[PATCH 0/2] [PATCH 0/2] Updated NetLabel/secid-reconciliation bits and a bugfix

[PATCH 0/2] [PATCH 0/2] Updated NetLabel/secid-reconciliation bits and a bugfix

[paul.moore]

This patchset includes an update to the NetLabel/secid-reconciliation patch,
replacing my "v3" patch from earlier this week, and a bugfix patch to cure a
race condition found during testing this week.  The bugfix patch does not
rely on the secid patches and should be merged regardless as it fixes a bug
which has been around since the very first NetLabel patches (not sure why I
didn't see this sooner).

--
paul moore
linux security @ hp

[PATCH v4 1/2] NetLabel: secid reconciliation support

[paul.moore]

[-- Attachment #1: netlabel-secid_support --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 13804 bytes --]

This patch provides the missing NetLabel support to the secid reconciliation
patchset.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c                    |  104 +++++++++++++++++----------
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h           |    1 
 security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h |   28 +++----
 security/selinux/ss/services.c              |  106 ++++++++++------------------
 4 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 118 deletions(-)

Index: net-2.6/security/selinux/hooks.c
===================================================================
--- net-2.6.orig/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ net-2.6/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3465,6 +3465,10 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(s
 			goto out;
 	}
 
+	err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, sock_class, skb, ad);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
 	err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb, ad);
 
 out:
@@ -3501,10 +3505,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(s
 	else
 		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
 				   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
 
-	err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad);
 out:	
 	return err;
 }
@@ -3527,11 +3528,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_str
 		peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
 	}
 	else if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
-		peer_sid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(sock);
-		if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
-			ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
-			peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
-		}
+		ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
 		if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
 			err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
 			goto out;
@@ -3573,13 +3571,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgr
 	if (sock && (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX))
 		selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
 	else if (skb) {
-		peer_secid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(skb);
-		if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) {
-			if (selinux_compat_net)
+		if (selinux_compat_net) {
+			peer_secid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(
+				skb);
+			if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
 				peer_secid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb);
-			else
-				peer_secid = skb->secmark;
-		}
+		} else
+			peer_secid = skb->secmark;
 	}
 
 	if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
@@ -3641,13 +3639,11 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(str
 	u32 newsid;
 	u32 peersid;
 
-	newsid = selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(skb, sksec->sid);
-	if (newsid != SECSID_NULL) {
-		req->secid = newsid;
-		return 0;
-	}
-
 	if (selinux_compat_net) {
+		err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb, sksec->sid, &peersid);
+		if (err == 0 && peersid != SECSID_NULL)
+			goto out;
+
 		err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &peersid, 0);
 		BUG_ON(err);
 
@@ -3659,6 +3655,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(str
 	} else
 		peersid = skb->secmark;
 
+out:
 	err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
@@ -3700,6 +3697,9 @@ static void selinux_req_classify_flow(co
 static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned short family)
 {
 	u32 xfrm_sid;
+	u32 nlbl_sid;
+	u32 ext_sid;
+	u32 loc_sid;
 	int err;
 
 	if (selinux_compat_net)
@@ -3714,19 +3714,34 @@ static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk
 	if (skb->dev == &loopback_dev)
 		return 1;
 
+	if (skb->secmark)
+		loc_sid = skb->secmark;
+	else
+		loc_sid = SECINITSID_NETMSG;
+
 	err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &xfrm_sid, 0);
 	BUG_ON(err);
-
-	err = avc_has_perm(xfrm_sid, skb->secmark? : SECINITSID_NETMSG,
-					SECCLASS_PACKET,
-					PACKET__FLOW_IN, NULL);
+	err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb,
+				     xfrm_sid ? xfrm_sid : loc_sid,
+				     &nlbl_sid);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
-	if (xfrm_sid)
-		skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
+	if (nlbl_sid)
+		ext_sid = nlbl_sid;
+	else
+		ext_sid = xfrm_sid;
+
+	err = avc_has_perm(ext_sid,
+			   loc_sid,
+			   SECCLASS_PACKET,
+			   PACKET__FLOW_IN,
+			   NULL);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
 
