From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: David Miller Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] [UDP]: fix send buffer check Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2007 03:31:38 -0800 (PST) Message-ID: <20071220.033138.157714241.davem@davemloft.net> References: <47673195.80004@redhat.com> <4767328B.70601@redhat.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, netdev@vger.kernel.org, tyasui@redhat.com, mhiramat@redhat.com, satoshi.oshima.fk@hitachi.com, billfink@mindspring.com, andi@firstfloor.org, johnpol@2ka.mipt.ru, shemminger@linux-foundation.org, yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org, yumiko.sugita.yf@hitachi.com To: haoki@redhat.com Return-path: Received: from 74-93-104-97-Washington.hfc.comcastbusiness.net ([74.93.104.97]:58995 "EHLO sunset.davemloft.net" rhost-flags-OK-FAIL-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754605AbXLTLbj (ORCPT ); Thu, 20 Dec 2007 06:31:39 -0500 In-Reply-To: <4767328B.70601@redhat.com> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: From: Hideo AOKI Date: Mon, 17 Dec 2007 21:38:03 -0500 > This patch introduces sndbuf size check before memory allocation for > send buffer. > > signed-off-by: Satoshi Oshima > signed-off-by: Hideo Aoki ... > diff -pruN net-2.6/net/ipv4/ip_output.c net-2.6-udp-take11a1-p1/net/ipv4/ip_output.c > --- net-2.6/net/ipv4/ip_output.c 2007-12-11 10:54:55.000000000 -0500 > +++ net-2.6-udp-take11a1-p1/net/ipv4/ip_output.c 2007-12-17 14:42:31.000000000 -0500 > @@ -1004,6 +1004,11 @@ alloc_new_skb: > frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i]; > } > } else if (i < MAX_SKB_FRAGS) { > + if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) + PAGE_SIZE > + > 2 * sk->sk_sndbuf) { > + err = -ENOBUFS; > + goto error; > + } > if (copy > PAGE_SIZE) > copy = PAGE_SIZE; > page = alloc_pages(sk->sk_allocation, 0); If we are going to do this, we need to add the same check to skb_append_datato_frags() which is invoked via ip_ufo_append_data(). We also have to be very careful in this area. One problem we had a long time ago was that we would socket account when fragmenting an outgoing frame. This was bogus because even if the socket had enough space for one full sized frame, the packet send would fail because it could not fit the space for both the original frame and the fragmented copy of it. This situation was cured by simply not enforcing accounting for the fragmented copy. It is valid because after we fragment, we keep the fragmented copy but free the original. This doesn't apply directly to this specific patch, but it is something to keep in mind when doing these changes.