From: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
To: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 04/14] selinux: Fix missing calls to netlbl_skbuff_err()
Date: Tue, 02 Sep 2008 20:49:08 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080903004908.15669.36176.stgit@flek.lan> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080903003647.15669.45349.stgit@flek.lan>
At some point I think I messed up and dropped the calls to netlbl_skbuff_err()
which are necessary for CIPSO to send error notifications to remote systems.
This patch re-introduces the error handling calls into the SELinux code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
---
include/net/netlabel.h | 6 ++++--
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 5 +++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
security/selinux/include/netlabel.h | 9 +++++++++
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
5 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 5303749..e16db09 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ int netlbl_sock_getattr(struct sock *sk,
int netlbl_skbuff_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
-void netlbl_skbuff_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error);
+void netlbl_skbuff_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, int gateway);
/*
* LSM label mapping cache operations
@@ -454,7 +454,9 @@ static inline int netlbl_skbuff_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
-static inline void netlbl_skbuff_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error)
+static inline void netlbl_skbuff_err(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ int error,
+ int gateway)
{
return;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index 2a2b8fa..38ee891 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -490,6 +490,7 @@ int netlbl_skbuff_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
* netlbl_skbuff_err - Handle a LSM error on a sk_buff
* @skb: the packet
* @error: the error code
+ * @gateway: true if host is acting as a gateway, false otherwise
*
* Description:
* Deal with a LSM problem when handling the packet in @skb, typically this is
@@ -497,10 +498,10 @@ int netlbl_skbuff_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
* according to the packet's labeling protocol.
*
*/
-void netlbl_skbuff_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error)
+void netlbl_skbuff_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, int gateway)
{
if (CIPSO_V4_OPTEXIST(skb))
- cipso_v4_error(skb, error, 0);
+ cipso_v4_error(skb, error, gateway);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 995488d..35a577c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4093,6 +4093,8 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
return err;
err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, ad);
+ if (err)
+ selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
} else {
err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, ad);
if (err)
@@ -4142,10 +4144,14 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return err;
err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
peer_sid, &ad);
- if (err)
+ if (err) {
+ selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
return err;
+ }
err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
PEER__RECV, &ad);
+ if (err)
+ selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
}
if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
@@ -4370,6 +4376,7 @@ out:
static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
u16 family)
{
+ int err;
char *addrp;
u32 peer_sid;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
@@ -4393,10 +4400,14 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
return NF_DROP;
- if (peerlbl_active)
- if (selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
- peer_sid, &ad) != 0)
+ if (peerlbl_active) {
+ err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
+ peer_sid, &ad);
+ if (err) {
+ selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
return NF_DROP;
+ }
+ }
if (secmark_active)
if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
index 487a7d8..e034d25 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void);
+void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, int gateway);
+
void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
int family);
@@ -63,6 +65,13 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
return;
}
+static inline void void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ int error,
+ int gateway)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(
struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
int family)
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 89b4183..0207bd2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -106,6 +106,24 @@ void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
}
/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_err - Handle a NetLabel packet error
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @error: the error code
+ * @gateway: true if host is acting as a gateway, false otherwise
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * When a packet is dropped due to a call to avc_has_perm() pass the error
+ * code to the NetLabel subsystem so any protocol specific processing can be
+ * done. This is safe to call even if you are unsure if NetLabel labeling is
+ * present on the packet, NetLabel is smart enough to only act when it should.
+ *
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, int gateway)
+{
+ netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, error, gateway);
+}
+
+/**
* selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset - Reset the NetLabel fields
* @ssec: the sk_security_struct
* @family: the socket family
@@ -307,7 +325,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
return 0;
if (nlbl_sid != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
- netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc);
+ netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
return rc;
}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-09-03 0:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-09-03 0:48 [RFC PATCH v4 00/14] Labeled networking patches for 2.6.28 Paul Moore
2008-09-03 0:48 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/14] netlabel: Remove unneeded in-kernel API functions Paul Moore
2008-09-03 0:48 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/14] selinux: Better local/forward check in selinux_ip_postroute() Paul Moore
2008-09-05 8:51 ` James Morris
2008-09-05 21:58 ` Paul Moore
2008-09-03 0:49 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/14] selinux: Fix a problem in security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr() Paul Moore
2008-09-05 8:53 ` James Morris
2008-09-03 0:49 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2008-09-05 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/14] selinux: Fix missing calls to netlbl_skbuff_err() James Morris
2008-09-03 0:49 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/14] smack: " Paul Moore
2008-09-03 0:49 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/14] netlabel: Replace protocol/NetLabel linking with refrerence counts Paul Moore
2008-09-03 0:49 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/14] netlabel: Add a generic way to create ordered linked lists of network addrs Paul Moore
2008-09-03 0:49 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/14] netlabel: Add network address selectors to the NetLabel/LSM domain mapping Paul Moore
2008-09-03 0:49 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/14] netlabel: Add functionality to set the security attributes of a packet Paul Moore
2008-09-05 9:03 ` James Morris
2008-09-03 0:49 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/14] selinux: Set socket NetLabel based on connection endpoint Paul Moore
2008-09-05 9:08 ` James Morris
2008-09-03 0:50 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/14] selinux: Cache NetLabel secattrs in the socket's security struct Paul Moore
2008-09-05 9:12 ` James Morris
2008-09-03 0:50 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/14] netlabel: Changes to the NetLabel security attributes to allow LSMs to pass full contexts Paul Moore
2008-09-05 9:12 ` James Morris
2008-09-03 0:50 ` [RFC PATCH v4 13/14] cipso: Add support for native local labeling and fixup mapping names Paul Moore
2008-09-03 0:50 ` [RFC PATCH v4 14/14] netlabel: Add configuration support for local labeling Paul Moore
2008-09-03 3:48 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/14] Labeled networking patches for 2.6.28 Casey Schaufler
2008-09-03 14:05 ` Paul Moore
2008-09-04 11:44 ` Paul Moore
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