-	/* See if NetLabel can flow in thru the current secmark here */
+	if (ext_sid)
+		skb->secmark = ext_sid;
 
 out:
 	return err ? 0 : 1;
@@ -3740,21 +3755,29 @@ static int selinux_skb_flow_out(struct s
 		return 1;
 
 	if (!skb->secmark) {
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
 		u32 xfrm_sid;
+		u32 nlbl_sid;
 
 		selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
+		err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb,
+					     xfrm_sid ? xfrm_sid : sksec->sid,
+					     &nlbl_sid);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
 
-		if (xfrm_sid)
+		if (nlbl_sid)
+			skb->secmark = nlbl_sid;
+		else if (xfrm_sid)
 			skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
-		else if (skb->sk) {
-			struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
+		else if (skb->sk)
 			skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
-		}
 	}
 
 	err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, nf_secid, SECCLASS_PACKET,
 				PACKET__FLOW_OUT, NULL);
 
+out:
 	return err ? 0 : 1;
 }
 
@@ -3903,17 +3926,24 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
 						       family, addrp, len);
 	else {
 		if (!skb->secmark) {
+			struct sk_security_struct *sksec =
+				skb->sk->sk_security;
 			u32 xfrm_sid;
+			u32 nlbl_sid;
 
 			selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
-
-			if (xfrm_sid)
+			err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb,
+					      xfrm_sid ? xfrm_sid : sksec->sid,
+					      &nlbl_sid);
+			if (err)
+				goto out;
+
+			if (nlbl_sid)
+				skb->secmark = nlbl_sid;
+			else if (xfrm_sid)
 				skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
-			else if (skb->sk) {
-				struct sk_security_struct *sksec =
-						skb->sk->sk_security;
+			else if (skb->sk)
 				skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
-			}
 		}
 		err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, SECINITSID_NETMSG,
 				   SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_OUT, &ad);
Index: net-2.6/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
===================================================================
--- net-2.6.orig/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ net-2.6/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -102,7 +102,6 @@ struct sk_security_struct {
 	u32 sid;			/* SID of this object */
 	u32 peer_sid;			/* SID of peer */
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
-	u16 sclass;			/* sock security class */
 	enum {				/* NetLabel state */
 		NLBL_UNSET = 0,
 		NLBL_REQUIRE,
Index: net-2.6/security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h
===================================================================
--- net-2.6.orig/security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h
+++ net-2.6/security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h
@@ -42,17 +42,17 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(st
 				      int sock_family,
 				      u32 sid);
 void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock);
-u32 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 sock_sid);
-int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
+int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sock_sid,
+				u16 sock_class,
 				struct sk_buff *skb,
 				struct avc_audit_data *ad);
-u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock);
 u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb);
 void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 				     int family);
 void selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 				      struct sk_security_struct *newssec);
 int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask);
+int selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid);
 #else
 static inline void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
 {
@@ -72,24 +72,14 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_sock_g
 	return;
 }
 
-static inline u32 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct sk_buff *skb,
-						   u32 sock_sid)
-{
-	return SECSID_NULL;
-}
-
-static inline int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sock_sid,
+					      u16 sock_class,
 					      struct sk_buff *skb,
 					      struct avc_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock)
-{
-	return SECSID_NULL;
-}
-
 static inline u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	return SECSID_NULL;
@@ -114,6 +104,14 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_inode_p
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					 u32 base_sid,
+					 u32 *sid)
+{
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
 
 #endif
Index: net-2.6/security/selinux/ss/services.c
===================================================================
--- net-2.6.orig/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ net-2.6/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
 #include "selinux_netlabel.h"
 
 extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
+extern int selinux_compat_net;
 unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
 
 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
@@ -2454,7 +2455,6 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(str
 void selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 				      struct sk_security_struct *newssec)
 {
-	newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
 	if (ssec->nlbl_state != NLBL_UNSET)
 		newssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQUIRE;
 	else
@@ -2476,11 +2476,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(st
 				      int sock_family,
 				      u32 sid)
 {
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
 
-	sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
-
 	if (sock_family != PF_INET)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -2500,24 +2497,23 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(st
  */
 void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock)
 {
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
 	u32 nlbl_peer_sid;
 
-	sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
-
 	if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET)
 		return;
 
