From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795336794; b=TKX/5uAgauGRAYS285JOnlp0DO5oQuXY01a2SqIFjXB1NFMsybV8nVL6Q5m0RAttGOkI LJUSYcqnuZDJ3Hnuz4tEAPA4gWJcQaRP8We2Dz9OXarA+sDhyWNfM9xIcBmdpBbpfzhDd r/vpZRFNt+TBtdzpHD2kDL4hnDKw6YVnGF+hgUUHy6oYcLHj2OG2uLq6VN6e8DHY3MXTE ewWGqPZIckc7g2T2bHM1PXOc8zW89X9nlvUOk/4/x2Xr2AaCtzonpcakInLHWkukSXOzi naV6n2yLMEQeWtUJnWGGJQ9lU6qDn1Pj4KHkmR8vBGXnBb6hFDFHh2os+2/lVldidGQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795336794; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Subject:From:To:Cc:Date:Message-ID: In-Reply-To:References:X-sashiko-severity:Content-Type: Content-Transfer-Encoding:MIME-Version; bh=82tcMrGFYnv3COc/Y81tp4EqEYsTMRAGEcxNCdMHdRc=; b=SkAAruU1vIoOPyLYrukNZ0eLpl0UJQ20IQAiIt8xwVYhwpXIHeYOjwvsABDl0uAArkAp fCvCvAMQJfsYrf6YQsGUNoSjv100ZdE9L79GCpdWmfN1mtn+SGDclwAD7gn/rQ6Y7jtAy G3rFUsHZxESTkq+5RkHSXR6do0huN0xLGNPT7jAAHDfrymWN8++0nJtDZ5ClCVK00cfbs 58DpzEXY1knMwPAMUYw/aoDtit34MfWiDkf0/1yYTUJrmk/2wIiybIG/uTygnH6aufuMQ 6Vx3vHEuAbJWdC/5CyyFW8V8TiQDctrq+a642X2dIGlKL4h8UYOEc2T6Jo5j7L/b0jA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=Qd8eb41b; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 00EA7606A335; Sun, 22 Nov 2026 08:39:53 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=Qd8eb41b Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 40AB51F000C4; Sun, 22 Nov 2026 08:39:53 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795336793; bh=82tcMrGFYnv3COc/Y81tp4EqEYsTMRAGEcxNCdMHdRc=; h=Subject:From:To:Cc:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=Qd8eb41bJedj+mQUUvTaHt6REHI79qptfzrHrEd1wff4Qydzlbv2mRiTbHCjpNoF0 vGrBaUBc9LN3ietU9JGaIeCfTr7chKK5F8DIWztMidhwFUWGE4S55ndJPK0eG/umHd JRydsd62Psp6lmOSDiO8tc+DZwQ/KpA5ttU8lKROnhObZYQ9N3Vtg1MFBqn43MRSgV Lodhbot6dCi1LYHoKZBQC1gUXPYeqjiij5k/2lr8IgufbIk6UzMFvSmxX8dF4Mz1l4 9B5+Ycd/zS77dSSYLAgMLYFWLSGs8ClTy41mV954GSAZ/lyPzypnAmsGVx2AovFbSp qJjsSQIPfuUrw== Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] net/nfc: fix skb ownership on data exchange errors From: netdev-bot+sashiko@kernel.org To: luob87709@gmail.com Cc: oe-linux-nfc@lists.linux.dev, johan@kernel.org, david+nfc@ixit.cz, netdev@vger.kernel.org, kuba@kernel.org Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 08:39:52 +0000 Message-ID: <179533679278.3135.7201159366500267043@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: <20261118081530.32-1-luob87709@gmail.com> References: <20261118081530.32-1-luob87709@gmail.com> X-sashiko-severity: High Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider. Critical: 0 · High: 1 · Medium: 0 · Low: 1 If you believe none of the issues are legitimate, please reply to each issue of Medium severity or higher and explain why the AI is wrong. If any of them are legitimate and you plan to respin, please let patchwork know by including "pw-bot: cr" as a separate line at the end of your reply (one such reply per series is enough). - [High] The fix is incomplete. - [Low] The commit fixes a user-reachable skb leak in rawsock_data_exchange_complete() (net/nfc/rawsock.c) and changes… -- net/nfc: fix skb ownership on data exchange errors The commit documents that a data_exchange_cb_t callback takes ownership of a non-NULL skb regardless of err. It frees the skb on the rawsock, LLCP and NCI loopback error paths. It also stops digital DEP from freeing the response after the callback has been invoked. > diff --git a/include/net/nfc/nfc.h b/include/net/nfc/nfc.h > index bcafab5c53e51..d3c2d67357f1b 100644 > --- a/include/net/nfc/nfc.h > +++ b/include/net/nfc/nfc.h > @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ struct nfc_dev; > * > * When a rx or tx package is lost or corrupted or the target gets out > * of the operating field, err is -EIO. > + * If skb is non-NULL, ownership is transferred to the callback regardless > + * of err. Providers must not access or free skb after invoking the callback. > */ > typedef void (*data_exchange_cb_t)(void *context, struct sk_buff *skb, > int err); [Severity: High] This rule now covers every data_exchange_cb_t implementer. Several in-tree callbacks still return on error without freeing the skb. Is the fix complete without them? In net/nfc/nci/hci.c, nci_hci_data_received_cb() is installed as conn_info->data_exchange_cb and does: if (err) { nci_req_complete(ndev, err); return; } nci_rx_data_packet() strips a status byte for every conn_id, based on the device-wide ndev->target_active_prot. That status ends up in: nci_rx_data_packet() nci_add_rx_data_frag(..., nci_to_errno(status)) nci_data_exchange_complete(ndev, skb, conn_id, err) cb(cb_context, skb, err); Suppose an NFCC sends an error-status data packet on the HCI conn_id while a frame-I/F target is active and an RF transceive is pending. Wouldn't that skb leak? This is the same provider path that was tested for rawsock. On the HCI side, nfc_hci_resp_received() calls: __nfc_hci_cmd_completion(hdev, nfc_hci_result_to_errno(result), skb); As a result, every non-OK HCI response reaches the callback registered by nfc_hci_send_cmd_async() with both a non-NULL skb and a nonzero err. In drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c, st21nfca_im_recv_atr_res_cb() and st21nfca_im_recv_dep_res_cb() are registered directly as that callback. Both start with: if (err != 0) return; Would every HCI error response during NFC-DEP leak the response skb here? For example, a timeout when the peer leaves the field. Separately, the ST21NFCA_CB_TYPE_READER_F success branch of st21nfca_im_recv_atr_res_cb() never frees skb at all. Four default branches only free on success: default: if (err == 0) kfree_skb(skb); break; They are hci_transceive_cb() in net/nfc/hci/core.c, pn544_hci_data_exchange_cb() in drivers/nfc/pn544/pn544.c, st21nfca_hci_data_exchange_cb() in drivers/nfc/st21nfca/core.c and microread_im_transceive_cb() in drivers/nfc/microread/microread.c. Under the new contract, don't these leak skb when err != 0? nfc_hci_execute_cb() already frees skb on error, so the in-tree callbacks end up inconsistent with each other and with the documented rule. Should these callbacks be updated in the same patch, or at least mentioned in the commit message? > diff --git a/net/nfc/digital_dep.c b/net/nfc/digital_dep.c > index 968547c306a5d..c7f5378cd12e2 100644 > --- a/net/nfc/digital_dep.c > +++ b/net/nfc/digital_dep.c > @@ -882,6 +882,7 @@ static void digital_in_recv_dep_res(struct nfc_digital_dev *ddev, void *arg, > > exit: > data_exch->cb(data_exch->cb_context, resp, rc); > + resp = NULL; > > error: > kfree(data_exch); [Severity: Low] This isn't a bug, but should this carry a Fixes: tag and Cc: stable? The rawsock_data_exchange_complete() leak can be reached by an unprivileged user through an NFC raw socket. The hunks also depend on each other. The resp = NULL in digital_in_recv_dep_res() stops the provider from freeing resp, and the rawsock and LLCP hunks make the consumers free it. A partial backport would either leak or double free the skb. Fixes: tags would help stable take the change as one unit. [ ... ] -- Sashiko AI review · https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20261118081530.32-1-luob87709%40gmail.com