From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] security: introducing security_request_module Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2009 09:03:06 -0500 Message-ID: <20090813140306.GC30731@us.ibm.com> References: <20090813134451.29186.41664.stgit@paris.rdu.redhat.com> <20090813134457.29186.7182.stgit@paris.rdu.redhat.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, davem@davemloft.net, shemminger@linux-foundation.org, kees@ubuntu.com, morgan@kernel.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com, dwalsh@redhat.com To: Eric Paris Return-path: Received: from e1.ny.us.ibm.com ([32.97.182.141]:48781 "EHLO e1.ny.us.ibm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751582AbZHMOLV (ORCPT ); Thu, 13 Aug 2009 10:11:21 -0400 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20090813134457.29186.7182.stgit@paris.rdu.redhat.com> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: Quoting Eric Paris (eparis@redhat.com): > Calling request_module() will trigger a userspace upcall which will load a > new module into the kernel. This can be a dangerous event if the process > able to trigger request_module() is able to control either the modprobe > binary or the module binary. This patch adds a new security hook to > request_module() which can be used by an LSM to control a processes ability > to call request_module(). Is there a specific case in which you'd want to deny this ability from a real task? -serge