-	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
-	if (netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr) == 0 &&
-	    selinux_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(NULL,
-					  &secattr,
-					  sksec->sid,
-					  &nlbl_peer_sid) == 0)
-		sksec->peer_sid = nlbl_peer_sid;
-	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr, 0);
+	if (selinux_compat_net) {
+		netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+		if (netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr) == 0 &&
+		    selinux_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(NULL,
+						  &secattr,
+						  sksec->sid,
+						  &nlbl_peer_sid) == 0)
+			sksec->peer_sid = nlbl_peer_sid;
+		netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr, 0);
+	}
 
 	sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQUIRE;
 
@@ -2528,32 +2524,6 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct so
 }
 
 /**
- * selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request - Handle a new connection request
- * @skb: the packet
- * @sock_sid: the SID of the parent socket
- *
- * Description:
- * If present, use the security attributes of the packet in @skb and the
- * parent sock's SID to arrive at a SID for the new child sock.  Returns the
- * SID of the connection or SECSID_NULL on failure.
- *
- */
-u32 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 sock_sid)
-{
-	int rc;
-	u32 peer_sid;
-
-	rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, sock_sid, &peer_sid);
-	if (rc != 0)
-		return SECSID_NULL;
-
-	if (peer_sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
-		return SECSID_NULL;
-
-	return peer_sid;
-}
-
-/**
  * selinux_netlbl_inode_permission - Verify the socket is NetLabel labeled
  * @inode: the file descriptor's inode
  * @mask: the permission mask
@@ -2593,7 +2563,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(stru
 
 /**
  * selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb - Do an inbound access check using NetLabel
- * @sksec: the sock's sk_security_struct
+ * @sock_sid: the socket's SID
+ * @sock_class: the socket's class
  * @skb: the packet
  * @ad: the audit data
  *
@@ -2603,7 +2574,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(stru
  * error.
  *
  */
-int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
+int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sock_sid,
+				u16 sock_class,
 				struct sk_buff *skb,
 				struct avc_audit_data *ad)
 {
@@ -2618,7 +2590,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct s
 	if (netlbl_sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
 		return 0;
 
-	switch (sksec->sclass) {
+	switch (sock_class) {
 	case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
 		recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
 		break;
@@ -2629,9 +2601,9 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct s
 		recv_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
 	}
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sock_sid,
 			  netlbl_sid,
-			  sksec->sclass,
+			  sock_class,
 			  recv_perm,
 			  ad);
 	if (rc == 0)
@@ -2642,25 +2614,6 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct s
 }
 
 /**
- * selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream - Return the connected peer's SID
- * @sock: the socket
- *
- * Description:
- * Examine @sock to find the connected peer's SID.  Returns the SID on success
- * or SECSID_NULL on error.
- *
- */
-u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock)
-{
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
-
-	if (sksec->peer_sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
-		return SECSID_NULL;
-
-	return sksec->peer_sid;
-}
-
-/**
  * selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram - Return the SID of a NetLabel packet
  * @skb: the packet
  *
@@ -2686,4 +2639,27 @@ u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgr
 
 	return peer_sid;
 }
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_skb_sid - Calculate the NetLabel SID of a packet
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only attributes
+ * @sid: the SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Call the NetLabel mechanism to get the security attributes of the given
+ * packet and use those attributes to determine the correct context/SID to
+ * assign to the packet.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, base_sid, sid);
+	if (rc == 0 && *sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
+		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	return rc;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */

--
paul moore
linux security @ hp

[PATCH 2/2] NetLabel: fix a cache race condition

[paul.moore]

[-- Attachment #1: netlabel-cache_fix --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 9729 bytes --]

Testing revealed a problem with the NetLabel cache where a cached entry could
be freed while in use by the LSM layer causing an oops and other problems.
This patch fixes that problem by introducing a reference counter to the cache
entry so that it is only freed when it is no longer in use.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
---
 include/net/netlabel.h         |   62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c          |   18 ++++++-----
 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c   |    2 -
 security/selinux/ss/services.c |   37 +++++++++++++-----------
 4 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)

Index: net-2.6/include/net/netlabel.h
===================================================================
--- net-2.6.orig/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ net-2.6/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include <linux/net.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
 #include <net/netlink.h>
+#include <asm/atomic.h>
 
 /*
  * NetLabel - A management interface for maintaining network packet label
@@ -106,6 +107,7 @@ int netlbl_domhsh_remove(const char *dom
 
