03 10:17 ` Steffen Klassert
2026-11-02 10:04 ` [PATCH 09/14] xfrm: fix use-after-free of migrated state in xfrm_do_migrate_state() Steffen Klassert
2026-11-02 10:04 ` [PATCH 10/14] xfrm: fix hw offload state leak on xfrm_do_migrate_state() error path Steffen Klassert
2026-11-02 10:04 ` [PATCH 11/14] xfrm: include mark in MIGRATE_STATE SA collision check Steffen Klassert
2026-11-03 8:05 ` netdev-bot+sashiko
2026-11-03 11:13 ` Steffen Klassert
2026-11-03 12:17 ` Paolo Abeni
2026-11-02 10:04 ` [PATCH 12/14] xfrm: pass extack through to xfrm_init_replay() from xfrm_init_state() Steffen Klassert
2026-11-02 10:04 ` [PATCH 13/14] docs: xfrm: include mark in XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE EEXIST tuple Steffen Klassert
2026-11-03 8:05 ` netdev-bot+sashiko
2026-11-02 10:04 ` [PATCH 14/14] xfrm4: use a full socket for local errors Steffen Klassert
2026-11-03 8:05 ` netdev-bot+sashiko
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