From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: David Miller Subject: Re: RFC: Established connections hash function Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2007 12:04:29 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <20070328.120429.98555893.davem@davemloft.net> References: <200703281129.43783.ak@suse.de> <20070328104505.GA18748@2ka.mipt.ru> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: johnpol@2ka.mipt.ru, nikb@webmaster.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org To: andi@firstfloor.org Return-path: Received: from 74-93-104-97-Washington.hfc.comcastbusiness.net ([74.93.104.97]:36991 "EHLO sunset.davemloft.net" rhost-flags-OK-FAIL-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S965685AbXC1TEa (ORCPT ); Wed, 28 Mar 2007 15:04:30 -0400 In-Reply-To: Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: netdev.vger.kernel.org From: Andi Kleen Date: 28 Mar 2007 16:14:17 +0200 > Evgeniy Polyakov writes: > > > > Jenkins hash is far from being simple to crack, although with some > > knowledge it can be done faster. > > TCP tends to be initialized early before there is anything > good in the entropy pool. Andi, you're being an idiot. You are spewing endless and uninformed bullshit about this secure hash topic, and it must stop now! You obviously didn't even read my patch, because if you did you would have seen that I don't initialize the random seed until MUCH MUCH later _EXACTLY_ to deal with this issue. In my patch the random seed is initialized when the first TCP or DCCP socket is created, at which point we'll have sufficient entropy. So please stop talking such nonsense about this topic.