 /* LSM security attributes */
 struct netlbl_lsm_cache {
+	atomic_t refcount;
 	void (*free) (const void *data);
 	void *data;
 };
@@ -117,7 +119,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
 	unsigned char *mls_cat;
 	size_t mls_cat_len;
 
-	struct netlbl_lsm_cache cache;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_cache *cache;
 };
 
 /*
@@ -126,6 +128,43 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
 
 
 /**
+ * netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc - Allocate and initialize a secattr cache
+ * @flags: the memory allocation flags
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Allocate and initialize a netlbl_lsm_cache structure.  Returns a pointer
+ * on success, NULL on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static inline struct netlbl_lsm_cache *netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(int flags)
+{
+	struct netlbl_lsm_cache *cache;
+
+	cache = kzalloc(sizeof(*cache), flags);
+	if (cache)
+		atomic_set(&cache->refcount, 1);
+	return cache;
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_secattr_cache_free - Frees a netlbl_lsm_cache struct
+ * @cache: the struct to free
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Frees @secattr including all of the internal buffers.
+ *
+ */
+static inline void netlbl_secattr_cache_free(struct netlbl_lsm_cache *cache)
+{
+	if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&cache->refcount))
+		return;
+
+	if (cache->free)
+		cache->free(cache->data);
+	kfree(cache);
+}
+
+/**
  * netlbl_secattr_init - Initialize a netlbl_lsm_secattr struct
  * @secattr: the struct to initialize
  *
@@ -143,20 +182,16 @@ static inline int netlbl_secattr_init(st
 /**
  * netlbl_secattr_destroy - Clears a netlbl_lsm_secattr struct
  * @secattr: the struct to clear
- * @clear_cache: cache clear flag
  *
  * Description:
  * Destroys the @secattr struct, including freeing all of the internal buffers.
- * If @clear_cache is true then free the cache fields, otherwise leave them
- * intact.  The struct must be reset with a call to netlbl_secattr_init()
- * before reuse.
+ * The struct must be reset with a call to netlbl_secattr_init() before reuse.
  *
  */
-static inline void netlbl_secattr_destroy(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
-					  u32 clear_cache)
+static inline void netlbl_secattr_destroy(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
-	if (clear_cache && secattr->cache.data != NULL && secattr->cache.free)
-		secattr->cache.free(secattr->cache.data);
+	if (secattr->cache)
+		netlbl_secattr_cache_free(secattr->cache);
 	kfree(secattr->domain);
 	kfree(secattr->mls_cat);
 }
@@ -178,17 +213,14 @@ static inline struct netlbl_lsm_secattr 
 /**
  * netlbl_secattr_free - Frees a netlbl_lsm_secattr struct
  * @secattr: the struct to free
- * @clear_cache: cache clear flag
  *
  * Description:
- * Frees @secattr including all of the internal buffers.  If @clear_cache is
- * true then free the cache fields, otherwise leave them intact.
+ * Frees @secattr including all of the internal buffers.
  *
  */
-static inline void netlbl_secattr_free(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
-				       u32 clear_cache)
+static inline void netlbl_secattr_free(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
-	netlbl_secattr_destroy(secattr, clear_cache);
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(secattr);
 	kfree(secattr);
 }
 
Index: net-2.6/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
===================================================================
--- net-2.6.orig/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ net-2.6/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
 #include <net/tcp.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
+#include <asm/atomic.h>
 #include <asm/bug.h>
 
 struct cipso_v4_domhsh_entry {
@@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ struct cipso_v4_map_cache_entry {
 	unsigned char *key;
 	size_t key_len;
 
-	struct netlbl_lsm_cache lsm_data;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_cache *lsm_data;
 
 	u32 activity;
 	struct list_head list;
@@ -188,13 +189,14 @@ static void cipso_v4_doi_domhsh_free(str
  * @entry: the entry to free
  *
  * Description:
- * This function frees the memory associated with a cache entry.
+ * This function frees the memory associated with a cache entry including the
+ * LSM cache data if there are no longer any users, i.e. reference count == 0.
  *
  */
 static void cipso_v4_cache_entry_free(struct cipso_v4_map_cache_entry *entry)
 {
-	if (entry->lsm_data.free)
-		entry->lsm_data.free(entry->lsm_data.data);
+	if (entry->lsm_data)
+		netlbl_secattr_cache_free(entry->lsm_data);
 	kfree(entry->key);
 	kfree(entry);
 }
@@ -315,8 +317,8 @@ static int cipso_v4_cache_check(const un
 		    entry->key_len == key_len &&
 		    memcmp(entry->key, key, key_len) == 0) {
 			entry->activity += 1;
-			secattr->cache.free = entry->lsm_data.free;
-			secattr->cache.data = entry->lsm_data.data;
+			atomic_inc(&entry->lsm_data->refcount);
+			secattr->cache = entry->lsm_data;
 			if (prev_entry == NULL) {
 				spin_unlock_bh(&cipso_v4_cache[bkt].lock);
 				return 0;
@@ -383,8 +385,8 @@ int cipso_v4_cache_add(const struct sk_b
 	memcpy(entry->key, cipso_ptr, cipso_ptr_len);
 	entry->key_len = cipso_ptr_len;
 	entry->hash = cipso_v4_map_cache_hash(cipso_ptr, cipso_ptr_len);
-	entry->lsm_data.free = secattr->cache.free;
-	entry->lsm_data.data = secattr->cache.data;
+	atomic_inc(&secattr->cache->refcount);
+	entry->lsm_data = secattr->cache;
 
 	bkt = entry->hash & (CIPSO_V4_CACHE_BUCKETBITS - 1);
 	spin_lock_bh(&cipso_v4_cache[bkt].lock);
Index: net-2.6/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
===================================================================
--- net-2.6.orig/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ net-2.6/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ void netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
 int netlbl_cache_add(const struct sk_buff *skb,
 		     const struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
-	if (secattr->cache.data == NULL)
+	if (secattr->cache == NULL)
 		return -ENOMSG;
 
 	if (CIPSO_V4_OPTEXIST(skb))
Index: net-2.6/security/selinux/ss/services.c
===================================================================
--- net-2.6.orig/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ net-2.6/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2173,7 +2173,12 @@ struct netlbl_cache {
  */
 static void selinux_netlbl_cache_free(const void *data)
 {
-	struct netlbl_cache *cache = NETLBL_CACHE(data);
+	struct netlbl_cache *cache;
+
+	if (data == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	cache = NETLBL_CACHE(data);
 	switch (cache->type) {
 	case NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS:
 		ebitmap_destroy(&cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat);
@@ -2198,17 +2203,20 @@ static void selinux_netlbl_cache_add(str
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
 
 	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	secattr.cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (secattr.cache == NULL)
+		goto netlbl_cache_add_return;
 
 	cache = kzalloc(sizeof(*cache),	GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (cache == NULL)
-		goto netlbl_cache_add_failure;
-	secattr.cache.free = selinux_netlbl_cache_free;
-	secattr.cache.data = (void *)cache;
+		goto netlbl_cache_add_return;
+	secattr.cache->free = selinux_netlbl_cache_free;
+	secattr.cache->data = (void *)cache;
 
 	cache->type = NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS;
 	if (ebitmap_cpy(&cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat,
 			&ctx->range.level[0].cat) != 0)
-		goto netlbl_cache_add_failure;
+		goto netlbl_cache_add_return;
 	cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.highbit =
 		cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat.highbit;
 	cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.node =
@@ -2216,13 +2224,10 @@ static void selinux_netlbl_cache_add(str
 	cache->data.mls_label.level[0].sens = ctx->range.level[0].sens;
 	cache->data.mls_label.level[1].sens = ctx->range.level[0].sens;
 
-	if (netlbl_cache_add(skb, &secattr) != 0)
-		goto netlbl_cache_add_failure;
-
-	return;
+	netlbl_cache_add(skb, &secattr);
 
-netlbl_cache_add_failure:
-	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr, 1);
+netlbl_cache_add_return:
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2264,8 +2269,8 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_secattr_to_sid
 
 	POLICY_RDLOCK;
 
-	if (secattr->cache.data) {
-		cache = NETLBL_CACHE(secattr->cache.data);
+	if (secattr->cache) {
+		cache = NETLBL_CACHE(secattr->cache->data);
 		switch (cache->type) {
 		case NETLBL_CACHE_T_SID:
 			*sid = cache->data.sid;
@@ -2370,7 +2375,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(
 						   &secattr,
 						   base_sid,
 						   sid);
-	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr, 0);
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
 
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -2416,7 +2421,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid(
 	if (rc == 0)
 		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
 
-	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr, 0);
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
 
 netlbl_socket_setsid_return:
 	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
@@ -2512,7 +2517,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct so
 						  sksec->sid,
 						  &nlbl_peer_sid) == 0)
 			sksec->peer_sid = nlbl_peer_sid;
-		netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr, 0);
+		netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
 	}
 
 	sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQUIRE;

--
paul moore
linux security @ hp

Re: [PATCH 0/2] [PATCH 0/2] Updated NetLabel/secid-reconciliation bits and a bugfix

[James Morris]

On Wed, 4 Oct 2006, paul.moore@hp.com wrote:

> This patchset includes an update to the NetLabel/secid-reconciliation patch,
> replacing my "v3" patch from earlier this week, and a bugfix patch to cure a
> race condition found during testing this week.  The bugfix patch does not
> rely on the secid patches and should be merged regardless as it fixes a bug
> which has been around since the very first NetLabel patches (not sure why I
> didn't see this sooner).

So, patch 2/2 should go in on it's own against upstream?  If so, in 5B
future, please post such patches separately.

As for the rest of the network labeling, please work together with Venkat 
and the SELinux developers on a final patchset which meets all of the 
design goals and has been tested, with policy which has been merged 
upstream and is available via Fedora devel.  Please keep the discussion 
going, but ensure that the final patchset for review and merge 
consideration is a complete set against the current git kernel coming from 
one person.

Thanks,



- James
-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>

Re: [PATCH 0/2] [PATCH 0/2] Updated NetLabel/secid-reconciliation bits and a bugfix

[Paul Moore]

James Morris wrote:
> On Wed, 4 Oct 2006, paul.moore@hp.com wrote:
> 
>>This patchset includes an update to the NetLabel/secid-reconciliation patch,
>>replacing my "v3" patch from earlier this week, and a bugfix patch to cure a
>>race condition found during testing this week.  The bugfix patch does not
>>rely on the secid patches and should be merged regardless as it fixes a bug
>>which has been around since the very first NetLabel patches (not sure why I
>>didn't see this sooner).
> 
> So, patch 2/2 should go in on it's own against upstream?  If so, in 5B
> future, please post such patches separately.

Yes, please commit patch 2/2 regardless as it fixes a bug which is not
dependent on any of the secid patches which are being discussed.  My
apologies for including it in the same patchset, I'll be sure to split
it up next time.

> As for the rest of the network labeling, please work together with Venkat 
> and the SELinux developers on a final patchset which meets all of the 
> design goals and has been tested, with policy which has been merged 
> upstream and is available via Fedora devel.  Please keep the discussion 
> going, but ensure that the final patchset for review and merge 
> consideration is a complete set against the current git kernel coming from 
> one person.

I'm trying :)  When I posted the NetLabel secid support patch last week
I asked Venkat if he could merge it with the main secid patchset (due to
size and dependencies that seemed like the most reasonable course of
action).  For reasons I'm not aware of he chose not to.  As a result I
keep posting updated patches backed against Venkat's latest and
incorporating the latest feedback.

Venkat, can you please merge the latest my latest NetLabel secid support
patch in with your next release?  If not, would you have a problem if I
pushed out a patchset which included your latest patches with the
NetLabel secid support patch and we used this patchset as the basis for
future work?

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp

Re: [PATCH 0/2] [PATCH 0/2] Updated NetLabel/secid-reconciliation bits and a bugfix

[James Morris]

On Wed, 4 Oct 2006, Paul Moore wrote:

> > So, patch 2/2 should go in on it's own against upstream?  If so, in 5B
> > future, please post such patches separately.
> 
> Yes, please commit patch 2/2 regardless as it fixes a bug which is not
> dependent on any of the secid patches which are being discussed.  My
> apologies for including it in the same patchset, I'll be sure to split
> it up next time.

Applied.

http://git.infradead.org/?p=users/jmorris/selinux-2.6.git

(This repo may move soon).


-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>

RE: [PATCH 0/2] [PATCH 0/2] Updated NetLabel/secid-reconciliation bits and a bugfix

[Venkat Yekkirala]

> > As for the rest of the network labeling, please work 
> together with Venkat 
> > and the SELinux developers on a final patchset which meets 
> all of the 
> > design goals and has been tested, with policy which has been merged 
> > upstream and is available via Fedora devel.  Please keep 
> the discussion 
> > going, but ensure that the final patchset for review and merge 
> > consideration is a complete set against the current git 
> kernel coming from 
> > one person.
> 
> I'm trying :)  When I posted the NetLabel secid support patch 
> last week
> I asked Venkat if he could merge it with the main secid 
> patchset (due to
> size and dependencies that seemed like the most reasonable course of
> action).  For reasons I'm not aware of he chose not to.

FYI- I am no NetLabel expert, and the pathset I sent out that day included
the peersid changes. And since you were going to have to post a patch for
that
again, I thought it best you ported and reposted the entire patch again.

>  As a result I
> keep posting updated patches backed against Venkat's latest and
> incorporating the latest feedback.

And let's keep this going like this on the selinux list. When all the
testing is done and selinux ok's the patchsets, I will combine them
and send them onto netdev. How does that sound?

> 
> Venkat, can you please merge the latest my latest NetLabel 
> secid support
> patch in with your next release?

I would, but it currently is premature. As James says, let's
get policy done, the design proven, and tested and then we will
go to netdev with one patchset.

Re: [PATCH 0/2] [PATCH 0/2] Updated NetLabel/secid-reconciliation bits and a bugfix

[Paul Moore]

Venkat Yekkirala wrote:
>>>As for the rest of the network labeling, please work 
>>
>>together with Venkat 
>>
>>>and the SELinux developers on a final patchset which meets 
>>
>>all of the 
>>
>>>design goals and has been tested, with policy which has been merged 
>>>upstream and is available via Fedora devel.  Please keep 
>>
>>the discussion 
>>
>>>going, but ensure that the final patchset for review and merge 
>>>consideration is a complete set against the current git 
>>
>>kernel coming from 
>>
>>>one person.
>>
>>I'm trying :)  When I posted the NetLabel secid support patch 
>>last week
>>I asked Venkat if he could merge it with the main secid 
>>patchset (due to
>>size and dependencies that seemed like the most reasonable course of
>>action).  For reasons I'm not aware of he chose not to.
> 
> 
> FYI- I am no NetLabel expert, and the pathset I sent out that day included
> the peersid changes. And since you were going to have to post a patch for
> that
> again, I thought it best you ported and reposted the entire patch again.

I'm not talking about the peer_sid changes, although I'm glad they are
part of the secid patchset - thank you.  I'm talking about the patch I
keep reposting to include NetLabel is the secid reconciliation path.

There was a secid patchset posted on Thursday (9/28) night, I posted the
a patch on Friday (9/29) to provide NetLabel support.

There was a secid patchset posted on Sunday (10/1) night, I respun the
NetLabel support patch on Monday (10/2) - "v2".

I respun the NetLabel support patch to take into account Stephen
Smalley's comments on Monday (10/2) - "v3".

There was a small update to the secid patches yesterday (10/3) so I
respun the NetLabel support patch (10/4) - "v4".

>> As a result I
>>keep posting updated patches backed against Venkat's latest and
>>incorporating the latest feedback.
>  
> And let's keep this going like this on the selinux list. When all the
> testing is done and selinux ok's the patchsets, I will combine them
> and send them onto netdev. How does that sound?

Yes, the discussion is a good one I don't want to disrupt that.

I would prefer if all of the patches were in one patchset, pushed out by
one person as that would save me from having to respin my patch if all I
need to do is update it for the latest secid patches.  I think that has
value so people can review/test/etc all of the parts as one coherent
patchset.  However, it's ultimately up to you as you are the one working
on the main secid patchset.

>>Venkat, can you please merge the latest my latest NetLabel 
>>secid support
>>patch in with your next release?
>  
> I would, but it currently is premature. As James says, let's
> get policy done, the design proven, and tested and then we will
> go to netdev with one patchset.

I think it's easier to decide on policy, review the design, and test it
all if there is one place/patchset with all of the latest bits/patches.
 Right not it's not that easy with different patches scattered around.

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp